



**U.S. Department of
Transportation**

Office of the Secretary
of Transportation

GENERAL COUNSEL

1200 New Jersey Ave. S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20590

May 18, 2011

Catherine A. McMullen, Esq.
Chief, Disclosure Unit
U.S. Office of Special Counsel
1730 M Street, NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 20036-4505

Re: OSC File No. DI-10-2602

Dear Ms. McMullen:

This letter is in response to an email from Karen Gorman, dated March 16, 2011, in which the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) raised questions concerning the Foster II investigation (DI-10-2602). I have enclosed the Department's supplemental report.

OSC Request 1a asks for a copy of "the final report resulting from the investigation in OSC1." Attachment A provides a status report on the 13 items contained in the "implementation Plan" which we provided to OSC in July 2009 with copies of the draft report and draft supplemental report from the OSC I investigation. I am not enclosing the memorandum that I received from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) after OSC closed its investigation. While it addresses allegations raised and FAA's response, the OIG memorandum was done solely for the Department's consideration.

In response to OSC Request 2, the supplemental report refers to an email from Mr. Foster and includes the email in Attachment D. In light of our recent discussions with OSC concerning release of personally identifiable information (PII) on OSC's public file, and on advice of the Department's privacy experts, we have redacted PII from the March 2, 2010, email contained in Attachment D.

If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact Debra Rosen or me.

Sincerely,

Judith S. Kaleta
Assistant General Counsel for General Law

Enclosure



Office of Audit and Evaluation (AAE)
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, DC 20591

**Federal Aviation Administration
Supplemental Report to OSC**

In response to:

U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC)

File DI-10-2602

**Director, Audit and Evaluation (AAE-1)
Federal Aviation Administration**

May 18, 2011

1. Introduction

This document was prepared in response to an e-mail request by Ms. Karen Gorman of the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) to Ms. Judith Kaleta of the Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of General Counsel requesting additional information concerning OSC cases, DI-08-1904 (OSC I) and DI-10-2602 (OSC II). Both OSC cases dealt with allegations by FAA aviation safety inspector (ASI), Rand Foster, of safety issues concerning night vision imaging systems (NVIS) modifications by, and supplemental type certificates (STCs) of, Aviation Systems Unlimited, Inc., (ASU) of Boise, Idaho. NVIS facilitate the use of night vision goggles (NVG), a significant safety enhancement for night-time helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) operations. The DOT assigned responsibility for investigation and response for the e-mail message to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Office of Audit and Evaluation (AAE).

2. OSC Observations, Requests and FAA Supplemental Responses

1. **OSC Observation:** *The report summarizes the history of Mr. Foster's two OSC disclosures referred to DOT on July 8, 2008 (OSC I), and July 9, 2010 (OSC II), and acknowledges that the OSC II referral is based on the same allegations presented in OSC I.*

However, the report does not include a summary of the investigation conducted by FAA and reviewed by DOT's Office of Inspector General in OSC I; nor does it discuss any of the findings, recommendations, or corrective actions resulting from that investigation. The report briefly summarizes the 2008 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) that was initiated prior to the OSC I referral, and then discusses the impetus for the 2010 Audit that was conducted in conjunction with the investigation in OSC II.

Section 2.4 of the report states that after receipt of Mr. Foster's disclosure in OSC I, AFS and AIR regional managers were aware of growing concerns regarding ASU, and that surveillance conducted since completion of the CAP indicated a history of performance issues by ASU in installing NVIS modifications. Thus, a meeting was convened on July 6, 2010, which resulted in specific actions including the 2010 Audit.

FAA Response: The OSC observation above contains the following statement from the OSC II report: "Section 2.4 of the report states that after receipt of Mr. Foster's disclosure in OSC I, AFS (Flight Standards Service) and AIR (Aircraft Certification Service) regional managers were aware of growing concerns regarding ASU." However, the statement above was not intended to convey a comprehensive chronology of FAA responses to the issues associated with the two disclosures or when FAA first became aware of potential problems involving ASU compliance with the STC.

The manager of the Northwest Mountain Flight Standards Division (ANM-200) was aware of ASU repair station issues, and began responding to them earlier than Mr. Foster's OSC I disclosure of July 2008. The manager of the Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD or ANM-100) became aware of AIR related issues with ASU performance shortly after ANM-200, but some time before Mr. Foster's disclosure in OSC I.

OSC Request 1a: *We request a copy of the final report resulting from the investigation conducted in OSC I and information concerning the implementation of any recommended corrective actions resulting from that investigation.*

FAA Response: In response to this request, Attachment A provides a status report on the thirteen items contained in the "implementation Plan" which was provided to OSC in July 2009 with copies of the draft report and draft supplemental report from the OSC I investigation. The Office of General Counsel (OGC) provided these items to OSC as part of its request for a short extension prior to OSC closing the matter on July 30, 2009. The DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG) subsequently prepared a sufficiency review of the FAA reports and submitted its review to OGC, which will respond to your request.

OSC Request 1b: *We also request clarification on the initiation of the 2010 Audit. The report, page 3, states that planning for the 2010 Audit was initiated in March 2010; however, this date appears to be inconsistent with the July 6, 2010, date noted on page 10. Further, it appears from the report that the 2010 Audit has not been completed. Thus, we request information on the status and any additional findings of the 2010 Audit. We also request a copy of any report resulting from the 2010 Audit.*

FAA Response: With regard to 1b, surveillance data were analyzed by the ANM-200 assistant manager, which indicated data quality and ASU repair station performance concerns. In response to the analyses, discussion began between the ANM-100 and ANM-200 assistant managers regarding these data. This led to planning for a more in-depth assessment designed to more clearly identify the issues. This planning, beginning in March 2010, continued through the succeeding months, ultimately leading to a decision to conduct the 2010 Audit in July 2010. Work on Phase 1 of the 2010 Audit was accomplished between August 31 and September 30, 2010. Thus, the OSC II ROI was factual, albeit perhaps unclear, with regard to the activities and the timeline leading up to the 2010 audit.

It should also be noted that Mr. Foster's March 2, 2010, e-mail message to the Associate Administrator and Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS-1 and AVS-2) did have the effect of accelerating the planning and execution of additional surveillance. However, it did not initiate these activities because additional surveillance was already underway.

Phase I results of the 2010 audit were provided in the original ROI transmitted by the Secretary of Transportation to OSC on December 10, 2010. With regard to the completion of the Audit and a status report, see Attachment B for information on the specific findings from Phase 2 of the audit. At the time of the OSC II report, the visual inspections of all Phase 2 aircraft were complete. However, data analyses of those inspections were still underway. Preliminary data were available indicating that some of the earlier findings were not unique to ASU. The data from Phase 2 resulted in changes

to the OSC II Action Plan to the extent that it will lead to FAA policy changes, which will affect the entire NVIS modified fleet. The data analyses for Phase 2 of the 2010 Audit have been completed, and the final results confirmed the preliminary findings.

OSC Request 1c: *In addition, we request information on the status of the corrective actions outlined in the Audit Action Plans in Section 3.2 of the report. We also request a summary of any corrective actions not included in the Audit Action Plans which FAA has taken or plans to take as a result of the findings.*

FAA Response: With regard to 1c., see Attachment C. The Action Plan is also tracked by AAE and will remain an active item through completion on AVS management tracking systems. Within AVS, the AFS Planning and Performance Management Branch, AFS-160, is the lead office for ensuring execution and completion of Action Plan.

2. **OSC Request:** *The report, page 2, states that prior to the OSC II referral, Aviation Safety (AVS) had initiated an investigation of the allegations Mr. Foster raised in his March 2, 2010, e-mail to AVS management. We request additional information concerning that investigation.*

FAA Response: At the request of AVS, ANM-100 and -200 staff prepared a response memorandum dated March 15, 2010, to Mr. Foster's e-mail dated March 2, 2010. Appropriate subject matter experts provided the technical basis for the response. It formed the basis for the reply of AVS-2 to Mr. Foster on March 30, 2010. Please see Attachment D for a copy of the Mr. Foster's e-mail and the ANM-100 and -200 response memorandum.

3. **OSC Request:** *We request clarification of the finding that Notice 8900.51 issued by FAA in September 2008 was proper. The Notice states that "aircraft modified by ASU may have been improperly returned to service, which "may have resulted in incomplete installations, due to incomplete technical data, or unapproved data that was not specific to the aircraft installation." It further states, "Although those ASU modified aircraft may have been improperly returned to service, it is important to note the return to service is valid unless actual safety discrepancies are identified. Therefore an operator is not required to remove an ASU modified aircraft from service based solely on 'missing' or 'incomplete data.'" In addition, the report states that conformity was a long term objective of the 2008 CAP and not a primary objective.*

According to the definition of "airworthy" provided in Appendix B of the report, citing 49 U.S.C. § 44704(c) and 14 CFR § 21.183(a), (b) and (c), two conditions must be met for an aircraft to be airworthy: 1) the product must conform to its type certificate (TC). A product conforms to its TC when its configuration and the components installed are as described in the drawings, specifications, and other data that are part of the TC, which includes any supplemental type certificate . . . and 2) the aircraft must be in a condition for safe operation. In light of these requirements, and given that 14 CFR part 91.7 prohibits the operation of aircraft that are not in an airworthy condition, we request clarification of the basis for determining that Notice 8900.51, advising that operators were not required to remove aircraft from service based solely on missing or 'incomplete data, was not "contrary to any regulations, orders or policies pertaining to airworthiness."

FAA Response: Notice 8900.51 correctly stated FAA policy as applied to the situation presented by the ASU modified helicopters. That is, even if a return to service was approved in the presence of incorrect or missing data, the return to service was legal and proper, absent legal action by the FAA to suspend or revoke an airworthiness certificate. Questions or concerns regarding detailed conformity with the type design do not automatically equate to an “unairworthy” or unsafe condition. Conformity issues could be trivial or they could be significant. The FAA is required to obtain specific evidence that the condition is disqualifying and unsafe beyond all reasonable doubt. In fact, due process requires the FAA to produce detailed evidence showing that an aircraft is “unairworthy” before action can be taken against the airworthiness certificate of an aircraft, resulting in grounding the aircraft.

Nonetheless, the FAA was aware of some probability that some ASU modified aircraft may have had incorrect or missing data, which could have made the return to service improper in some cases. Based on experience, the FAA anticipated the situation that some number of NVIS modified helicopters might be grounded by their operators if the FAA took an aggressive stance towards possible incorrect or missing data. It is important to keep in mind that missing or incomplete data does not necessarily imply that an aircraft is unsafe. However, it was very clear that the grounding of a large percentage of the ASU-modified fleet would have had a significant deleterious effect on the safety of the public due to the unavailability of HEMS or NVG-aided night and low visibility operations for the emergency transport of critically injured or ill patients. Therefore, based upon the information available at that time, the FAA decided that confirmation of NVIS system “conformity” (defined by no missing or incomplete data) should not be the primary consideration, in light of the circumstances, and began seeking a more comprehensive solution to the concerns identified.

In retrospect, the decision to not aggressively pursue NVIS conformity determinations can be legitimately questioned, but the fact remains that the safety consequences of grounding a large percentage of the HEMS fleet was considered to be a much larger safety issue. Thus, the FAA stands by the decision to allow those aircraft to remain in operation, while corrective action was pursued, because of the greater public good.

4. **OSC Request:** *The report substantiates the allegation that while helicopters may now be deemed to conform to their STCs, they have not been physically evaluated to determine whether the lights and filters previously installed without approved data are correctly positioned, are compatible with NVG use, and do not impede the pilot’s ability to see the instruments and radios in normal night and day situations or while using the goggles. In light of this, and the numerous potential safety findings from the 2010 Audit, we request clarification and additional information concerning FAA’s determination that the issuance of an AD was not appropriate in this case. Could the safety concerns associated with grounding entire fleets have been addressed in the AD? We further request additional information concerning the safety analysis conducted by FAA, noted on page 15, which formed the basis for the finding that “there is no analytical justification to substantiate that a potential safety hazard exists, which is unique to ASU NVIS installations.”*

FAA Response: With regard to a physical evaluation of each helicopter by AVS, notice N 8900.51 required that principal inspectors of operators “...ensure that the operator

conforms the aircraft to the new data.” In hindsight, AVS accepts that the notice did not achieve its intended effect. Had the notice required follow-up verification actions by a specified date, it would likely have been more successful. Learning from experience, OSC II Action Plan item 5.a. and the planned notice (draft number N 8900.NVIS) required by item 5.a. will require that all ASU modified aircraft receive an NVIS inspection by Flight Standards ASIs within 180 days of N 8900.NVIS release.

With regard to the issuance of an AD, the FAA must follow Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. Subsection 39.5 states the “FAA issues an airworthiness directive addressing a product when we find that:

- (a) An unsafe condition exists in the product; and
- (b) the condition is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.”

It is important to note that an AD only affects aircraft with known, unsafe conditions, but it does not necessarily apply to an entire fleet. In addition, the concept of a “fleet” has questionable relevance when applied to HEMS helicopters. There is far more variation between individual HEMS aircraft than is found, for example, in large aircraft air carrier fleets, where aircraft configurations are far more standardized. In helicopter manufacturing, even sequentially-produced helicopters have marked differences in equipment and instrument installations. This is further compounded as operators acquire aircraft individually (frequently from other operators) resulting in changes to the “as manufactured” configurations. The result is that it is common for no two helicopters utilized by a given operator to be identical.

With regard to the request for additional information concerning the safety analysis conducted by FAA, Attachment E is a PowerPoint presentation of the conclusions by Ms. Ann Azededo, Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor, Safety Analysis, Aviation Safety. A separate report did not accompany the PowerPoint presentation.

5. **OSC Request:** *With respect to any inspections of modified helicopters conducted by FAA, we request information on how FAA is able to determine that the filters installed on instruments and radios were the proper part numbers and proper colors during inspections. (1) What criteria are used for visual tests? (2) Are the helicopters tested with goggles in night conditions for a final installation check? (3) If not, how is the aircraft actually determined to be in full compliance with the approved data?*

FAA Response: In order for an ASI to make an accurate determination of what filters are to be installed on instruments and radios as part of a modification, the ASI would refer to the approved STC data package to establish specific part number applicability.

As part of an approved NVIS installation, the installer is required to complete a day and night readability inspection in accordance with the approved STC. The checklist used incorporates checks for day and night-time conditions and becomes part of the STC installation documents. A conformity inspection of the installation ensures the aircraft is in full compliance.

6. **OSC Request:** *The report and Audit Action Plans discuss increased monitoring and surveillance of*

ASU in light of the substantial non-conformance and non-compliance findings of the 2010 Audit. It is our understanding, however, that ASU was already under heightened surveillance after it surrendered its certificate, in lieu of revocation, for falsification of documents in April 2008 and was re-certified by FAA one month later. In light of FAA's knowledge of ASU's continued deficiencies in NVIS installation, failure to produce compliant and/or conforming modifications and deficiencies in the data packages, we request additional information concerning FAA's oversight and surveillance activities for ASU following its re-certification and prior to the 2010 Audit. We also request information concerning the recent investigation initiated by FAA's Civil Aviation Security Office concerning the Boise FSDO and its oversight and certification of ASU.

FAA Response: ASU did not surrender its certificate in lieu of revocation. The ASU repair station certificate was revoked by the FAA, with immediate effect, on April 29, 2008. The repair station was re-certificated on May 29, 2008.

For information on FAA's oversight and surveillance activities for ASU, see Attachment F. It shows that 113 ASU repair station surveillance and 43 closely-related activities occurred between June 2008 and August 2010. This is several times the minimum surveillance activity requirements for a repair station of ASU's complexity.

The Office of Security and Hazardous Materials (ASH) conducted an investigation into a complaint that alleged "there was a conspiracy by the FAA against ASU," likely stimulated by heightened FAA surveillance as a result of issues identified in OSC I and OSC II. A Report of Investigation was subsequently provided to AAE on April 20, 2011. The investigation failed to substantiate those allegations. The heightened surveillance of ASU was justified in light of the issues identified with ASU-modified NVIS aircraft.

A second and entirely separate ASH investigation was conducted based upon charges that Boise FSDO management sought to interfere with the above-referenced investigation. All FAA Boise FSDO employees with knowledge of ASU certificate management functions were interviewed by a team of ASH investigators assembled from outside of the FAA region which manages the Boise FSDO.

The Boise FSDO Manager admitted to asking for copies of the statements to ASH from employees under his supervision, and he was requested to do so by the Acting Assistant ANM Regional Manager. Both management officials admitted, in retrospect, that they should not have made such a request, but they stated they did so because they thought at the time that the statements might be useful for future enforcement reasons. Both denied allegations that they were trying to interfere with the investigation, but they both further admitted that their actions could have had that appearance. However, the requests did not result in the alteration of any statements supplied to ASH, as the statements were compared, and the majority of them had already been submitted prior to his request.

The FSDO Manager then verbally suggested to some, and in writing to other, FAA employees, who supplied statements, that they delete the statements from their FSDO computers. Some complied as directed although at that point all statements were already

in ASH custody. He said he did so "to protect his employees from future lawsuits and FOIA requests." In summary, while some statements were deleted from certain individual employees' computers, no statements were actually destroyed or altered, and they remain in the custody of ASH.

No records pertaining to FAA surveillance of ASU were destroyed, and there was never any direction to do so by any FAA manager or employee. The directive pertained only to the ASH statements collected in conjunction with the previous investigation on allegations that FAA was conspiring against ASU. It should also be noted that there was a "document hold order" put into effect by AGC in 2008 at the time of the Foster I OSC referral for all ASU documents, and that order remains in place.

The actions of both managers are currently under review for potential personnel action or management counseling, as appropriate.

7. **OSC Request:** *The report substantiates several of Foster's allegations, including finding:*
1. *many helicopters were improperly returned to service with field approvals contrary to FAA policy and directives;*
 2. *in 2007 and 2008 approximately 160 helicopters were returned to service with approvals inaccurately indicating that the NVIS modifications conformed to the specifications of the STCs;*
 3. *the 2010 Audit confirmed that this problem persists and similar discrepancies may exist in the entire ASU-modified fleet;*
 4. *the 2008 CAP failed to adequately address the non-compliance problem and there was no effective systemic approach to ensuring conformity;*
 5. *Notice 8900.51 issued by FAA lacked sufficient accountability and tracking to ensure that inspections were conducted; and,*
 6. *while the helicopters may now be deemed to conform to their STCs, they have not been physically evaluated to determine whether the lights and filters previously installed without approved data are correctly positioned, compatible with NVG use, and do not impede the pilot's ability to see the instruments and radios in normal night and day situations or while using the goggles.*
 7. *The 2010 Audit findings revealed that all 29 helicopters inspected had non-compliances and/or non-conformances, and that 51 of the 278 findings are potential safety findings; and*
 8. *AFS oversight of operator maintenance and alteration is inadequate.*

In light of these findings, we are concerned by the report's finding that the investigation did not substantiate any form of wrongdoing that formed the basis for OSC's referral -- i.e., a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement or an abuse of authority. We are therefore requesting clarification of this finding.

FAA Response: Finding 1 is addressed and closed in section 1.7 of the OSC II report. The inspector involved received a five-day suspension, and the managers involved received appropriate impacts on their pay-for-performance payouts. Findings 2 and 3 were caused by operators and industry personnel failing to comply with regulatory requirements, and ASIs failing to perform adequate surveillance and oversight of the process. Findings 4 and 5 were previously discussed in the answer to question 3. Finding 6 will be resolved in OSC II Action Plan, items 4.a., which will require a conformity inspection by an ASI. With regard to finding 7, of the fifty-one (51)

potential safety findings, only one (1) met the requirements for issuance of an AD. Of the remaining fifty (50), nine (9) were attributed to ASU as the STC holder, resulting in a letter of investigation and the actions described in OSC II Action Plan item 2. Forty-one (41) were attributable to operators and fifteen (15) to the ASU repair station.¹ Each of the fifty (50) items resulted in notice to the appropriate field office for processing under the FAA's standard regulatory enforcement process. These issues resulted from failures by regulated parties. Finding 8 will be resolved by OSC II Action Plan item 4.b., 4.e., 5.b., 6.c and 7.

¹ As noted in the description of finding 1 in the OSC II Action Plan, some findings and potential safety findings are associated with multiple entries.

Attachment A

OSC Implementation Plan
Recommendations From FAA's Investigative Report on OIG Complaint 08IH-B66-1-000 and OSC File No. DI-080-1904

Recommendation	Office	Milestone	Comments	Date Complete
<p>1. Flight Standards and Aircraft Certification must keep the corrective action plan on schedule</p>	ANM-100 ANM-200	10/31/2008	Corrective action plan completed on schedule.	10/30/2008
<p>2. Clarify and strengthen Flight Standards policy on not using field approvals to NVIS with a change to FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standards Information Management System, volume 4, chapter 9, section 1, Perform Field Approval of Major Repairs and Alterations.</p>	AFS-300	12/31/2009	Update 4/14/11 – In figure 4-68, Major Alteration Job Aid, of the field approval chapter (8900.1, volume 4, chapter 9, section 1), it states no field approval for NVG. NVG requires an STC. This guidance was already in 8900.1, prior to this recommendation.	Completed
<p>3. Expand Flight Standards policy on the issuance of NVIS operations specifications to include airworthiness and avionics coordination with a change to FAA Order 8900.1, volume 4, chapter 7, section 4, Night Vision Imaging Systems.</p> <p>a. Review the content of the expired notice on NVIS and incorporate the expired guidance permanently into Order 8900.1</p>	AFS-300	12/31/2009	Update 4/14/11 – Instead of initiating a change to 8900.1, volume 4, chapter 7, section 4, AFS-300 developed a new 8900.1 volume/chapter/section for the issuance of NVIS operations specifications with airworthiness and avionics coordination. AFS-300 completed the new draft for 8900.1, volume 6, chapter 11, section 22, in December 2010. The document is in the coordination phase and should go out for formal coordination in April 2011. Expect publication by the 10/15/11 due date.	In progress
<p>4. Initiate rulemaking to disallow immediate recertification of repair stations whose certificates have been revoked or surrendered as a result of intent to revoke.</p> <p>a. Until completion of rulemaking change Flight Standards policy in 8900.1 to require a risk assessment on a revoked repair station if it reapplies for certification less than a year after revocation of surrender of its certificate</p>	AFS-300	6/30/2012	AFS-300 is issuing interim guidance as a notice. Expect publication of the notice by the 7/15/11 due date. NPRM has been developed and is in internal FAA coordination	
<p>5. Limit the number of people involved in a special or sensitive project to reduce delays and confusion and expedite arriving at a consensus solution.</p>	AFS-300	12/31/2009		
<p>6. For operators whose aircraft have NVIS installations—regardless of who did the modification—</p>	AVS	Continuous		

OSC Implementation Plan
Recommendations From FAA's Investigative Report on OIG Complaint 08IH-B66-I-000 and OSC File No. DI-080-1904

Recommendation Office	Milestone	Comments	Date Complete
<p>FAA should require operators to conduct an annual conformity inspection to assure that any subsequent modifications have not invalidated the NVIS modification.</p> <p>a. Operators could incorporate this conformity inspection into the annual inspection required by 14 CFR section 91.409</p> <p>b. FAA inspectors could confirm operator actions during scheduled surveillance, focusing on HEMS aircraft when they are not on operational assignment or are out of service for scheduled maintenance.</p>	<p>AFS-200 12/31/2009</p> <p>AFS-200 12/31/2009</p>	<p>The recommendation is superseded by the actions required to implement NVIS Action Plan, items 4.a., 5.a.-c. and 6.a.-c.</p>	<p>Various see NVIS Action Plan items 4a., 5a.-c., and 6a.-c.</p>
<p>7. Review existing NVIS training for inspectors and determine the need to improve that training.</p> <p>a. Consider adding system safety approaches (distinguishing genuine safety concerns, risk management, etc.) to oversight of all aspects of NVIS.</p>	<p>AFS-300 AFS-500 AFS-300</p> <p>12/31/2009 09/30/2011 12/31/2009</p>	<p><u>AFS-300</u>: Update 4/14/11 -- AFS-300 submitted a Training Development Request to AFS-500 on 6/18/10. The NVIS course is being developed. The course prototype should be available in October 2011 (date moved due to cancellation of critical workgroup meeting due to possible government shutdown).</p> <p><u>AFS-500</u>: Received the Training Development Request from AFS-300 in June of 2010 (TDR#10-300-10). Following the development of guidance/notices, the new course is on schedule for completion in September 2011.</p>	<p>In Progress</p>
<p>8. Consider having the Rotorcraft Directorate issue all rotorcraft STCs versus the closest ACO.</p> <p>a. At a minimum ASW-100 should coordinate on and participate in all issuances of rotorcraft STCs by other ACOs.</p>	<p>AIR-1 AIR-1</p> <p>12/31/2009 12/31/2009</p>	<p><u>AIR</u> (as reported on 04/21/11): We have considered this recommendation, however, this procedure would be contrary to the organizational construct for the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR). AIR provides project oversight primarily based on geographic service areas. AIR procedures do include project notifications to the Directorate with product responsibility. Accordingly ASW receives project notices on rotorcraft projects to provide standardization and ensure novel design features</p>	



**OSC Implementation Plan
Recommendations From FAA's Investigative Report on OIG Complaint 08IH-B66-I-000 and OSC File No. DI-080-1904**



Recommendation Office	Milestone	Comments	Date Complete
		are being properly addressed.	
9. Use the events regarding ASU-modified aircraft as a case study on how to improve coordination and communication between and within each other when addressing new technologies.	AFS-1 AIR-1 6/30/2010		
10. Evaluate using the Minimum Equipment List as a method to address NVIS malfunctions or when subsequent cockpit modifications may have invalidated the NVIS STC to allow continued HEMS operations until a conformity inspection, as recommended in Number 6 above.	AFS-300 12/31/2009	Update 4/14/11 – MMEL policy letter #127 was published on 6/7/10.	06/07/10
11. To heighten the credibility of the photographs used for evaluating conformity, consider certifying copies of digital photographs as true copies when using them to determine if full or partial evaluations of NVIS modified cockpits are necessary before issuance of an STC.	ANM-100 ANM-200 OBE	Because the CAP is complete, this recommendation is moot. However, ANM-100 and ANM-200 should prepare a report for AFS-1 and AIR-1, as well as, AVS-1, outline how they used photographs to determine conformity, how they determined the photographs were accurate, and photography can be used in future such instances. This evaluation could be completed by 12/31/2009	
12. Consider the possibility of a one-time special emphasis inspection of ASU modifications after completion of the corrective action plan. a. Flight Standards could sample a percentage of aircraft from ASU's 14 CFR part 135 customers (available on ASU's Web site) and validate the results.	AFS-300 10/31/2009	Update 4/14/11 – A special emphasis team was commissioned on September 1, 2010 to perform this inspection. The team completed their inspection on October 31, 2010. The findings led to the creation of an action plan that generated a series of steps to correct the shortcomings in the NVIS community. The action items are being worked by the responsible organizations.	10/31/10
13. Refer the falsification issue (ASU former director of maintenance) to the OIG for criminal investigation	ANM-200 7/31/2009	Referred to ANM-700, Aviation Security and Hazardous Materials Division, for further referral to the OIG.	3/2010

Attachment B


Phase 2 Audit Findings

The following bar charts indicate the Phase 2 Audit findings associated with the audit. The charts indicate there was a total of 14 helicopters inspected resulting in 142 findings. The final two bar charts indicate Phase 2 vs. Phase 1 by finding category.






Findings Categories - Phase 2



Findings Categories - Phase 1



Attachment C

2010 Audit Detailed Findings and Action Plans

Finding 1

Of the 29 aircraft inspected (with findings validated) to date, all aircraft had non-compliances and/or non-conformances

- There were installation conformity errors found on all aircraft inspected
- There are currently 278 findings of which 51 (18%) are potential safety findings. *Some findings and potential safety findings are associated with multiple entities. Therefore, aggregate percentages may exceed 100%.*
 - o There are 9 STC Holder (ASU) potential safety findings (3% of the overall findings, 18% of the potential safety findings)
 - o There are 41 operator potential safety findings (16% of the overall findings, 80% of the potential safety findings)
 - o There are 13 installer (ASU) potential safety issues (5% of the overall findings, 25% of the potential safety findings)
- ASU currently has 119 STC holder findings and 72 installer findings (55% of the overall findings)
- Operators currently have 155 findings (45% of the overall findings)

Action Plan 1	Due	Primary Office	Status
a. Appropriate FSDO PIs will formally notify operators of the findings and will track all findings through completion of action.	1 a. (1) On receipt by PIs 1 a (2) 12/31/2010 (60 days)	CHDO	1 a. (1): ANM-200 confirmed via telephone or email that all operators were notified. 1 a. (2): no reliable information available to show that PIs were tracking all findings as the operator addressed them, but see 1b to show that corrective actions have been completed.
b. AFS Technical Standards Branches will follow-up with notified PIs to confirm corrective actions complete	Monthly thereafter until complete	Regional -230 branches	All air carrier corrective actions reported complete by PI or office leadership. One public category operator declined to share corrective actions or root cause analysis information.
c. SACO will notify ASU of all type design issues	11/14/2010 (30 days)	SACO	Completed on 10/20/2010 with the issue of LOI # 2010NMM560001
d. SACO will evaluate STC related potential safety findings using existing COS process	11/14/2010 (30 days)	SACO	COS Process Completed 11/10/2010 (There was one safety issue for TOT Post Light issue. There will be an ASU Service Bulletin for initial compliance, with follow-up AD issued)

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Finding 2

There are numerous drawing/documentation errors and ambiguities which may have contributed to non-conformance/non-compliance

- Failures to thoroughly assess filtration requirements led to design omissions (e.g. components not lighted in NVIS mode, lights not filtered)
- Numerous cases of document errors (e.g. ICAs, Master Drawing Lists)
 - o Recurring issues related to design and installation processes (e.g. radar altimeter Decision Height light filters coming off in service)

Action Plan 2	Due	Primary Office	Status
a. Formally notify ASU of the inaccuracies found in documents during the audit.	12/13/2010 (60 days)	SACO	This item was completed on 10/20/2010 with the issue of LOI # 2010NM560001.
1. Require ASU to provide root cause analyses for the issues found to reduce the overall error rate.	4/27/2011 (180 days)	SACO	Complete – February 1, 2011. ASU has submitted their root cause to the Seattle ACO and are writing procedures as part of their LOI response.
2. ASU to define how it will incorporate the root cause corrective action(s) for the drawing and document errors into all of its modified aircraft, not just the aircraft in the audit.	4/27/2011 (180 days)	SACO	This item is in work with ASU. They are on a second iteration of their root cause corrective action document. Complete – April 15, 2011 - SACO has accepted ASU's definition on how they will incorporate their corrective action into their system. ASU is in the process of formalizing the written process for SACO approval.
3. Corrective action must address the inadequate pre-assessment process and how it will be improved.	10/15/2011 (12 months)	SACO	This item is in work with ASU.
b. SACO to monitor ASU's performance and provide follow-up management through Action Plan 3.	Started and Continuous	SACO	This item is in work by SACO and will continue through completion of Action Plan Item 3d.
c. Send the TSO policy clarification memorandum (AIR-100 dated 9/28/10) to all ACOs/MIDOs via email with explanation.	11/14/2010 (30 days)	AIR-100	Memo completed in September 2010.
d. SACO to work with the Rotorcraft Directorate to standardize drawing marking requirements for modified Technical Standard Order (TSO) articles; as part of the detailed corrective action, previously approved STC	10/15/2011 (12 months)	SACO	The initial process to communicate this action plan has started via email between SACO and the Rotorcraft Directorate and it is in work.

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<p>drawings must be reviewed to ensure they require marking of modified TSO articles per FAA Order 8150.1.</p>			
<p>e. AIR and AFS to develop an NVIS installation conformity checklist.</p>	<p>1/15/2011 (3 months)</p>	<p>Seattle MIDO</p>	<p>There are two separate checklists associated with this action item. The initial AIR checklist was completed on 1/28/2011. The AIR checklist was part of this action plan to enable ASU's STC conformity process to continue and ability to work issues that surfaced with audit aircraft in the field.</p>

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Finding 3

The minor change process does not consistently produce compliant/conforming aircraft

Action Plan 3	Due	Primary Office	Status
a. Terminate the minor change authority in the PSP. All ASU certification activities will be managed by the SACO.	10/15/2010/	ANM-100	Completed by 10/15/2010
b. Increase the level of involvement of FAA engineers and inspectors in future ASU projects. Add one additional engineer to project.	Started and ongoing.	SACO	Additional engineer added to the project. This item is in work by SACO and will continue through completion of Action Plan Item 3d.
c. Increase level of designee supervision for designees associated with ASU projects	Started and ongoing	SACO	This item is in work by SACO/MIDO and will continue through completion of Action Plan Item 3d.
d. Evaluate ASU's performance prior to considering re-issuance of minor change authority in the PSP. Minor change authority will not be re-issued until ASU develops and implements specific procedures to reliably produce complete and compliant STCs.	Started and ongoing	SACO	This action plan item is in work. The onus for the re-issue of the PSP resides with ASU. This action plan item will not be completed until the culmination of all other appropriate Action plan items (contained in 1, 2, & 3 above) are completed. The appropriate ANM, AIR and AFS offices are working together to determine what other objective evidence ASU must present to the FAA to enable us to reinstitute the PSP Minor Change authority and to cease the currently required 100% conformity inspection requirements levied on ASU.

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Finding 4

AFS oversight of operator maintenance/alteration is inadequate

- There is no standard process between CHDOs and the SACO for communicating issues with ASU STCs

Action Plan 4	Due	Primary Office	Status
a. Issue interim guidance to AFS PIs to require confirmation that OpSpecs paragraph D093 contents are correct, that operators are properly implementing ICA requirements for both aircraft NVIS equipment and goggles, and that NVIS equipped aircraft continue to meet type design requirements by conforming aircraft with NVIS STC data and other type design change data occurring after NVIS modification.	11/15/2010 (30 days)	AFS	Completed by the memo issued by AFS-300 on December 3.
b. Prescribe actions to ensure an effective and immediate surveillance plan is in place for NVIS modified aircraft.	11/15/2010 (30 days)	AFS	Completed by the memo issued by AFS-300 on December 3.
c. Establish an interim procedure for sharing potential safety findings with the appropriate certificate managing ACO.	11/15/2010 (30 days)	AFS and AIR	Completed by the memo issued by AFS-300 on December 3.
d. Establish a standard process between CHDOs, the ASW AEG and the SACO for communicating issues with ASU STCs	4/15/2012 (18 months)	AFS	Split this action item into two parts, the second one dependent upon the results from the first one. 4 d (1) – The AEG will evaluate existing and planned communication procedures. Due by March 2011. 4 d (2) – AFS-300 will draft guidance, if required, based on the findings of the evaluation. If required, draft guidance due 4/15/12.
e. Add inspection requirements to FY 2012 National Program Guidelines.	10/15/2011 (12 months)	AFS	- 4 e (1) – AFS-300 - Furnish draft NPG language to AFS-900 for inspection requirements for FY 2010 NPG. Completed February 2011. - 4 e (2) – AFS-900 to publish NVIS inspection requirements in FY12. NPG Order by 10/15/11.

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Finding 5

Operators failed to preserve the NVIS compatible configuration of their aircraft

- Changing the configuration of the flight deck after STC modification without consideration of the NVG compatibility of the individual components

Action Plan 5	Due	Primary Office	Status
a. Issue interim guidance to ASIs to ensure that operators properly implement ICA requirements addressing the maintenance of the NVIS compatible configuration.	7/15/2011 (9 months)	AFS	Action will be complete upon publication of notice on special emphasis inspection of NVIS installations. The notice is on track for publication by the due date.
b. Publish a revision to FAA Order 8900.1 to formally provide NVIS oversight guidance	10/15/2011 (12 months)	AFS	Action will be complete upon publication of the promised change to the 8900.1 handbook. AFS-300 completed the new draft for 8900.1, volume 6, chapter 11, section 22, in December 2010. The document is in the coordination phase. Expect publication by the 10/15/11 due date.
c. Issue guidance to operators to increase awareness of regulatory requirements to maintain NVG compatibility	4/15/2011 (6 months)	AFS	Completed by publication of SAFO 10022, dated 12/15/10, on maintenance of NVIS.
d. Initiate a working group between the Rotorcraft Directorate, AFS and Industry (e.g., Helicopter Association International) to develop educational material that communicates the importance of maintaining NVG compatibility and possible venue FAASTeam presentations.	4/15/2011 (6 months)	AFS	The working group is established. POC needs to enter the ongoing meeting dates in the target. This action item is owned by the FAASTeam.

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Finding 6

Operators are not properly maintaining NVIS components

- Operators are failing to follow inspection processes (e.g. daily inspections and failure to follow ICAs)
- ICAs generally lack clarity and specificity

Action Plan 6	Time Line	Primary Office	Status
a. Issue interim guidance to ASIs to ensure that operators properly implement ICA requirements addressing the maintenance of the NVIS configuration	7/15/2011 (9 months)	AFS	Action will be complete upon publication of notice on special emphasis inspection of NVIS installations. The notice is on track for publication by the due date.
b. Issue guidance to operators to increase awareness of regulatory requirements for maintenance.	4/15/2011 (6 months)	AFS	Completed by publication of SAFO 10022, dated 12/15/10, on maintenance of NVIS
c. Develop and implement an AFS surveillance program to ensure continuing compliance with required NVIS inspections.	10/15/2011 (12 months)	AFS	Split into two parts – one for AFS-900, the other AFS-300. - 6c(1) – AFS-300 - Furnished draft NPG language to AFS-900 for inspection requirements for FY 2010 NPG in February 2011. Completed. - 6c(2) – AFS-900 - Publish NVIS inspection requirements in FY12 in NPG order. Publish by 10/15/11.
d. Charter a work group to develop guidance for ICAs	4/15/2011 (6 months)	AFS and AIR	The group agreed that AIR has the lead on this action item, as ICAs are specific to installation documents. This action item is complete because have already chartered the work group. Please confirm if the POC is Kevin Brane, AIR-113.
e. Add an ASI to the Rotorcraft AEG staff specifically dedicated to the review of ICAs for initial and amended NVIS STCs.	4/15/2011 (6 months)	AFS-100 and ASW-200/201A	Update as of 4/19/2011: Currently using an existing AEG inspector to perform the function until the new position is filled. In this regard, the Southwest Region has already approved the position at the Regional Human Council Committee (HCC) level. Also, ASW-210 staff posted the position announcement (closed on

2010 Audit Detailed Findings and Action Plans

			<p>April 04, 2011) and received the candidate register from Human Resources (April 18, 2011). Interviews are now being scheduled. Once the selection is made, the selection will be forwarded to the HCC for approval and subsequent processing by AFS-1 and AVS-1. As of this date, the recent hiring freeze appears ready to be lifted so the selection and hiring process can be completed for this new position.</p>
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2010 Audit Detailed Findings and Action Plans

Finding 7
 There is insufficient knowledge among AFS PIs and operators regarding NVIS-related maintenance procedures
 - Special emphasis inspection results demonstrate a need for additional training/guidance

Action Plan 7	Time Line	Primary Office	Status
a. Develop and present appropriate briefings to improve ASI knowledge among the PIs for the 35 air carriers with NVIS authorization.	1/15/2011 (90 days)	AFS	AFS-300 - The national NVIS briefings were conducted in February 2011.
b. Develop and present appropriate training and support material to improve ASI knowledge.	10/15/2012 (24 months)	AFS	7b(1) – Form workgroup and develop course outline by 4/30/10. The first meeting of the NVIS training development workgroup took place January 25-27. Developed the course outline in February 2011. Complete 7b(2) – Complete training course prototype by 8/31/11. The course prototype should be available in October 2011. Delay due to cancellation of key workgroup meeting that was cancelled due to the possible government shutdown. 7b(3) – Training course available to field personnel.
c. Develop appropriate guidance for operators (e.g., SAFO, AC)	4/15/2011 (6 months for SAFO)	AFS	Completed by publication of SAFO 10022, dated 12/15/10, on maintenance of NVIS.

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Finding 8

OpsSpec paragraph D093 (HNVGO Maintenance Program) is not being effectively used to require appropriate maintenance

- AFS guidance for issuance of OpsSpec paragraph D093 is inadequate
- Currently issued OpsSpec paragraphs D093 do not always include requirements for maintenance of the NVGs and NVIS modified aircraft
- OpsSpec paragraph D093 is unclear

Action Plan 8		Time Line	Primary Office	Status
a.	Clarify AFS guidance for issuance of OpsSpec paragraph D093	7/15/2011 (9 months)	AFS	AFS-300 drafted a notice that clarifies AFS guidance for issuance of OpSpec paragraph D093, and we have revised the OpSpecs. The notice is on track for publication by the due date.
b.	Develop and implement an AFS surveillance program to ensure compliance with the existing and revised OpsSpec paragraph D093	7/15/2011 (9 months)	AFS	AFS-300 drafted a notice that clarifies AFS guidance for issuance of OpSpec paragraph D093. The notice is on track for publication by the due date.
c.	Clarify the language in OpsSpec paragraph D093.	4/15/2012 (18 months)	AFS	Completed draft revision to OpSpecs paragraph D093. The revised OpSpecs will be published at the same time as the notice.
d.	Revise OpsSpec paragraph D093 to better describe operator duties to maintain the NVIS equipment on their aircraft.	4/15/2012 (18 months)	AFS	Will issue the revised OpSpecs paragraph D093 concurrent with publication of the notice. Expect publication of the notice by 7/31/11.

Attachment D

Request for Investigation and Resolution

Rand L Foster

ANM-230, Technical Standards Branch GA

to: Peggy Gilligan, John
Hickey

03/02/2010 10:22 AM

Cc: [REDACTED]

History: This message has been replied to and forwarded.

Peggy and John,

With all due respect, I make the following statement:

In May 2008, I provided a whistleblower complaint to the OSC and DOT/OIG concerning installation of night vision supplemental lighting systems (NVIS) in HEMS helicopters by Aviation Specialties Unlimited (ASU). The action was taken due to frustration with division leadership and overt actions to circumvent laws and regulatory requirements. The complaint did not concern ASU as much as the collusion in the FAA to cover up the issues and to falsify documents in the process. I have attached a copy of the ruling by OSC for your convenience.

I believe that I acted in a manner that the public would expect in any government employee to protect their trust and safety. As a result, I have received requests from inspectors over the past two years as they wanted to know of my experiences. Those requests were for guidance concerning the personal effects and costs of a whistleblower complaint, the effects of complaining to their management about other managers and offices, my technical expertise on the subject, and what protocols might be effective. I want to let you know that my decisions are not and have not been taken lightly or with malice even though I have had occasional nightmares with cold sweats questioning what I have done with my career after watching the horrors experienced by others that filed whistleblower complaints.

However, the situation cannot go on.

I was aware that the Seattle ACO retroactively approved many data packages to "make" installations legal in the time leading up to 2008 just to keep HEMS flying. I was aware that [REDACTED], an assistant to [REDACTED], had been given a special assignment with a regional specialist to go forth and evaluate old installations and new ones as the company continued its tradition while the assignment was contrary to good judgement that would have directed the responsible offices to require immediate compliance rather than attempting to continue region level management of the certificate. Let me elaborate that the tradition of ASU means that it performs an installation then has data approved because of production needs, it performs installations without approved data hoping they would not get caught, or it performs the installation haphazardly and contrary to the data. Unfortunately, the data that was/is approved in most instances was manipulated to meet the requirements by ASU and/or the FAA although the installation was not compliant with that data.

Over time I have received knowledge about many new non-compliant installations. I

referred the informers to the appropriate parties for resolution with no resolution. The pencil whipping paperwork in SACO has continued. The company has continued to perform below regulatory requirements and I will assert that this has happened with the full knowledge of management individuals at great cost to the integrity of the FAA and the trust of its employees and the public.

Currently, there are several enforcement cases open against ASU. At least one case is for falsification. This is a real problem since the original falsification issues were not properly referred to OIG as they should have been in 2007 by management. The situation is not excusable. The FAA has not performed its duties or "made the right decisions even though no one is watching".

Let me add, that I have never prescribed to the notion that HEMS aircraft be grounded because of bad NVIS installations. The original voluntary groundings by operators in 2008 were not excusable and done because operators obtained knowledge that their aircraft were not airworthy and feared FAA retribution. The FAA has been irresponsible at the headquarters level by failing to provide guidance that describes the risks, mitigates those risks until compliance, and sets a firm date for full compliance. [REDACTED] issued a notice that went so far as to say that even though the aircraft were not airworthy it was OK to go ahead and operate. I do not know if that irresponsibility stems from bad business practices and decisions or from the failure of the division managers to be truthful with their briefings on the subject. In any event, the result as one phrase appropriately describes the situation, "is what it is and we are where we are".

I hereby request that the persons listed below be sanctioned in the manner described for each individual. I thank you with the trust in advance that some action will be taken within the next 10 days.

[REDACTED], ANM-200
Resignation by April 1, 2010

[REDACTED] ANM-100
Resignation by April 1, 2010

[REDACTED] ANM-201, currently Acting AWP-200,
Resignation by April 1, 2010 or reassignment below management level

[REDACTED] ANM-160S
Resignation by April 1, 2010 or reassignment below management level

[REDACTED] ANM-200SA
Reprimand for failure to report regulatory non-compliance by superiors

[REDACTED], ANM-240
Counseling for failure to report regulatory non-compliance by superiors



Press Release and Letter to President 07 30 2009.pdf

This email was copied to the interested parties so that communication can be facilitated and expedient. I will provide a copy of this email to the Office of Special Counsel.

Rand L. Foster
Aviation Safety Inspector
Regional Airworthiness Specialist
ANM-230 Technical Standards Branch
Cell 206-390-5483, Office 425-227-2248

WARNING: This record MAY contain Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know," except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 USC 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

Attachment to ANM-100 and ANM-200

Memorandum of March 15, 2010

On Tuesday, March 2, 2010, ASI Rand Foster sent an electronic mail message to AVS-1 and AVS-2. The message contained allegations of wrongdoing by Senior Executives and others assigned to the Northwest Mountain Region Flight Standards Division and the Transport Airplane Directorate. The allegations are quoted below with responses for each.

As part of his message, ASI Foster attached a copy of a press release and transmittal by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) dated July 30, 2009. This document was published without input from either the FAA or the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (OIG). As such, the conclusions reached by the OSC incorporate input from the complainant only and should not be construed as established fact.

Allegations and Response:

1. Allegation: The SACO “retroactively approved many data packages to ‘make’ installations legal in the time leading up to 2008 just to keep HEMS flying.”

Response: Once the FAA identified aircraft that were not properly returned to service, those aircraft were retroactively approved by an STC under the CAP. Under the CAP each aircraft design modification was evaluated to determine that it met the applicable airworthiness standards of Part 27 or Part 29. After this review was completed, each aircraft was recognized either through amendments to existing multi-ship STC’s or through issuance of STC’s applicable to individual aircraft – both practices falling within defined FAA policy and guidance.

Following the completion of the CAP in October of 2008, all aircraft that receive ASU NVIS modifications are STC approved by SACO prior to being returned to service. Additionally, since completion of the CAP, the majority of the STC’s applicable to individual aircraft have since been consolidated into existing multi-ship STC’s.

2. Allegation: “[REDACTED] an assistant to [REDACTED], had been given a special assignment with a regional specialist to go forth and evaluate old installations and new ones as the company continued its tradition while the assignment was contrary to good judgment.” The company noted was ASU.

Response: During the period the CAP was active, ASI’s [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were assigned responsibility for overseeing the Flight Standards (AFS) portion of the project. This was a prudent management assignment of resources considering the importance of the success of the CAP. Afterwards, they returned to their normal duties. Each inspector has intermittent involvement with ASU related issues as they arise.

3. Allegation: The “data that was/is approved in most instances was manipulated to meet the requirements by ASU and/or the FAA although the installation was not compliant with that data.”

Response: In no case did the SACO “manipulate” data to find compliance. In all cases, compliance findings were made based on application of the regulatory requirements, using the processes outlined in FAA orders, advisory circulars, and other appropriate Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) policy and guidance.

4. Allegation: ASI Foster referred other inspectors with concerns “to the appropriate parties for resolution,” but “without resolution.”

Response: The allegation cannot be resolved on the basis of the information provided. We need to know the specific ASI’s who raised concerns, the parties they attempted resolution with and the basis for their dissatisfaction with any response provided. All concerns that we are aware of were satisfactorily resolved.

5. Allegation: “The pencil whipping paperwork in SACO has continued.”

Response: In all cases where the SACO approved ASU STC’s or amendments to those STC’s, the requirements of 14 CFR part 27 or 29, FAA Order 8110.4, and Rotorcraft Directorate policy have been adhered to.

6. Allegation: ASU continues to “perform below regulatory requirements and I will assert that this has happened with the full knowledge of management individuals at great cost to the integrity of the FAA and the trust of its employees and the public.”

Response: In regard to the submission of data to the FAA for STC approval, an applicant must show that the subject modification meets or exceeds the applicable FAR standards. In the case of ASU, the SACO has only approved those STCs and amendments that have been shown to meet the requirements of 14 CFR parts 27 or 29.

7. Allegation: Several enforcement cases are underway against ASU. “At least one case is for falsification. This is a real problem since the original falsification issues were not properly referred to OIG as they should have been in 2007 by management.”

Response: EIR 2010EA030025 *may* result in a finding of falsification. However, the Allegheny FSDO has not completed their investigation and the Eastern Region Flight Standards Division has not completed the review required to determine sanction. With regard to the “original falsification issues,” these were properly processed by the Northwest Mountain Region Flight Standards Division and Regional Counsel’s Office.

8. Allegation: “The original voluntary groundings by operators in 2008 were not excusable and done because operators obtained knowledge that their aircraft were not airworthy and feared FAA retribution.”

Response: It is not true that the voluntary groundings ASI Foster referred to were “not excusable.” It was the operator’s actions alone that brought about the voluntary groundings. The facts of this matter are that in discovery activity in support of the falsification case involving the former ASU Director of Maintenance referred to in response 7, it was necessary for FAA counsel to obtain records and photographs of

approximately 20 aircraft. This occurred in April and May of 2008. An ANM-200 regional specialist coordinated the gathering of the needed documentation with the relevant principal inspectors was careful to point out that we were not making airworthiness determinations. That determination is always ultimately the responsibility of the operator. Some of the affected operators elected to review the airworthiness status of the subject aircraft. If they questioned conformity to the relevant STC, they recognized the aircraft were potentially technically unairworthy and therefore grounded them until they could resolve the airworthiness discrepancies. All air carriers are expected to recognize their responsibility to operate only airworthy aircraft and know the consequences of failing to do so.

9. Allegation: “The FAA has been irresponsible at the headquarters level by failing to provide guidance that describes the risks, mitigates those risks until compliance, and sets a firm date for full compliance.”

Response: The FAA has in fact been very responsive at the regional and headquarters level in response to the issues raised by ASU’s NVIS installations. The CAP and notice N 8900.51, issued to provide guidance to ASI’s concerning the CAP, were the result of a thoroughly reviewed and vetted process. As noted in the memorandum, the FAA’s Aviation Safety Chief Scientist and Technical Advisor performed a safety analysis and concluded the ASU NVIS modified HEMS fleet had not shown an increase in accident risk compared to the overall NVIS modified fleet. The notice contained a date for completion of the CAP of October 31, 2008, and the CAP was completed a day early.

10. Allegation: A notice was issued by AFS that “went so far as to say that even though the aircraft were not airworthy it was OK to go ahead and operate.”

Response: Notice N 8900.51 did not state that, “even though the aircraft were not airworthy it was OK to go ahead and operate.”

11. Allegation: The notice may have been issued because of “the failure of the division managers to be truthful with their briefings on the subject.”

Response: As noted in response 9, the safety analysis concluded the ASU NVIS modified fleet did not have a heightened accident risk compared to the overall NVIS modified fleet. Seeking this study is one of many examples of field and headquarters collaboration, and open and robust communication between many levels in AFS and AIR. The safety analysis conclusion was one of many inputs into an extensively coordinated decision to set aside in favor of the CAP an earlier plan to produce a draft notice directing operators to conduct conformity inspections. Participants in these discussions included the Directors of AFS and AIR.


Attachment E

Evaluation of ASU- Modified HEMS Aircraft

Presented to:
By: Ann Azevedo
Date: January 29, 2008



Federal Aviation
Administration



Baseline HEMS Accident Rates

- 2.6 million HEMS hours, 1998-2007
- 48% of the accidents occur at night, but only 35% of the flights (based on a 80% sample report)
- This equates to a 71% higher accident rate at night
 - Day approx. 3.7/100,000 hours
 - Night approx. 6.4/100,000 hours

Analysis based on HEMS industry studies conducted by Dr. Ira Blumen and presented to the AMTC, for dedicated HEMS helicopters



Baseline Rates (cont.)

- 2007 rates are lower than recent average
 - 1.35/100,000 hours (day/night combined, based on estimated hours)

Note: Baseline rates include ASU-modified helicopters



ASU Accident Rates

Assumptions:

- 585 hours/HEMS helicopter/year (Blumen)
- 2 years average on ASU mods (estimated from dates provided for STC)
- 260 ASU-modified helicopters
- 4 accidents on ASU-modified helicopters

Overall accident rate of 1.3/100,000 hours

- Comparable to 2007 overall experience



ASU Rates (cont.)

Accidents per helicopter:

- Overall: 2.2% of HEMS helicopters have had an accident over the past 2 years (17/763 (note – this includes all HEMS, not just dedicated, so is a tougher standard to meet))
- ASU-modified: 1.5% have had an accident (4/260)

ASU experience is comparable to overall



Caveats

- Analysis does not address NVIS usage
 - None of the 4 ASU accidents had NVIS involvement
- Rates are average for the overall HEMS and ASU-modified fleets
 - Rates may vary depending on degree on level of non-conformance of ASU mods



Attachment F

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
1.	NM11 201002508	UABR	AS-350-B3	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	08/23/2010	N497AE	ALM
F833P (F-Air Carrier Airworthiness 833-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)											
2.	NM11 201002509	UABR	AS-350-B3	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	08/23/2010	N433AE	LRU
E610U (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance U-Unacceptable) Aircraft s/n 3388 The radio altimeter indicator was not filtered as required by the approved data. This indicator appeared to have been replaced by the operator. This aircraft was completed during the Corrective Action Plan. The conformity was performed by ASU (337 block 6) however the data didn't identify the skyconnect or cabin audio panel. The operator will work with the Repair Station to correct this data. This equipment was installed at the time of the Corrective Action Plan conformity.											
3.	NM11 201002479	UABR	AS-350-B3	NM11MKB	I	C	5606	145	07/29/2010	N439AE	BOI
E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) During this surveillance the following issues were found: 1) The potentiometer placards were not manufactured to the specification called out in the approved data. The potentiometer nut and washer obstructed the placard information. 2) The ICA's the operator had and the ICA's the repair station had on record were not the same revision level. The operators was revision IR and the repair station was revision B. The ICA's used for continued airworthiness could not ensure airworthiness since they didn't depict all the equipment requiring filtering. 3) This aircraft appears as revision F on the MDL. The CAP was not accomplished on this aircraft. It was first thought to be a baseline aircraft but that seems unlikely since other AS-350 B3 models were returned to service and added to the MDL over a year prior to this one. The operator and the repair station have agreed to develop a new drawing system package and re-conform this aircraft. The CHDO PAI will follow up on this activity.											
4.	NM11 201001230	UABR	HU-369-FF	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	07/22/2010	N535W K	SAN
E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) THIS SURVEILLANCE INVOLVED THE ALTERATION OF A NEW MODEL OF MD 369(FF). THE SACO, SMIDO, AND DER/DAR WERE PRESENT. IT WAS NOTED UPON ARRIVAL THAT A LARGE AMOUNT OF RED LINE CORRECTION HAD TO BE MADE TO THE "IR" DRAWINGS. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS THE LEAD TECHNICIAN SAID THE PHOTO USED TO DO THE PRE-ASSESSMENT WAS BLURRY AND TURNED OUT TO BE OF A DIFFERENT SERIAL NUMBER. THIS HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE FIRST REVISION DRAWING CORRECTIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT ASU TECHNICIAN HAD CALLED A LOCAL AVIONICS SHOP TO MAKE INTERNAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE BENDIX/KING KY-196A RADIO. THIS SEEMED UNUSUAL SO WE INQUIRED ABOUT IT. WE WERE TOLD ASU TECHNICIANS NORMALLY MAKE THE MODIFICATION BUT THE DOM REQUESTED THAT AN AVIONICS SHOP BE CALLED THIS TIME SINCE THE FAA WOULD BE PRESENT. THIS MODIFICATION INVOLVES REPLACING OEM WHITE LAMPS ON THE GAS DISCHARGE PROCESSOR PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD WITH NVIS COMPATIBLE LAMPS. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS THE TOP AND BOTTOM COVERS MUST BE REMOVED FROM THE RADIO AND ONE CIRCUIT BOARD REMOVED TO ACCESS THE CIRCUIT BOARD THAT HOLD THE LAMPS. THE LAMPS ARE THEN DE-SOLDERED AND NEW ONES SOLDERED IN PLACE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME EITHER INSPECTOR HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THIS TYPE OF MODIFICATION BEING PERFORMED BY ASU TECHNICIANS. THIS											

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APPEARS TO BE OUTSIDE THE CURRENT RATINGS OF THE REPAIR STATION. THIS WILL BE ADDRESSED WITH MANAGEMENT AND ANOTHER PTRS WILL BE OPENED ON THIS MATTER.||

||
THE APPROVED DATA TO PERFORM THIS COMPONENT LEVEL CIRCUIT BOARD MAINTENANCE DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE APPROPRIATE AND ADEQUATE SAFE GUARDS ARE NOT IN PLACE TO INSURE THIS NVIS COMPATIBLE COCKPIT DOESN'T BECOME DE-MODED IN THE FUTURE. A SAFETY RECOMMENDATION # 10.188 WAS SUBMITTED ON THIS MATTER.||

||
DURING THE NIGHT EVALUATION IT WAS NOTED THAT AN OEM LIGHT BEHIND THE PILOTS HEAD HAD NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AND THE APPROPRIATE MEASURES USED TO PREVENT IT'S USE DURING NVG OPERATIONS. THIS WAS POINTED OUT TO THE FLIGHT TEST DER, SACO ENGINEER AND ASU TECHNICIANS. THE DATA WAS LATER CORRECTED.||

5.	NM11	UABR	HU-369-D	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	07/22/2010	N5108E	BOI
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201001376
E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
THIS AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 07-12-2010 AFTER A MAJOR ALTERATION TO INSTALL THE ASU NVG STC. ||

||
DURING THIS SURVEILLANCE IT WAS NOTED THAT THE INTERNAL LIGHTING IN THE BENDIX/KING KY-196A HAD NOT BEEN MODIFIED. AFTER ASKING THE LEAD TECHNICIAN PRESENT WHY THIS WAS HE STATED THAT THE LIGHTS DIDN'T ILLUMINATE DURING THE EVALUATION SO THE MODIFICATION WASN'T PERFORMED. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO THE TECHNICIAN THAT THERE WASN'T ANYTHING IN THE DATA PREVENTING THIS RADIO FROM BEING SWAPPED WITH THE OPERATORS OTHER 369 MODEL AIRCRAFT WHICH DID REQUIRE THE INTERNAL MODIFICATION ON THIS RADIO. IT APPEARS THAT THIS AIRCRAFT HAD AN AIRCRAFT LIGHTING WIRING PROBLEM CAUSING THIS RADIO LIGHT TO BE INOP. IT WAS ALSO BROUGHT TO THE TECHNICIAN'S ATTENTION THAT IF THIS WIRING DEFICIENCY WAS REPAIRED THIS RADIO WOULD NO LONGER BE NVIS COMPATIBLE.||

||
A COS FORM WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SACO ON THIS MATTER TO REQUIRE THE MODIFICATION OF THIS RADIO.

6.	NM11	UABR		NM11DLF	S	C	3618	145	07/21/2010		BOI
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201001341

7.	NM11	UABR		NM11DLF	S	C	3650	145	07/21/2010		BOI
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201001342

8.	NM11	UABR		NM11DLF	I	C	3656	145	07/21/2010		BOI
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201001346

E645I (E-Air Agencies 645-Conformance I-Information)
DURING THE INSPECTION OF THE TECHNICAL MANUALS AT AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED IT WAS NOTED THAT ASU USES A SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE TO KEEP THE TECHNICAL MANUALS UP TO DATE. ASU DOES NOT HAVE PROCEDURE FOR FOLLOWING UP TO ENSURE THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED THE MOST RECENT REVISION. THIS MATTER WAS DISCUSSED WITH ASU BY FAA INSPECTOR RITTENBERRY.

9.	NM11	UABR		NM11DLF	I	C	3661	145	07/21/2010		BOI
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201001352

E403I (E-Air Agencies 403-Training I-Information)
ASU HAS PERFORMED TRAINING ACCORDING TO THE CURRICULUM. ASU HAS ALSO DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED NEW TRAINING FOR THE AW139 HELICOPTER. TRAINING WAS DOCUMENTED FOR THE EMPLOYEES THAT RECEIVED THE NEW TRAINING.

10.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	S	C	5650	145	07/21/2010		BOI
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201001370

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

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11.	NM11 201001375	UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5659	145	07/21/2010		BOI
<p>E1051 (E-Air Agencies 105-Personnel I-Information) DURING AN INSPECTION OF THE PERSONNEL RECORDS FOR LONDON NYE AND CHRIS REBER IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WERE SOME SIGNATURES MISSING ON THE TRAINING RECORDS. THESE DISCREPANCIES WERE DISCUSSED WITH THE DOM. THE ROSTER OF PERSONNEL THAT HAVE RETURN TO SERVICE AUTHORITY GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT PERSONNEL CAN RETURN TO SERVICE ANY AIRCRAFT THAT ASU WORKS ON. THE LIST IN THE FRONT OF EACH INDIVIDUALS TRAINING RECORDS SHOW THE AIRCRAFT THAT THAT PERSON CAN ACTUALLY RETURN TO SERVICE. THIS WAY OF DOCUMENTATION CAN INTRODUCE SOME CONFUSION AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO A MISTAKE IN RETURN TO SERVICE. THIS WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE DOM AND IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT THEY DOCUMENT MORE ACCURATELY ON THE ROSTER.</p>											
12.	NM11 201001377	UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5661	145	07/21/2010		BOI
<p>E4031 (E-Air Agencies 403-Training I-Information) ASU HAS PERFORMED TRAINING ACCORDING TO THE CURRICULUM. ASU HAS ALSO DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED NEW TRAINING FOR THE AW139 HELICOPTER. TRAINING WAS DOCUMENTED FOR THE EMPLOYEES THAT RECEIVED THE NEW TRAINING.</p>											
13.	NM11 201002446	UABR		NM11CFK	C	C	3835		07/21/2010		SEA
<p>E9071 (E-Air Agencies 907-Management I-Information) A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE REGIONAL OFFICE IN SEATTLE WITH MIDO, ACO, BOISE FSDO MANAGERS AND REGIONAL MANAGERS TO DISCUSS COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS DEALING WITH FAA APPROVED DATA FOR AVIATION SPECIALITIES UNLIMITED INC. SURVEILLANCE OF THE 145 REPAIR STATION REVIEWED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS ERRORS IN THE FAA APPROVED DATA IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONFORMITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. SOME EXAMPLES INCLUDE: GOOSE NECK LIGHT INTERFERING WITH CYCLIC CONTROL MOVEMENT, IN PROPER CIRCUIT BREAKER SIZE FOR ELECTRICAL WIRING USED FOR NVIS LIGHTING CIRCUIT, FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS MODIFIED BY GRINDING OUT THE BEZELS FOR EXCEPTING NVIS BULBS CREATING INSTRUMENT FAILURE, WARNING CAUTION ANNUNCIATOR LIGHTS MODIFIED CONTRARY TO THE FAA APPROVED FLIGHT MANUAL IN RELATION TO LOCATION AND COLOR OF THE LIGHTS, TOT GAUGES FILTERED WHICH DIMINISHES THE DAYLIGHT READABLY. ONE OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DISCUSSED DURING THE MEETING WAS TO HAVE A BETTER LINE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE FLIGHT STANDARDS AND THE AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION OFFICE AND A BETTER PRE- ASSESSMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO THE APPROVAL OF THE DATA. </p>											
14.	NM11 201002447	UABR	HU-369-FF	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	07/21/2010	N535W K	SEE
<p>E816P (E-Air Agencies 816-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) THE SACO, SMIDO AND DER/DAR WERE PRESENT FOR THE ALTERATION OF THIS AIRCRAFT. THIS NEW MODEL AIRCRAFT WILL BE ADDED TO AN EXISTING STC. DURING THE ON SIGHT SURVEILLANCE OF THE MODIFICATION TO THIS AIRCRAFT, IT WAS NOTED THAT SOME OF THE ITEMS NEEDED FOR THIS MODIFICATION NEEDED TO BE ORDERED FOR NEXT DAY DELIVERY TO COMPLETE THE INSTALLATION. THE "IR" DRAWINGS USED FOR THE ALTERATION HAD A LARGE AMOUNT OF RED LINE CORRECTIONS. THE LEAD TECHNICIAN WAS ASKED, WHY SO MANY CORRECTIONS, HE STATED THAT THE PHOTO TAKEN FROM THE OPERATOR WAS BLURRY AND IT WAS NOT OF THIS AIRCRAFT. THIS HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE FIRST REVISION TO THE DRAWINGS. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT A LOCAL AVIONICS SHOP WAS CALLED IN TO MAKE INTERNAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE BENDIX KING KY-196A COMM RADIO. WE WERE TOLD BY THE LEAD TECHNICIAN THAT THEY NORMALLY MAKE THIS MODIFICATION BUT</p>											

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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THE DIRECTOR OF MAINTENANCE FOR ASU TOLD THEM TO HAVE THE AVIONICS SHOP COMPLETE THIS MODIFICATION BECAUSE THE FAA WERE GOING TO BE PRESENT FOR THIS ALTERATION. THE INTERNAL MODIFICATION TO THE RADIO INVOLVES REMOVING THE TOP AND BOTTOM COVERS AND THE CIRCUIT BOARD THAT HOLDS THE LAMPS. THE LAMPS HAVE TO BE DE-SOLDERED AND NEW ASU LAMPS SOLDERED IN THEIR PLACE. THIS RADIO MODIFICATION PERFORMED BY ASU TECHNICIANS WAS THE FIRST TIME EITHER FAA INSPECTOR HAD HEARD OF THIS. THIS WORK FUNCTION APPEARS TO BE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THEIR CURRENT REPAIR STATION RATINGS. BOISE FSDO MANAGEMENT WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS PROCESS.||

||
THE FAA APPROVED DATA TO PERFORM THIS RADIO MODIFICATION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ADEQUATE TO SAFELY GUARD THIS NVIS COMPATIBLE COCKPIT FROM BECOMING DE-MODED IN THE FUTURE. A SAFETY RECOMMENDATION WAS SUBMITTED TO ADDRESS THIS MATTER.||

||
DURING THE NIGHT EVALUATION OF THE NVIS MODIFICATION, THE FORWARD COCKPIT BULKHEAD LIGHT WAS NOT FILTERED FOR NVG. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ONE OF THE TECHNICIANS. HE ARGUED THAT THIS WAS NOT A LIGHT IT WAS A GASPER. THE LIGHT WAS TURNED ON WITH THE SWITCH LOCATED BELOW THE LIGHT. THE TECHNICIANS MADE CORRECTIONS TO THE DRAWINGS.||

||

15.	NM11	UABR	HU-369-D	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	07/20/2010	N5108E	SEE
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201002448

E610I (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance I-Information)

THIS AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 07-12-2010 AFTER THE INSTALLATION OF AN NVG STC.||

||
IT WAS NOTED THAT THE KING KY196 COM RADIO BACK LIGHTS FOR THE FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH AND THE CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH DID NOT LIGHT. THE FAA APPROVED DATA IDENTIFIED ONLY TO INSTALL A FILTER BEHIND THE FACE PLATE. THE TECHNICIAN WAS ASKED WHY THE WHITE LIGHT WERE NOT FILTERED WITH NVIS BULBS. HE STATED THAT THEY DID NOT COME ON DURING THE INSTALLATION AND THEY DID NOT SEE ANY REASON TO ADD NVIS BULBS. THE QUESTION WAS ASKED, WHAT IF THIS RADIO WAS REMOVED AND INSTALLED IN THE 369FF MODEL AIRCRAFT THAT REQUIRES THESE BULBS TO BE REPLACED WITH NVIS COMPONENTS. THE AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT CONFORM TO THE APPROVED DATA OF THE STC. THE TECHNICIAN STATED IT WOULD BE A PROBLEM.

16.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	F	C	5605	145	07/15/2010	N535W	SAN
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201001355

E317P (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports P-Potential Problem)

WHILE PERFORMING A MAJOR ALTERATION TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM THE TECHNICIAN FAILED TO CORRECTLY IDENTIFY AN OEM LIGHT BEHIND THE PILOTS HEAD. THIS LIGHT REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND LIMITATIONS DURING NVG OPERATIONS. ||

||
THIS ERROR WAS BROUGHT TO THE TECHNICIANS ATTENTION SO THE MODIFICATION DRAWINGS COULD BE CHANGED. ||

||
DURING THIS SURVEILLANCE IT WAS NOTED THAT SIGNIFICANT "RED LINE" DRAWINGS CHANGES WERE REQUIRED. AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE LEAD TECHNICIAN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE PRELIMINARY CONFIGURATION EVALUATION WAS CONDUCTED WITH A BLURRY PHOTOGRAPH. IN ADDITION THE PHOTOGRAPH WAS NOT THE SAME AIRCRAFT THAT WAS BEING MODIFIED.

17.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	F	C	5654	145	07/15/2010		BOI
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201001371

E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

WHILE PERFORMING A MAJOR ALTERATION TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM THE TECHNICIAN FAILED TO CORRECTLY IDENTIFY AN OEM LIGHT BEHIND THE PILOTS HEAD. THIS LIGHT REQUIRED IDENTIFICATION AND LIMITATIONS DURING NVG OPERATIONS. ||

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

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|| THIS ERROR WAS BROUGHT TO THE TECHNICIANS ATTENTION SO THE MODIFICATION DRAWINGS COULD BE CHANGED. ||

|| DURING THIS SURVEILLANCE IT WAS NOTED THAT SIGNIFICANT "RED LINE" DRAWINGS CHANGES WERE REQUIRED. AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE LEAD TECHNICIAN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE PRELIMINARY CONFIGURATION EVALUATION WAS CONDUCTED WITH A BLURRY PHOTOGRAPH. IN ADDITION THE PHOTOGRAPH WAS NOT THE SAME AIRCRAFT THAT WAS BEING MODIFIED.

18.	WP25 200803842	UABR	WP25MDO	C	C	5785	145	07/08/2010		
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E313I (E-Air Agencies 313-Records/Reports I-Information)
 04-23-2008: ON THIS DATE INSPECTOR JAMES L. BLAKE AT ANM-SEA-CMO-02|| NOTIFIED THIS OFFICE OF AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION REGARDING AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, CRS UABR273K. THE INVESTIGATION IS IN RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS THAT IN EXCESS OF 240 AIRCRAFT WERE ALTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH STC DATA THAT WAS NOT APPROVED FOR THE AIRCRAFT ALTERATIONS PERFORMED. THIS OFFICE IS THE CHDO FOR CALIFORNIA SHOCK/TRAUMA AIR RESCUE, CRS STRA, ONE OF THE AIR OPERATORS WHOSE AIRCRAFT WERE ALTERED BY THE REPAIR STATION UNDER INVESTIGATION. THIS INSPECTOR REVIEWED THE RECORDS OF THE SEVEN AIRCRAFT DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED BY AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED (ASU) AND CONFIRMED THAT FIVE OF THE AIRCRAFT ARE NOT AIRWORTHY AS A RESULT OF THE AIRCRAFT LISTING ON THE ELIGIBILITY DOCUMENT. THE ELIGIBILITY DOCUMENT IS ASSOCIATED WITH STC SR01546SE COVERING EUROCOPTER BO-105 AIRCRAFT AND IS PART OF THE MASTER DRAWING LIST MDL-105004-3 REV A DATED MARCH 31,2005. THE ELIGIBILITY INFORMATION IS CONTAINED ON DRAWING NUMBER 105004-00-000 LISTED IN THE MDL-105004-3 AND STIPULATES THAT STC SR01546SE IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO MODEL BO-105 AIRCRAFT SN2015 AND SN2045. THIS OFFICE ADVISED THE AIR OPERATOR WHICH AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DETERMINED TO BE UNAIRWORTHY ON THE DAY THE DETERMINATION WAS MADE, 04-29-2008. THIS INSPECTOR SENT ELECTRONIC COPIES OF THE DATA PACKAGES ASU PROVIDED CALIFORNIA SHOCK/TRAUMA AIR RESCUE FOR THREE SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT THEY ALTERED TO INSPECTOR BLAKE AS REQUESTED. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE N623MB, N8118Y AND N105SM. THE AIRCRAFT ARE CURRENTLY LOCATED AT OUTLYING AIR BASES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE AIRCRAFT PANEL CONFIGURATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN THE AIRCRAFT ARE FERRIED BACK TO HOME BASE AT MCCLELLAN AIRPORT.||

|| 05-01-2008: IT WAS FURTHER DETERMINED THAT BO-105 N105LS SN2012 WAS MODIFIED FOR NIGHT VISION GOGGLE OPERATION (NVG) IAW STC SR01546SE. THIS STC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS AIRCRAFT AND THEREFORE THE AIRCRAFT DOES NOT HAVE APPROVED DATA FOR NVG OPERATION, HOWEVER A FIELD APPROVED FAA FORM 337 DATED FEBRUARY 2, 2005 DOES APPROVE PROVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE STC AND CONFIRMS THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS STILL AIRWORTHY FOR STANDARD DAY/NIGHT OPERATION.

E999I (E-Air Agencies 999-Management I-Information)
 07/07/2010 VERIFIED WITH INSPECTOR BLAKE THAT NOTICE AND ISSUES WITH STC AFFECTED AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

19.	NM11 200903164	UABR	NM11MKB	T	C	5606	145	06/30/2010		
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E971I (E-Air Agencies 971-Management I-Information)
 ENTRY ENTERED IN ERROR

20.	NM11 200903166	UABR	NM11MKB	T	C	5608	145	06/30/2010		
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E971I (E-Air Agencies 971-Management I-Information)
 ENTRY ENTERED IN ERROR

21.	NM11 201002220	UABR	NM11CFK	C	C	3835		06/17/2010		BOI
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	E617P		(E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance	P-Potential Problem)							
	<p>A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE ASU FACILITY TO DISCUSS RESENT SURVEILLANCE ON AS-365 AIRCRAFT. MR. AND MRS ATWOOD WERE AT ATTENDANCE. THE DOM AND THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF QUALITY AND ALL AVAILABLE TECHNICIANS WERE ALSO AVAILABLE. FROM THE FAA WAS THE PAI, PMI AND OFFICE MANAGER. </p> <p> </p> <p>DURING THE SURVEILLANCE SEVERAL SERIOUS CONCERNS WERE NOTED. </p> <p> </p> <p>1. THE INSTALLATION OF A GOOSE NECK LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CENTER CONSOLE RESULTED IN LIMITING THE CYCLIC TRAVEL TO THE RIGHT BY APPROXIMATELY 1/3. WHEN THIS WAS DISCOVERED IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OPERATOR (AIR METHODS). </p> <p> </p> <p>DURING THE MEETING THE DOM MENTIONED THAT THEY HAD BEEN AWARE OF THIS ISSUE AND ARE IN THE PROCESS OF CORRECTING IT WITH THE OPERATOR (AIR METHODS). AFTER SHOWING MR. ATWOOD THE PICTURES OF THE LIGHT/CYCLIC CONFLICT, HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. MR. ATWOOD AND THE DOM AGREED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CORRECT THIS ISSUE. </p> <p> </p> <p>2. AN EXISTING 10 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS USED FOR CIRCUIT PROTECTION OF THE NEWLY INSTALLED NVIS LIGHTING SYSTEM. 22 AWG WIRE WAS USED IN THE MODIFICATION. THE PAI QUESTIONED THE BREAKER SIZE VERSUS WIRE SIZE. THE DOM STATED THAT AN DER HAD APPROVED THIS INSTALLATION. A FOLLOW UP WILL BE CONDUCTED BY THE PAI TO ENSURE THAT THIS WAS CORRECT. ANOTHER DER (MR. ERIC HOPKINS) REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS PROCEDURE ON OTHER INSTALLATIONS.</p>										

22.	EA03	UABR	MDHS-MD-900	EA03WDG	C	C	3731	145	05/17/2010	N905LF	FWQ
	<p>201002297</p> <p>E801U (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance U-Unacceptable)</p> <p>03/01/2010 ASSISTED INSPECTOR DELEWSKI. RESEARCHED FACTS. EIR COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR DELEWSKI.</p>										

23.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5605	145	05/13/2010	N199SM	IA87
	<p>201001354</p> <p>E840P (E-Air Agencies 840-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)</p> <p>SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED ON AN ALTERATION TO INSTALL STC SR01717SE. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE FOUND. </p> <p> </p> <p>1) THE GOOSE NECK LIGHT INSTALLED ON THE CONSOLE DID NOT MATCH THE APPROVED DATA. </p> <p> </p> <p>2) THE SKY CONNECT CONTROLLER WAS NOT LOCATED WHERE THE APPROVED DATA SHOWED. </p> <p> </p> <p>3) TWO PLACARDS WERE INSTALLED ON THE COCKPIT OVERHEAD. ONLY ONE WAS IDENTIFIED IN THE APPROVED DATA. </p> <p> </p> <p>NOTE: </p> <p> </p> <p>THE APPROVED DATA DEPICTED TWO OEM 10 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS BEING USED TO PROTECT THE NEWLY INSTALLED 20 & 22 AWG WIRING. ALTHOUGH THIS DATA WAS APPROVED BY A DESIGNEE IT WILL BE FOLLOWED UP ON TO ENSURE A MISTAKE WASN'T MADE WITH THIS DATA. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL BY ANOTHER DER DID NOT APPROVE THIS METHOD AND REQUIRED SEPARATE FUSING OF THE APPROPRIATE SIZE FOR THE WIRING BEING PROTECTED. </p> <p> </p> <p>THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED UP WITH THE REGION AND SACO.</p>										

24.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	05/13/2010		IA87
	<p>201002222</p> <p>E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)</p> <p>SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED ON AN ALTERATION TO INSTALL STC SR01717SE. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE FOUND. </p>										

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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||
 1) THE GOOSE NECK LIGHT INSTALLED ON THE CONSOLE DID NOT MATCH THE APPROVED DATA. ||

||
 2) THE SKY CONNECT CONTROLLER WAS NOT LOCATED WERE THE APPROVED DATA SHOWED.||

||
 3) TWO PLACARDS WERE INSTALLED ON THE COCKPIT OVERHEAD. ONLY ONE WAS IDENTIFIED IN THE APPROVED DATA. ||

||
 NOTE: ||

||
 THE APPROVED DATA DEPICTED TWO OEM 10 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS BEING USED TO PROTECT THE NEWLY INSTALLED 20 & 22 AWG WIRING. ALTHOUGH THIS DATA WAS APPROVED BY A DESIGNEE IT WILL BE FOLLOWED UP ON TO ENSURE A MISTAKE WASN'T MADE WITH THIS DATA. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL BY ANOTHER DER DID NOT APPROVE THIS METHOD AND REQUIRED SEPARATE FUSING OF THE APPROPRIATE SIZE FOR THE WIRING BEING PROTECTED. ||

||
 THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED UP WITH THE REGION AND SACO.

25.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5604	145	05/12/2010	N625CF	BOI
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201001353
 E901P (E-Air Agencies 901-Management P-Potential Problem)

1) BECAUSE OF THE PLACEMENT OF A GOOSE NECK NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CONSOLE THE RANGE OF MOTION OF THE CYCLIC WITH ANYONE SITTING IN THE LEFT SEAT WAS LIMITED. THIS LIMITED THE FLIGHT CONTROL BY APPROXIMATLY 1/3. THIS IS A POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT, NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION, CHDO FOR THE PART 135 OPERATOR (AIR METHODS), AND THE SACO. THE PRICIPLE INSPECTORS WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THIS POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE COULD EFFECT OTHER AS-365'S ALSO. THE REPAIR STATION/SACO WILL REVIEW ALL EFFECTED AIRCRAFT.||

||
 2) THE LEFT SIDE RADIO ALTIMETER D/H LIGHT FILTER WAS MISSING. THE APPROVED DATA REQUIRED A FILTER BE PLACED ON THIS INSTRUMENT.||

||
 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE REPAIR STATION ARE UNDERWAY. CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE IN THIS AREA IS NEED TO VALIDATE THE CONFORMITY AND AIRWORINESS OF THESE ALTERATIONS.

26.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	05/12/2010	N520CF	DAY
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201001358
 E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON THIS AIRCRAFT TO VALIDATE THE WORK AWAY PROCEDURES OF THE REPAIR STATION. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTED.||

||
 1) BECAUSE OF THE PLACEMENT OF A GOOSE NECK NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CONSOLE THE RANGE OF MOTION OF THE CYCLIC WITH ANYONE SITTING IN THE LEFT SEAT WAS LIMITED. THIS LIMITED THE FLIGHT CONTROL BY APPROXIMATLY 1/3. THIS IS A POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT, NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION, CHDO FOR THE PART 135 OPERATOR (AIR METHODS), AND THE SACO. THE PRICIPLE INSPECTORS WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THIS POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE COULD EFFECT OTHER AS-365'S ALSO. THE REPAIR STATION/SACO WILL REVIEW ALL EFFECTED AIRCRAFT.||

||
 2) THE APPROVED DRAWINGS DEPICT THE WARNING/CAUTION PANE TEST SWITCH AS AMBER HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL COLOR IS RED.||

||
 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE REPAIR STATION ARE UNDERWAY. CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE IN THIS AREA IS NEED TO VALIDATE THE CONFORMITY AND AIRWORINESS OF THESE ALTERATIONS.

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
27.	NM11 201001359	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	05/12/2010	N625CF	BOI
<p>E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON THIS AIRCRAFT TO VALIDATE THE WORK AWAY PROCEDURES OF THE REPAIR STATION. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTED. 1) BECAUSE OF THE PLACEMENT OF A GOOSE NECK NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CONSOLE THE RANGE OF MOTION OF THE CYCLIC WITH ANYONE SITTING IN THE LEFT SEAT WAS LIMITED. THIS LIMITED THE FLIGHT CONTROL BY APPROXIMATLY 1/3. THIS IS A POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT, NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION, CHDO FOR THE PART 135 OPERATOR (AIR METHODS), AND THE SACO. THE PRICIPLE INSPECTORS WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THIS POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE COULD EFFECT OTHER AS-365'S ALSO. THE REPAIR STATION/SACO WILL REVIEW ALL EFFECTED AIRCRAFT. 2) THE LEFT SIDE RADIO ALTIMETER D/H LIGHT FILTER WAS MISSING. THE APPROVED DATA REQUIRED A FILTER BE PLACED ON THIS INSTRUMENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE REPAIR STATION ARE UNDERWAY. CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE IN THIS AREA IS NEED TO VALIDATE THE CONFORMITY AND AIRWORINNESS OF THESE ALTERATIONS.</p>											
28.	NM11 201001369	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5618	145	05/12/2010	N520CF	BOI
<p>E801P (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON THIS AIRCRAFT TO VALIDATE THE WORK AWAY PROCEDURES OF THE REPAIR STATION. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTED. 1) BECAUSE OF THE PLACEMENT OF A GOOSE NECK NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CONSOLE THE RANGE OF MOTION OF THE CYCLIC WITH ANYONE SITTING IN THE LEFT SEAT WAS LIMITED. THIS LIMITED THE FLIGHT CONTROL BY APPROXIMATLY 1/3. THIS IS A POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT, NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION, CHDO FOR THE PART 135 OPERATOR (AIR METHODS), AND THE SACO. THE PRICIPLE INSPECTORS WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THIS POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE COULD EFFECT OTHER AS-365'S ALSO. THE REPAIR STATION/SACO WILL REVIEW ALL EFFECTED AIRCRAFT. 2) THE APPROVED DRAWINGS DEPICT THE WARNING/CAUTION PANE TEST SWITCH AS AMBER HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL COLOR IS RED. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE REPAIR STATION ARE UNDERWAY. CONTINUED SURVEILLANCE IN THIS AREA IS NEED TO VALIDATE THE CONFORMITY AND AIRWORINNESS OF THESE ALTERATIONS.</p>											
29.	NM11 201001374	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5656	145	05/12/2010	N625CF	BOI
<p>E649P (E-Air Agencies 649-Conformance P-Potential Problem) 1) BECAUSE OF THE PLACEMENT OF A GOOSE NECK NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CONSOLE THE RANGE OF MOTION OF THE CYCLIC WITH ANYONE SITTING IN THE LEFT SEAT WAS LIMITED. THIS LIMITED THE FLIGHT CONTROL BY APPROXIMATLY 1/3. THIS IS A POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT, NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION, CHDO FOR THE PART 135 OPERATOR (AIR METHODS), AND THE SACO. THE PRICIPLE INSPECTORS WILL FOLLOW UP ON THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THIS POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE COULD EFFECT OTHER AS-365'S ALSO. THE REPAIR STATION/SACO WILL REVIEW ALL EFFECTED AIRCRAFT. 2) THE LEFT SIDE RADIO ALTIMETER D/H LIGHT FILTER WAS MISSING. THE APPROVED DATA REQUIRED A FILTER BE PLACED ON THIS INSTRUMENT. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE REPAIR STATION ARE UNDERWAY. CONTINUED</p>											

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Code	Inspector Code	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	SURVEILLANCE IN THIS AREA IS NEED TO VALIDATE THE CONFORMITY AND AIRWORINESS OF THESE ALTERATIONS.						

30.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	C	C	5835	05/12/2010	BOI
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201002217
E617P (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance P-Potential Problem)

A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE ASU FACILITY TO DISCUSS RESENT SURVEILLANCE ON AS-365 AIRCRAFT. IN ATTENDANCE WAS MR & MRS ATWOOD, THE DOM, CHIEF OF QUALITY AND ALL AVAILABLE TECHNICIANS. FROM THE FAA WAS THE PAI, PMI AND OFFICE MANAGER. DURING THE SURVEILLANCE SEVERAL SERIOUS CONCERNS WERE NOTED. FIRST, THE INSTALLATION OF A GOOSE NECK LIGHT ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE CONSOLE RESULTED IN LIMITING THE CYCLIC TRAVEL TO THE RIGHT BY APPROXIMATELY 1/3. WHEN THIS WAS DISCOVERED IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE OPERATORS ATTENTION IMMEDIATELY (AIR METHODS). ||

||
DURING THE MEETING THE DOM MENTIONED THAT THEY HAD PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PROBLEM BUT HAD NOT TAKEN ANY ACTION YET. AFTER SHOWING MR. ATWOOD THE PICTURES TAKEN OF THE EFFECTED AIRCRAFT HE AGREED THAT IT WAS A SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. MR. ATWOOD AND THE DOM AGREED TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO MITIGATE THIS POSSIBLE SAFETY OF FLIGHT ISSUE. ||

||
SEVERAL OTHER DEFICIENCIES WERE DISCUSSED BUT THE MOST SERIOUS WAS THE MODIFICATION AF AN AS-365 USING AN EXISTING OEM 10 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR CIRCUIT PROTECTION OF NEWLY INSTALLED NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHTING WITH 22 AWG WIRING. I QUESTIONED THE SAFETY OF THIS AND WAS TOLD THAT A SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT DER HAD APPROVED THIS ALTERATION. I WILL FOLLOW UP ON THIS PRACTICE TO ENSURE THIS IS AN ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT A DIFFERENT DER (ERIC HOPKINS) REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS PRACTICE ON THE LAST FEW ALTERATION AND REQUIRED SEPARATE FUSES OF APPROPRIATE SIZE BE USED FOR THIS ALTERATION.||

||
NORTHWEST MOUNTAIN REGION, THE SACO AND MANAGEMENT HAVE ALL BEEN NOTIFIED OF THESE ISSUES. THE PRINCIPLE INSPECTORS WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THESE ISSUES AN CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.||

31.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	05/10/2010	N520CF	63IN
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201001332
E610I (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance I-Information)
AIRCRAFT SERIAL # 6537||

||
THIS AIRCRAFT WAS MODIFIED FOR NIGHT VISION GOGGLE OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN STC. REVIEW OF THE FAA APPROVED DRAWING PACKAGE REVIEWED SOME DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE APPROVED DATA AND THE SHIP.||

||
1. THE LEFT SIDE CYCLIC OPERATION INTERFERES WITH INSTALLED NVIS COMPATIBLE "GOOSE NECK LED LIGHT" AN ESTIMATE WOULD BE 1/3 OF FLIGHT CONTROL LOST DEPENDING ON ENVIRONMENTAL/PHYSICAL ISSUES WITH THE FLIGHT CREW/OBSERVER SITTING IN THAT SEAT.||

||
2. CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND NVG CIRCUIT PROTECTION DOES NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT THE LOCATION OR AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION.||

||
3. THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL COLORS DO NOT MATCH THE APPROVED DATA. THE TEST SWITCH IS RED AND THE DRAWINGS SHOW AMBER LIGHT.||

||
ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MR. SEAN WILLIAMS, REGIONAL MAINTENANCE DIRECTOR, HBS-REGION III (AIR METHODS)

32.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	05/10/2010	N164CF	9IN1
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201001333
E610I (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance I-Information)
AIRCRAFT SERIAL # 6442||

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SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	THIS AIRCRAFT WAS MODIFIED FOR NIGHT VISION GOGGLE OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN STC. REVIEW OF THE FAA APPROVED DRAWING PACKAGE REVIEWED SOME DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE APPROVED DATA AND THE SHIP.										
	1. FUEL TRANSFER LIGHT IS NOT FILTERED. THE DATA FOR THIS AIRCRAFT DOES NOT REQUIRE IT HOWEVER, OTHER AIRCRAFT APPROVED DATA DOES REQUIRE IT. THE ACCURACY OF THE COCKPIT EVALUATION COULD BE IN QUESTION.										
	2. APPROVED DATA DEPICTS A DIGITAL OXYGEN INDICATOR IN THE CABIN REQUIRING FILTRATION. THE INDICTOR IS NOT INSTALLED IN THE AIRCRAFT.										
	3. COCKPIT PLACARD RESTRICTING OEM LIGHTING DURING NVG OPERATION NOT INSTALLED IN AIRCRAFT.										
	4. CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND NVG CIRCUIT PROTECTION DOES NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT THE LOCATION OR AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION.										
	ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MR. SEAN WILLIAMS, REGIONAL MAINTENANCE DIRECTOR, HBS-REGION III (AIR METHODS)										

33.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	05/10/2010	N625CF	174
	201001334										
	E610I (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance I-Information)										
	AIRCRAFT SERIAL # 6596										
	THIS AIRCRAFT WAS MODIFIED FOR NIGHT VISION GOGGLE OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN STC. REVIEW OF THE FAA APPROVED DRAWING PACKAGE REVIEWED SOME DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE APPROVED DATA AND THE SHIP.										
	1. THE LEFT SIDE CYCLIC OPERATION INTERFERES WITH INSTALLED NVIS COMPATIBLE "GOOSE NECK LED LIGHT" AN ESTIMATE WOULD BE 1/3 OF FLIGHT CONTROL LOST DEPENDING ON ENVIRONMENTAL/PHYSICAL ISSUES WITH THE FLIGHT CREW/OBSERVER SITTING IN THAT SEAT.										
	2. LEFT SIDE RADIO ALTIMETER FILTER HAD FALLEN OFF AND WAS NOT ANLE TO BE LOCATED. THE AIRCRAFT WAS MODIFIED APPROXIMATELY 66 WEEKS AGO.										
	3. APPROVED DATA DOES NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT NVG POTENTIOMETER QUANTITY OR LOCATIONS. THREE INSTALLED AND SIX SHOWN ON APPROVED DRAWINGS.										
	4. COCKPIT PLACARD RESTRICTING OEM LIGHTING DURING NVG OPERATION MISSING FROM APPROVED DATA BUT INSTALLED IN AIRCRAFT.										
	5. CABIN CENTER SEAT LIGHTING FILTERED BUT NOT SHOWN IN THE APPROVED DATA.										
	6. CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND NVG CIRCUIT PROTECTION DOES NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT THE LOCATION OR AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION.										
	ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MR. SEAN WILLIAMS, REGIONAL MAINTENANCE DIRECTOR, HBS-REGION III (AIR METHODS)										

34.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	05/10/2010	N199SM	131I
	201001335										
	E610I (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance I-Information)										
	AIRCRAFT SERIAL # 6396										
	THIS AIRCRAFT WAS MODIFIED FOR NIGHT VISION GOGGLE OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN STC. REVIEW OF THE FAA APPROVED DRAWING PACKAGE REVIEWED SOME DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE APPROVED DATA AND THE SHIP.										
	1. THE OVERHEAD SWITCH PANEL HAD TWO PLACARDS INSTALLED, DRAWINGS SHOW ONLY ONE.										
	2. THE DRAWING SHOW AN FLEX ABLE LED LIGHT LOCATED ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE										

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Act Result Status	No. FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	CENTER CONSOLE. THIS LIGHT IS INSTALLED FORWARD OF THE APPROVED LOCATION.								
	3. TWO WHITE FLEX ABLE LIGHTS LOCATED IN THE AFT CABIN. DRAWINGS DO NOT SHOW THESE LIGHTS.								
	4. DRAWINGS SHOW 22 AWG WIRE SUPPLYING CURRENT TO THE NVG LIGHTING CIRCUIT THROUGH A 10 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKER.								
	ALL OF THESE ISSUES HAVE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MR. SEAN WILLIAMS, REGIONAL MAINTENANCE DIRECTOR, HBS-REGION III (AIR METHODS)								

35.	EA03	UABR	MDHS-MD-900	EA03AKO	C	C	3001	05/06/2010	N905LF	
	201002518									
	E617I (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance I-Information)									
	PERFORM ASSIGNED QA DUTIES BY REVIEWING THIS EIR. AKO									

36.	NM11	UABR	AS-365	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	05/05/2010	N164CF	BOI
	201002219										
	E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)										
	DURING SURVEILLANCE PERFORMED FOR WORK AWAY PROCEDURES IT WAS NOTED THAT ONE OF THE REQUIRED PLACARDS ON THE COCKPIT OVERHEAD WAS NOT INSTALLED IAW THE APPROVED DATA. THIS PLACARD REQUIRES THE OPERATOR NOT TO USE OEM LIGHTING DURING NVG OPERATIONS. THIS INFORMATION IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR SAFE NVG OPERATIONS. AFTER REVIEWING THE REPAIR STATION PHOTOGRAPHS IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PLACARD WAS NEVER INSTALLED.										
	THE APPROVED DATA DEPICTED A DIGITAL OXYGEN INDICATOR IN THE CABIN. THE APPROVED DATA REQUIRED A FILTER TO BE INSTALLED. THE DATA WAS INCORRECT BECAUSE THIS TYPE OF OXYGEN INDICATOR WAS NOT INSTALLED IN THE AIRCRAFT. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE REPAIR STATION TO ALTER THE AIRCRAFT IAW THIS DATA SINCE THE INDICATOR WAS NOT INSTALLED.										
	ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE SHOULD BE PERFORMED TO VALIDATE THE CORRECT ALTERATION OF THESE AIRCRAFT AND OTHERS BY THIS REPAIR STATION.										

37.	EA17	UABR	MBB-BK117-B1	EA17EXL	I	C	5656	145	03/12/2010	N911CH	40N
	201003159										
	E647U (E-Air Agencies 647-Conformance U-Unacceptable)										
	08/17/2010 - FOR THE PAST WEEK, THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN WORKING WITH THE SEATTLE ANM-230, SEATTLE ACO AND THE BOISE FSDO, TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES FOUND IN STC SR01611SE. THIS STC IS FOR THE MODIFICATION OF MBB-BK117 HELICOPTERS FOR NVG USE. THE STC IS INSTALLED BY AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC (UABR). THE ASSIGNED PRINCIPAL AVIONICS INSPECTOR REVIEWED THE STC PACKAGE AFTER MODIFICATION OF A MBB-BK117 B-1, N911CH, SERIAL NO.7223. THERE WERE SEVERAL MISTAKES FOUND WITH REGARD TO THE HELICOPTER MMS, DRAWINGS AND ICA'S.										
	A CONFORMITY INSPECTION OF THE MODIFIED AIRCRAFT AND THE ALTERATION DOCUMENTATION THERETO REVEALED THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS:										
	1.STC SR01611SE DOES NOT INCLUDE A BK 117 B-1 LISTED.										
	2.STC SR01611SE REFERENCES PART 27 OF THE FAR'S, INSTEAD OF PART 29, WHICH IS APPLICABLE TO A BK117 AIRCRAFT, LISTED ON THE TC AS A TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRCRAFT.										
	3.THE MASTER DRAWING LIST WAS ASU APPROVED ON 01/12/10 AND APPROVED BY THE FAA, ACO ON 02/11/2010.										
	4.THE ROTORCRAFT FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, NO. FMS-117004-6, REFERENCING STC SR01611SE, WAS FAA ACO APPROVED ON 12/04/2009, FOR AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 7223, WHICH IS A BK117 B-1, N911CH.										

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Act Result Status No.	FAR Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
5.	FIGURES 5.1, 5.2 & 5.4.	TYPICAL					
<p>MODELS C1, C2 AND B2". NO REFERENCE IS MADE TO MODEL B1!!</p> <p> </p> <p>6. REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 5-11, CABIN LIGHTING SYSTEM: INFORMATION OBTAINED FOR THE ERA MED LLC CHIEF INSPECTOR AND MY OWN INSPECTION OF N911CH, APPEARED THAT THE CABIN LIGHTING SYSTEM HAD NOT BEEN MODIFIED, IN THAT THE OEM INCANDESCENT LIGHTING WAS STILL INSTALLED. IF NO MODIFICATION WAS DONE, THEN WHY IS THE AFOREMENTIONED PARAGRAPH 5-11 IN THE ICA'S? IT HAD BEEN MENTIONED TO THE PAI THAT THE REASON THAT THE CABIN LIGHTING WAS NOT CHANGED IS THAT A BLACKOUT CURTAIN WAS INSTALLED IN N911CH. ALL OF THE ERA MED AIRCRAFT HAVING HAD THE STC SRSR01611SE INSTALLED, TO INCLUDE THE CABIN LIGHTING HAVE ALL HAD BLACKOUT CURTAINS INSTALLED. </p> <p> </p> <p>ALL OF THESE ITEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE REPAIR STATION CHDO AND THE SEATTLE ACO. UABR WAS NOTIFIED, BY THE ERAMED CHIEF INSPECTOR, AND COMPLETED CORRECTIONS TO THE STC PACKAGE AND SUBMITTED THEM TO THE SEATTLE ACO FOR APPROVAL. THE ANM ACO HAS PREVIOUSLY DECIDED THAT DUE TO THE MANY DIFFERENCES IN THE MBB-BK 117 SERIES THAT THE STC SHOULD BE MADE MMS AND SERIAL NUMBER SPECIFIC. AFTER RECEIVING CORRECTIONS FROM PART 145 REPAIR STATIONS, THEY WOULD BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE ACO AND THE AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN BE ADDED TO THE STC SRSR01611SE, WHICH HAD NOW BECOME AIRCRAFT MMS AND SERIAL NUMBER SPECIFIC. </p> <p> </p> <p>STATUS: CURRENTLY THE ERA MED LLC HAS NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED, BY ASU, WHO HAD BEEN SO INSTRUCTED TO DO SO, BY THE ANM ACO, TO OPERATE N911CH. UNTIL THE ACO AND ASU COMPLETED THE PROCESS OF REVISING STC SRSR01611SE AND TO CORRECT THE ERRORS WHICH WERE FOUND BY THE PAI, A PROJECT WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. </p> <p> </p> <p>ACTIONS TAKEN: IN ADDITION TO THE ACTIONS MENTIONED IN THE BACKGROUND ABOVE, THIS FSDO (EA-17) HAS ADVISED THE ANM-230 REGIONAL AVIONICS SPECIALIST AS WELL AS THE AFOREMENTIONED CHDO AND ACO OF THESE PROBLEMS. IN ADDITION, THE UABR PAI AND MANAGER OF THE BOISE FSDO WERE BRIEFED, REGARDING THE ABOVE FINDINGS. </p> <p> </p> <p>THE INABILITY, DELAY OR NEGATION BY ASU (UABR) TO COMPLY WITH THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS HAS SUBSTANTIALLY DELAYED THE USE OF NVG BY 7KFA. THE ABILITY TO USE THIS VISION ENHANCEMENT DEVICE WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE THE LEVEL OF SAFETY AFFORDED HEMES MISSIONS CONDUCTED BY THIS OPERATOR. </p> <p> </p> <p>ON 02/17/10, THE ERA MED CHIEF INSPECTOR INFORMED THE PAI THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH KIP MCDERMOTT OF ASU, THAT THEY EXPECTED TO HAVE THE REVISED VERSION OF STC SR01611SE BACK FROM THE ACO OFFICE IN A COUPLE OF DAYS. </p> <p> </p> <p>ON 02/18/10, THE ERA MED CHIEF INSPECTOR INFORMED THE PAI THAT ASU HAD INFORMED HIM THAT ALL CORRECTIONS TO THE ABOVE FINDINGS HAD MADE AND THAT NEW AND OR REVISED MAINTENANCE /ALTERATION DOCUMENTATION WOULD BE MAILED TO ERA MED LLC ON 02/22/10. </p> <p> </p> <p>ON 02/24/2010, THE ERA MED CHIEF INSPECTOR INFORMED THE PAI THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE CORRECTED DOCUMENTATION FOR N911CH, SERIAL NO.7223, FROM ASU AND THAT IT WAS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW. </p> <p> </p> <p>ON 03/01/2010, THE PAI REVIEWED THE ASU CORRECTED DOCUMENTATION FOR N911CH, SERIAL NO.7223 AND FOUND THE MAJORITY OF THE ERRORS HAD BEEN CORRECTED, BUT THAT SEVERAL ERRORS WITHIN THE ICA'S, LISTED BELOW, STILL EXISTED AND ARE AS FOLLOWS: </p> <p> </p> <p>1. THE LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (LOEP) DID NOT REFLECT A REVISION OF PAGE 5-3. </p> <p>PAGE 5-3, CONSISTED OF HAVING FIGURE 5.1, WHICH STILL DID NOT HAVE A BK 117 B-1 LISTED. </p> <p> </p> <p>2. THE LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (LOEP) DID NOT REFLECT A REVISION OF PAGE 5-4. </p> <p>PAGE 5-4, CONSISTED OF HAVING FIGURE 5.2, WHICH STILL DID NOT HAVE A BK 117 B-1 LISTED. </p>							

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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3. THE LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (LOEP) DID NOT REFLECT A REVISION OF PAGE 5-6. ||
 PAGE 5-6, CONSISTED OF HAVING FIGURE 5.4, WHICH STILL DID NOT HAVE A BK 117 B-1 LISTED. ||

4. THE LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (LOEP) DID NOT HAVE APPENDIX D LISTED. ||

ON 03/01/2010, THE PAI CONTACTED THE MANAGER OF THE BOISE FSDO, WHO WAS REQUESTED TO PASS THE RESULTS OF THE PRESENT FINDINGS, ON TO THE PAI OF ASU, ADDITIONALLY, A CALL WAS MADE TO THE SEATTLE ACO AND A MESSAGE WAS LEFT, REQUESTING A RETURN CALL. THE ERA MED CHIEF INSPECTOR WAS ALSO INFORMED OF THE ERRORS. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE CHIEF INSPECTOR CONTACT ASU AND INFORM THEM OF THE PAI FINDINGS. ||

ON 03/01/2010, RECEIVED CALL FROM THE SEATTLE ACO, WHO STATED THAT ASU HAD NOTIFIED THE ACO OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ERRORS, WITHIN THE ICA'S AND THAT THE ACO WOULD COORDINATE WITH ASU TO HAVE THE ERRORS CORRECTED. ||

ON 03/02/2010, RECEIVED A CALL FROM MS CHRIS ATWOOD, PRESIDENT OF ASU, WHO STATED THAT THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF CORRECTING THE REMAINING ERRORS WHICH HAD BEEN FOUND ON THE ICA'S, FOR N911CH. ADDITIONALLY, RECEIVED A CC E-MAIL FROM MS ATWOOD, WITH THE CORRECTIONS TO THE LAST FOUR (4) ABOVE MENTIONED FINDINGS, WHEREBY SHE INFORMED THE ERA MED CHIEF INSPECTOR THAT CORRECTIONS WOULD BE PERFORMED AND THAT CORRECTED DOCUMENTATION FOR N911CH WOULD BE FURNISHED TO ERA MED. ||

ON 03/02/2010, RECEIVED A CC E-MAIL FROM AEG DFW, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO MS ATWOOD, CONCERNING THE ISSUANCE OF CHANGES TO THE ICA'S. ||

ON 03/09/2010 - ERA MED RECEIVED THE FINAL HARD COPY CORRECTIONS TO THE LAST FOUR (4) ABOVE MENTIONED FINDINGS. A REVIEW OF THE RECEIVED DOCUMENTATION SHOWED THAT DISCREPANCIES THAT HAD BEEN FOUND, HAD BEEN CORRECTED.

38.	NM11	UABR	BHT-222-U	NM11MKB	C	C	5835		03/11/2010		
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201001929
 E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)
 ON 2/18/10 WHILE REVEIING ALTERATIONS PERFORMED BY ASU I DISCOVERED THAT BELL 222U AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN MODIFIED PRIOR TO THE RE-CERTIFICATION OF THE REPAIR STATION (CAP AIRCRAFT). THE STC DID NOT SHOW THE BELL 222U OR 222B AS APPROVED MODELS FOR THE ASU STC. IN ADDITION THE REPAIR STATION WAS ALSO PLANNING TO MODIFY ANOTHER BELL 222U THE FOLLOWING WEEK. ||

I BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS SENDING THE INFORMATION TO THE REGION. AS OF 03/09/10 NO ANSWER HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE ACO OR REGION AS TO THE RELEVANCE OF THE APPROVED DATA FOR THESE MODELS OR THE FACT THAT THESE MODELS SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS APPROVED MODELS. ||

I WAS CONTACTED BY JIM BLAKE OF NORTH WEST MOUTAIN REGION TO INFORM ME THAT HE HAD FINALLY BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN THE DATA PACKAGES FROM THE ACO FOR THE BHT 222U AIRCRAFT. HE SAID HE WOULD SEND THEM TO ME FOR REVIEW TO DETERMINE IF THE 222U MODEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE STC. HE CALLED ME BACK A COUPLE OF HOUR LATER TO INFORM ME THAT THE ACO PROJECT MANAGER INFORMED HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY ASU TO INFORM HIM THEY WOULD BE SENDING ADDITIONAL DATA TO ADD THE 222U MODELS TO THE STC. IT APPEARS THAT SOMEONE WITH IN THE AGENCY HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ASU ON THIS MATTER.

39.	NM11	UABR		NM11CFK	C	C	3835		03/11/2010		
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201001939
 E903I (E-Air Agencies 903-Management I-Information)
 A MEETING WITH MANAGEMENT PERSONAL TO DISCUSS THE RECENT SURVEILLANCE PERFORMED DURING MODIFICATIONS ON SHIP N409EM AND N914EM LOCATED IN WICHITA, KANSAS. ||

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ITEMS NOTED DURING THE MODIFICATIONS. ||

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- 1. THE INSTALLATION OF THE LED NAV LIGHTS WERE DIFFERENT BETWEEN THE TWO SHIPS. ONE USED BLACK RTV TO SEAL AROUND THE OUTSIDE PERIMETER OF THE LIGHT ASSEMBLY AND THE OTHER WAS NOT. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE ONE NOT SEALED LEFT A GAP BETWEEN THE LED LIGHT ASSEMBLY AND THE STABILATOR. (CORROSION ISSUES?) ||
- ||
- 2. THE OEM LIGHTING FOR THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND THE OUT SIDE AIR TEMPERATURE GAUGE WERE NOT FILTERED FOR NIGHT VISION? ||
- ||
- 3. DRAWING NOTE # 29 IS CONFUSING IN REGARDS TO THE MECHANIC PERFORMING THE REQUIRED INSPECTION OF THE NVG SYSTEM ON AN ANNUAL BASES. ||
- ||
- 4. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT MAINTENANCE PERSONAL ALSO BE GIVEN TRAINING ON THE NVG MODIFICATION TO BETTER AID IN THEIR INSPECTIONS. ||
- ||
- 5. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO POSSIBLY INCLUDE THE VERBIAGE AS STATED ON THE LIMITATIONS SECTION OF THE STC ON THE ICA'S TO BETTER EDUCATE THE MAINTENANCE PERSONAL ABOUT ANY ADDITIONAL ALTERATIONS THAT MIGHT EFFECT THE NVG SYSTEM. ||
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- 6. FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENTS WERE DISCUSSED IN REGARDS TO ANY REVISIONS THAT MIGHT BE MANDATORY AND HOW WOULD THE OPERATOR KNOW OF ANY CHANGES WOULD BE REQUIRED

40.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	C	C	5835	03/11/2010
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201001940
 E699I (E-Air Agencies 699-Conformance I-Information)
 A MEETING WAS HELD AT THE ASU FACILITY TO DISCUSS RESENT SURVEILLANCE AND TO PROVIDE FEEDBACK FROM LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FIELD. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED: ||

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- 1) THE VISIBILITY OF THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND OAT INDICATOR DURING NVG OPERATIONS OF THE AS-350 MODEL AIRCRAFT. ||
- ||
- 2) WHAT CONSTITUTES A MANDATORY RFMS REVISION AND HOW THEY ARE TRACKED AND IMPLEMENTED. ||
- ||
- 3) ICA ACCURACY IN THE AS-350 AIRCRAFT (E.G. APPENDIX D WHEN NO SUCH APPENDIX IS INCLUDED IN THE DATA PACKAGE.) ||
- ||
- 4) THE UNSPECIFIC REFERENCES USED IN NOTE 29 OF THE DRAWING PACKAGES. IT APPEARS TO BE CAUSING A PROBLEM WITH THE ICA USE IN THE FIELD. IT'S VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE OPERATORS TO DETERMINE WHAT THE FILTERING REQUIREMENTS ARE DURING THE ANNUAL INSPECTIONS. ||
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- 5) LED POSITION AND STROBE LIGHTS ARE NOW BEING INCLUDED IN THE ASU NVG ALTERATION. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE ICA'S. ||
- ||
- 6) I MADE A RECOMMENDATION THAT INFORMATION FROM THE LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS SECTION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN BLOCK 8 OF THE 337. THIS WOULD HELP EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF EQUIPMENT THAT EMITS OR REFLECTS LIGHT AND THE PROCESS NEEDED TO EVALUATE AND APPROVE THIS EQUIPMENT. ||
- ||
- 7) SURVEILLANCE WOULD CONTINUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO EVALUATE NEW EMPLOYEE TRAINING AND SKILL SETS. ||
- ||
- 8) THE CHDO IS STILL WAITING TO RECEIVE THE REVISED DOCUMENTATION TO SUPPORT THE REPAIR STATIONS CHANGE IN RATINGS TO INCLUDE SPECIALIZED SERVICE. ||
- ||
- ASU MANAGEMNT TOOK THIS INFORMATION UNDER ADVISMENT AND WILL KEEP THE CHDO INFORMED AS TO ANY CHANGES IMPEMENTED AS A RESULT OF THIS MEETING. ||
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41.	NM11 201001928	UABR	MD-900	NM11MKB	C	C	5835		03/09/2010	N905LF	
<p>E801P (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) PURSUANT TO AN INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY THE ALLEGHENY FSDO I WAS ASKED TO REVIEW THE DATA PACKAGES FOR THE ALTERATION OF AN MD-900, N905LF, S/N 900-00011. THIS INVESTIGATION INVOLVED THE DAMAGE TO FOUR FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS THAT APPEARED TO NOT BE ALTERED IAW APPROVED DATA. MYSELF AND INSPECTOR KAREL REVIEWED THE DATA OBTAINED BY NORTHWEST MOUNTAIN TECHNICAL BRANCH, THE 135 OPERATOR (METRO AVIATION) AND THE WORK ORDER FROM THE REPAIR STATION (ASU UABR). DURING THE REVIEW SEVERAL AREAS OF CONCERN WERE IDENTIFIED. </p> <p> </p> <p>1) THE SYSTEMS & EQUIPMENT DER PROVIDED 8110-3 APPROVAL AT PROJECT REVISION LEVEL IR. REVISION CHANGES WERE MADE UP TO REVISION A AND A1 WITH OUT ANY ADDITIONAL DER INVOLVEMENT. </p> <p> </p> <p>2) THE SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED BY THE DER STATING THERE WAS NO EMI EVALUATION PERFORMED BECAUSE THERE WERE NO WIRING SYSTEMS CHANGES. HOWEVER, AT REVISION A THERE WERE. </p> <p> </p> <p>3) THE ICA'S DO NOT ADDRESS THE POSITION LIGHT INSTALLED AS PART OF THIS ALTERATION. </p> <p> </p> <p>4) THE FINAL APPROVED DRAWINGS RECEIVED FROM THE ACO DO NOT MATCH THE VERSIONS PROVIDED BY THE REPAIR STATION. </p> <p> </p> <p>5) AN ECO WITH REVISED DRAWINGS (REV A1) WERE COMPLETED BY THE REPAIR STATION AND SENT TO THE OPERATOR TO SUBSTANTIATE THE GRINDING OF FOUR INSTRUMENTS FOR THE INSTALLATION OF NVIS LIGHTING BARS. THIS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO THE INSTRUMENTS AND WAS DISCOVERED OVER A MONTH LATER WHEN SCHEDULED 91.411/91.413 TESTING WAS PERFORMED. THIS GRINDING WAS NOT APPROVED IN THE INITIAL APPROVED DATA. THIS ECO WAS NOT PART OF THE ACO'S APPROVED DATA PACKAGE. I'M UNSURE IF THIS DATA WAS ACTUALLY APPROVED BY THE ACO AT THE TIME IT WAS PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR SINCE THE ECO WAS INITIATED AFTER THE DAMAGE WAS DISCOVERED. </p> <p> </p> <p>THIS REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED ON 2/23/10 AND THE FINDING PRESENTED TO OFFICE MANAGEMENT THE SAME DAY. </p> <p> </p> <p>ON 3/03/10 A TELECON INVOLVING THIS OFFICE, REGION, AND REGIONAL COUNSEL TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. AFTER THE TELECON IT WAS DECIDED THAT I WOULD TRAVEL TO SEATTLE WITH THE DATA PACKAGES TO PRESENT THE ISSUES FOUND. I WAS NOTIFIED BY OFFICE MANAGEMENT ON 03/05/10 THAT REGIONAL COUNSEL HAD DECIDED NOT TO REVIEW THE DATA AND THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN. WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THESE ISSUES TO THE REGION AND THE ACO I FEEL THAT CORRECTIVE ACTION MAY NEVER TAKE PLACE. </p> <p> </p>											
42.	NM11 201001328	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	03/08/2010	N409EM	ICT
<p>E621I (E-Air Agencies 621-Conformance I-Information) S/N 2946 HOBBS: 1340.7 WO# 38748 </p> <p> </p> <p>THE WORK AWAY PROCEDURES WERE BEING FOLLOWED AS OUTLINED IN THEIR REPAIR STATION MANUAL.</p>											
43.	NM11 201001329	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11CFK	I	C	3606	145	03/08/2010	N914EM	ICT
<p>E211I (E-Air Agencies 211-Manuals I-Information) S/N 2652 HOBBS: 3262.6WO# 38749 </p> <p> </p> <p>THE WORK AWAY PROCEDURES WERE BEING FOLLOWED AS OUTLINED IN THEIR REPAIR STATION MANUAL.</p>											

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Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
44.	NM11 201001337	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11CFK	I	C	3608	145	03/08/2010	N409EM	ICT
<p>E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information) WORK ORDER # 38748 HOBBS: 1340.7 THE TASK INVOLVED MODIFYING THIS HELICOPTER FOR NIGHT VISION OPERATIONS. THE FAA APPROVED DATA WAS USED FOR THIS ALTERATION. THE CALIBRATION CURRENCY OF THE TOOLS USED WERE ADEQUATE. THE PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 145 REPAIR STATION MANUAL.</p>											
45.	NM11 201001338	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11CFK	I	C	3608	145	03/08/2010	N914EM	ICT
<p>E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information) WORK ORDER # 38749 HOBBS: 3262.6 THE TASK INVOLVED MODIFYING THIS HELICOPTER FOR NIGHT VISION OPERATIONS. THE FAA APPROVED DATA WAS USED FOR THIS ALTERATION. THE CALIBRATION CURRENCY OF THE TOOLS USED WERE ADEQUATE. THE PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 145 REPAIR STATION MANUAL.</p>											
46.	NM11 201001343	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11CFK	I	C	3654	145	03/08/2010	N914EM	ICT
<p>E317I (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports I-Information) WORK ORDER # 38749 HOBBS: 3262.6 THE TASK INVOLVED MODIFYING THIS HELICOPTER FOR NIGHT VISION OPERATIONS. THE FAA APPROVED DATA WAS USED FOR THIS ALTERATION. THE CALIBRATION CURRENCY OF THE TOOLS USED WERE ADEQUATE. THE PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 145 REPAIR STATION MANUAL. THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE GAUGE WERE NOT FILTERED FOR NVG. THE OEM LIGHTING IS STILL OPERATIONAL. THE FAA APPROVED DRAWINGS DID NOT ADDRESS THESE INSTRUMENTS.</p>											
47.	NM11 201001344	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11CFK	I	C	3654	145	03/08/2010	N409EM	ICT
<p>E801I (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information) WORK ORDER # 38748 HOBBS: 1340.7 THE TASK INVOLVED MODIFYING THIS HELICOPTER FOR NIGHT VISION OPERATIONS. THE FAA APPROVED DATA WAS USED FOR THIS ALTERATION. THE CALIBRATION CURRENCY OF THE TOOLS USED WERE ADEQUATE. THE PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 145 REPAIR STATION MANUAL. THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE GAUGE WERE NOT FILTERED FOR NVG. THE OEM LIGHTING IS STILL OPERATIONAL. THE FAA APPROVED DRAWINGS DID NOT ADDRESS THESE INSTRUMENTS.</p>											
48.	NM11 201001349	UABR		NM11CFK	I	C	3658	145	03/08/2010		ICT
<p>E539I (E-Air Agencies 539-Facilities/Equipment/Surface I-Information) THE CALIBRATION DATES FOR THE TOOLS USED FOR THE ALTERATION ON WORK ORDER # 38748 AND 38749 WERE IN DATE.</p>											
49.	NM11 201001356	UABR	AS-350-B2	NM11MKB	I	C	5606	145	03/05/2010	N914EM	BOI
<p>E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information) SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION WAS CONDUCTED USING ACCEPTABLE METHODS</p>											

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50.	NM11	UABR AS-350-B2	NM11MKB	I	C	5606	145	03/05/2010	N409EM	BOI
<p>201001360 E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information) SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION WAS CONDUCTED USING ACCEPTABLE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES. </p> <p> </p> <p>A QUESTION AROSE DURING THE SURVEILLANCE AS TO THE NEED TO INCLUDE NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHTING FOR THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND OAT INDICATOR. CURRENTLY UNDER NVG OPERATIONS THESE INSTRUMENTS APPEAR NOT BE VISIBLE SINCE THE OEM LIGHTING IS TURNED OFF DURING THESE OPERATIONS. </p> <p> </p> <p>THESE AREAS OF CONCERN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND THE NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION.</p>										
51.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	I	C	5608	145	03/05/2010	N408EM	BOI
<p>201001366 E801I (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information) SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION WAS CONDUCTED USING ACCEPTABLE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES. THE ALTERATION DID CONFORM TO THE APPROVED DATA. </p> <p> </p> <p>THIS ALTERATION INCLUDED NEW LED POSITION AND STROBE LIGHTS. THESE WERE INCLUDED IN THE APPROVED DATA. HOWEVER, THESE PARTS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE CURRENT ICA'S. THIS HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AND THE NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION. </p> <p> </p> <p>A QUESTION AROSE DURING THE SURVEILLANCE AS TO THE NEED TO INCLUDE NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHTING FOR THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND OAT INDICATOR. CURRENTLY UNDER NVG OPERATIONS THESE INSTRUMENTS APPEAR NOT BE VISIBLE SINCE THE OEM LIGHTING IS TURNED OFF DURING THESE OPERATIONS. </p> <p> </p> <p>THESE AREAS OF CONCERN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND THE NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION.</p>										
52.	NM11	UABR AS-350-B2	NM11MKB	I	C	5654	145	03/02/2010	N409EM	ICT
<p>201001372 E801I (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information) SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION WAS CONDUCTED USING ACCEPTABLE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES. </p> <p> </p> <p>A QUESTION AROSE DURING THE SURVEILLANCE AS TO THE NEED TO INCLUDE NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHTING FOR THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND OAT INDICATOR. CURRENTLY UNDER NVG OPERATIONS THESE INSTRUMENTS APPEAR NOT BE VISIBLE SINCE THE OEM LIGHTING IS TURNED OFF DURING THESE OPERATIONS. </p> <p> </p> <p>THESE AREAS OF CONCERN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND THE NORTH WEST MOUNTAIN REGION.</p>										

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53.	NM11 201001361	UABR		NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	02/05/2010		7G1
<p>E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) THE FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED AT THE REQUEST OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE AND THEIR CHDO. N1287G S/N: 208B0778 CESSNA 208B 1)RETURN TO SERVICE WAS ONE OF THE MIKE MISNICK FIELD APPROVALS. FEB 08, 2006 (STC PROJECT #ST9890SE-A) INITIAL APPROVAL OF THE CESSNA 208B STC SA01745SE WAS MARCH 28, 2007. THE DATA THE OPERATOR HAS MAY BE THE INITIAL STC PACKAGE AND NOT THE FINAL APPROVED DATA. 2)MISSING AFMS FOR NVG ALTERATION. 3)POSSIBLE UNAPPROVED ICA'S: ICA-208004-1 REV "A" MARCH 01, 2009 4)AUTOPILOT ANNUNCIATOR DOESN'T APPEAR TO BE FILTERED. DRAWING SHOWS FILTER INSTALLED. 5)"BELOW ICING MN SPD" INDICATOR MAY NEED FILTERED. WHITE LIGHT VISIBLE. 6)DRAWING SHOWS KT-70 TRANSPONDER, AIRCRAFT HAS A KT-71 INSTALLED. 7)DRAWING SHOWS MOTOROLA ASTRA RADIO INSTALLED. AIRCRAFT HAS A MOTOROLA SPECTRA RADIO INSTALLED. 8)DRAWING SHOWS KLN-89; AIRCRAFT HAS KLN-94 AND IT IS NOT FILTERED. 9)MD-41 GPWS ANNUNCIATOR NOT FILTERED. 10)ITEM "K" ON DWG 208004-014-000 MAY BE MISIDENTIFIED AS AN "RMI". 11)FIRST OFFICERS NAV SOURCE LIGHT IS FILTERED BUT APPEARS TO NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THE STC. 12)NAT AUDIO CONTROLLER IN REAR OF AIRCRAFT IS FILTERED BUT APPEARS TO NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THE STC. 13)CHRONOGRAPH, CAPT SIDE, DRAWING SHOWS A FILTER, CHRONOGRAPH IS UN-FILTERED, BUT HAS POST LIGHTS. 14)POST LIGHTS: DWG SHOWS POST LIGHTS THROUGHOUT BUT IS NOT CLEAR AS TO EXACT LOCATION AND QUANTITY. THE CHDO PMI WAS PRESENT FOR THIS SURVEILLANCE AND WILL FOLLOW UP WITH ALL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. HE MAY ALSO OPEN AN EIR IF NECESSARY. </p>											

54.	NM11 201001363	UABR		NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	02/05/2010		7G1
<p>E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem) THE FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED AT THE REQUEST OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE AND THEIR CHDO. N192P S/N 4336 BELL 206 1)RADIO ALTIMETER: DRAWING SHOWS FILTER ON DECISION HEIGHT LIGHT (DH). DH LIGHT IS INTERNAL TO INSTRUMENT AND WAS NOT FILTERED. 2)MACOMM DIGITAL RADIO (OPEN SKY 800 MHZ): DRAWING SHOWS RADIO DISPLAY BEING FILTERED. RADIO DISPLAY WAS NOT FILTERED. PILOT REPORTED WHITE "SELECT" KEYS WERE THE ISSUE, NOT SO MUCH THE DISPLAY. SELECT KEYS WERE SOFT TOUCH TYPE, PILOT PLACES UNIT INTO "STEALTH" MODE WHICH BLANKS DISPLAY AND BUTTONS DURING NVG OPERATIONS. RADIO MUST BE BROUGHT OUT OF "STEALTH" MODE TO CHANGE ANYTHING. THE EFFECT OF THIS WHITE LIGHT ON TOP OF THE GLARE SHIELD AND THE CURRENT WORK AROUND BEING USED BY THE PILOTS IS A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERN. 3)GPS KLN-89B: DRAWING SHOWS IT BEING FILTERED. GPS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE FILTERED. 4)SKY 497 TAS INDICATOR: DRAWING SHOWS THE INDICATOR BEING FILTERED. INDICATOR APPEARS NOT TO BE FILTERED. 5)CABIN NAT AUDIO SELECT PANEL: THE AUDIO CONTROLLER IN THE CABIN WAS FILTERED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE FRONT, BUT THE CABIN CONTROLLER WAS NOT</p>											

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Rec. No	Dsgn	Inspector	Act	A/C	Loc.
No	Record ID Code Make/Model Series	Code Result Status	No. FAR Status Date	Reg#	Depart
	LISTED ON THE DRAWINGS PROVIDED BY THE OPERATOR.				
	6)LOW ROTOR RPM INDICATOR LIGHT (CAUTION/WARNING PANEL): INDICATOR WAS THE INCORRECT COLOR. INDICATOR IS RED, SHOULD BE AMBER. BELL RFM VERIFIES THIS. THIS ISSUE WAS IDENTIFIED DURING PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCE. PLEASE PROVIDE THE STATUS OF ASU'S CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN THIS AREA AND NOTIFY THIS OFFICE OF ANY OTHER POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT THAT COULD HAVE THIS DEFICIENCY ASAP.				
	7)BACK LIGHTING FOR MAGNETIC COMPASS, HYD CONTROL PANEL AND OVHD SWITCH PANEL: WIRING DIAGRAMS DOES NOT APPEAR TO MATCH OPERATION OF LIGHTING IN THE AIRCRAFT.				
	N173P S/N 51370				
	BELL 206				
	1)MAGNETIC COMPASS WAS FILTERED, DRAWING SHOWS NVIS LAMP.				
	2)TRANSPONDER "IDENT" LIGHT IS UN-FILTERED, DRAWING CALLS FOR FILTER.				
	3)ILLUMINATED ROCKER SWITCHES IN REAR PASSENGER AREA, OVERHEAD LIGHTS ARE NOT NVIS COMPLIANT AND LIGHTS ARE NOT NVIS COMPLIANT. PLACARDS MAY BE APPROPRIATE.				
	4)TSO'D INSTRUMENTS MODIFIED BY DRILLING OUT ONE MOUNT HOLE TO ACCEPT A LARGER POST LIGHT ASSEMBLY. APPROVED DATA DOES NOT SEEM TO SUPPORT THIS MODIFICATION.				
	5)INITIAL INSTALLATION OF WIRING WAS A DUAL WIRE POST LIGHT INSTALLATION, THE NEW DATA PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR AS PART OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN WAS FOR A ONE WIRE INSTALLATION (CONFORMITY ISSUE).				
	N175P S/N 53316				
	BELL 407				
	1)RFMS WAS INITIAL RELEASE DATE 3/18/05, DOC# FMS-407004-4. CAP DATA RFMS WAS FMS-407004-6 REV "A" DATED 07/17/08. THE -6 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE RFM.				
	2)APPROVED DATA SHOWS 5 NAT AA SERIES AUDIO SELECTOR PANELS. AIRCRAFT HAS 3 INSTALLED.				
	3)KLN-89B NOT FILTERED, DATA SHOWS FILTER REQUIRED.				
	4)MAGNETIC COMPASS HAS NO LIGHTING IN ANY MODES. DRAWING SHOWS INTERNAL NVIS BULB.				
	5)NVG INSTRUMENT PANEL LIGHTING NOT PROPERLY ZONED IAW DRAWING.				
	6)APPROVED DATA SHOWS THREE (3) NVG POST LIGHTS. THE POST LIGHTS HAVE WHITE LIGHT BULBS. THIS PORTION OF THE ALTERATION MAY HAVE BEEN MISSED DURING THE INITIAL ALTERATION.				
	7)CAUTION/WARNING PANEL HAS A RED "ENGINE FIRE" LIGHT. RFM DOES NOT SHOW THE LIGHT.				
	THE CHDO PMI WAS PRESENT FOR THIS SURVEILLANCE AND WILL FOLLOW UP WITH ALL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. HE MAY ALSO OPEN AN EIR IF NECESSARY.				

55.	NM11	UABR ECD-EC135-P2+	NM11MKB	I	C	5618	145	02/05/2010	N845ME	7G1
	201001368									
	E647I (E-Air Agencies 647-Conformance I-Information)									
	DURING THIS SURVEILLANCE IT WAS NOTED THAT THE APPROVED DATA CONTAINED CONTRADICTIONARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROPER PLACARDING OF THE POTENTIOMETER PANEL. THE REPAIR STATION WILL CONFIRM THE PROPER PLACARDING OF THE PANEL WITH THE ACO AND REQUEST THE PROPER CHANGES BE MADE TO THE APPROVED DATA. THE OPERATOR WAS NOTIFIED AND HAS ALSO CONTACTED THE REPAIR STATION.									

56.	NM11	UABR ECD-EC135-P2+	NM11MKB	I	C	5656	145	02/05/2010	N845ME	BOI
	201001373									
	E647I (E-Air Agencies 647-Conformance I-Information)									
	DURING THIS SURVEILLANCE IT WAS NOTED THAT THE APPROVED DATA CONTAINED CONTRADICTIONARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PROPER PLACARDING OF THE POTENTIOMETER PANEL. THE REPAIR STATION WILL CONFIRM THE PROPER PLACARDING OF THE PANEL WITH THE ACO AND REQUEST THE PROPER CHANGES BE MADE TO THE									

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57.	NM11 UABR	NM11CFK	C	C	3372 141 01/27/2010		BOI

APPROVED DATA. THE OPERATOR WAS NOTIFIED AND HAS ALSO CONTACTED THE REPAIR STATION.

57. NM11 UABR NM11CFK C C 3372 141 01/27/2010 BOI
 201001801
 E299I (E-Air Agencies 299-Manuals I-Information)
 REVIEWED RSM/QCM AND TRAINING MANUALS. SENT OUT LETTER TO CERTIFICATE HOLDER FOR CORRECTIONS.||
 RSM/QCM||
 1. PAGE IV: MANUAL UPDATE AND DISTRIBUTION: A COPY OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT MANUAL DISTRIBUTION FORM NEEDS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FORMS SECTION OF THIS MANUAL. HOW IS THE MANUAL STATUS REPORT TRACKED AND CONTROLLED IN THE REPAIR STATION?||
 ||
 2. PAGE V: HOW MANY DAYS AFTER THE REVISION IS COMPLETED WILL THE CHDO BE NOTIFIED?||
 ||
 3. PAGE 1-2: FLOOR PLAN: THE FLOOR PLAN TEXT IS NOT LEGIBLE. ||
 ||
 4. PAGE 2-1: COMPANY ORGANIZATION: NEED TO INCLUDE INSPECTORS IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL FLOW CHART.||
 ||
 5. PAGE 3-1: SECTION 3: NEED TO INCLUDE THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE INSPECTORS.||
 ||
 6. PAGE 3-2: QUALITY MANGER/CHIEF INSPECTOR: REMOVE RELEASING TO SERVICE OF ENGINES, PROPELLERS AND APPLIANCES. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE REPAIR STATION.||
 ||
 7. PAGE 3-5: TECHNICIAN: REMOVE "ACCOMPLISH MAINTENANCE" AND ADD AUTHORIZED TO SIGN A MAINTENANCE RELEASE FOR APPROVING A MAINTAINED OR ALTERED ARTICLE FOR RETURN TO SERVICE. ||
 ||
 8. PAGE 4-2: ADD REFERENCE TO "RECORD OF EMPLOYEE'S TRAINING FORM 145-ETR-1".||
 ||
 9. PAGE 5-4: CAPABILITY LIST PROCEDURE: REMOVE THE TWO YEAR REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN THE SELF EVALUATION FORM 145-CAPSE-1). REMOVE 30 BUSINESS DAYS AND ADD 5 BUSINESS DAYS FOR PROVIDING THE CHDO WITH A COPY OF THE REVISED CAPABILITIES LIST AND REMOVE THE 30 BUSINESS DAYS FOR NON-ACCEPTANCE.||
 ||
 10. PAGE 5-5: RECORD OF WORK: MUST COMPLY WITH FAR PART 145.219.||
 ||
 11. PAGE 5-6: IN PROGRESS INSPECTION: WHAT MANUAL RECOMMENDATIONS? ADD SHALL BE RECORDED ON 145-WOL-1.||
 ||
 12. PAGE 5-10: DEFICIENCY PROCESS PROCEDURE: HOW OFTEN WILL THIS PROCESS TAKE PLACE? AND # 5 DOES NOT PERTAIN TO THIS PARAGRAPH. ||
 ||
 13. PAGE 5-10: FINAL INSPECTION AND RELEASE TO SERVICE: CHANGE THE TITLE OF THIS PARAGRAPH TO READ RETURN TO SERVICE.||
 ||
 14. PAGE 5-11: FAA FORM 337: PAGE 3 OF THE FAA FORM 337?||
 ||
 15. PAGE 5-11: LOG BOOK ENTRY: ADD FAR 43.9, PARAGRAPH A.||
 ||
 16. PAGE 5-11: RETURN TO SERVICE DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION PROCESS: INCLUDE STC COVER SHEET AS PART OF THIS PROCESS.||
 ||
 17. PAGE 5-14: SUBCONTRACTED MAINTENANCE: STATE HOW OFTEN THE QUALITY MANAGER/ CHIEF INSPECTOR WILL MAINTAIN AND REVISE THE CONTRACT INFORMATION AND TIME RESTRAINT TO NOTIFY THE CHDO.||
 ||
 18. PAGE 5-15: HOW WILL DEVIATIONS TO THIS PROCESS BE ADDRESSED?||
 ||
 TRAINING||

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn	Inspector	Act	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
61.	NM11 UABR 201001364	NM11MKB	F C	5608 145	11/23/2009 BOI

Record ID Code Make/Model Series Code Result Status No. FAR Status Date

IT WAS NOTED THAT ALL THE RED LINED DRAWING CHANGES WERE NOT ROLLED INTO THE APPROVED DATA. THE REQUIREMENT TO REMOVE PIN G ON THE -13 DRAWING WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH. PIN G WAS NOT REMOVED. THE WIRE GOING INTO PIN G WAS CUT BEHIND THE CANNON PLUG AND WAS CAPPED AND STOWED.||

||

ALTHOUGH THE ELECTRICAL EFFECT WAS THE SAME IN BOTH METHODS OF TERMINATING THIS WIRE IT'S IMPERATIVE THAT THE WORK PERFORMED IS IAW THE APPROVED DATA.

||

||

FOLLOW UP INSPECTIONS WILL BE PERFORMED IN THIS AREA.

61. NM11 UABR NM11MKB F C 5608 145 11/23/2009 BOI

201001364

E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

N15460 WAS MODIFIED TO INSTALL STC SR019555E. AFTER REVIEWING THE WORK ORDER IT WAS NOTED THAT ALL THE RED LINED DRAWING CHANGES WERE NOT ROLLED INTO THE APPROVED DATA. THE REQUIREMENT TO REMOVE PIN G ON THE -13 DRAWING WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH. PIN G WAS NOT REMOVED. THE WIRE GOING INTO PIN G WAS CUT BEHIND THE CANNON PLUG AND WAS CAPPED AND STOWED.

62. NM11 UABR NM11MKB F C 5606 145 11/03/2009 N145FH ORD

201001357

E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

ALL REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS NOTED THAT SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE A 1 AMP LIGHTING CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS DISCOVERED POPPED. LATER TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THAT THE WIRING SUPPLING POWER THE THE NEW NVIS COMPATIBLE GOOSNECK LIGHT HAD BEEN CRIMPED WHEN THE LIGHT WAS INSTALLED. THIS CAUSED A SHORT IN THIS LIGHTING CIRCUIT CAUSING THE 1 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKER TO POP.||

||

FOLLOW UP SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED TO ENSURE PROPER INSPECTIONS ARE BEING PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE ALTERED AIRCRAFT BEING RETURNED TO SERVICE.

63. NM11 UABR NM11MKB F C 5608 145 11/03/2009 N145FH ORD

201001365

E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

ALL REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS NOTED THAT SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE A 1 AMP LIGHTING CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS DISCOVERED POPPED. LATER TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THAT THE WIRING SUPPLING POWER THE THE NEW NVIS COMPATIBLE GOOSNECK LIGHT HAD BEEN CRIMPED WHEN THE LIGHT WAS INSTALLED. THIS CAUSED A SHORT IN THIS LIGHTING CIRCUIT CAUSING THE 1 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKER TO POP.||

||

FOLLOW UP SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED TO ENSURE PROPER INSPECTIONS ARE BEING PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE ALTERED AIRCRAFT BEING RETURNED TO SERVICE.

64. NM11 UABR NM11MKB F C 5618 145 11/03/2009 ORD

201001367

E801P (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

ALL REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION WAS REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. IT WAS NOTED THAT SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE A 1 AMP LIGHTING CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS DISCOVERED POPPED. LATER TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED THAT THE WIRING SUPPLING POWER THE THE NEW NVIS COMPATIBLE GOOSNECK LIGHT HAD BEEN CRIMPED WHEN THE LIGHT WAS INSTALLED. THIS CAUSED A SHORT IN THIS LIGHTING CIRCUIT CAUSING THE 1 AMP CIRCUIT BREAKER TO POP.||

||

FOLLOW UP SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED TO ENSURE PROPER INSPECTIONS ARE BEING PERFORMED PRIOR TO THE ALTERED AIRCRAFT BEING RETURNED TO SERVICE.

65. SW03 UABR BO-105 SW03LGS C C 3454 145 10/22/2009 N911JF

201000072

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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E307P (E-Air Agencies 307-Records/Reports P-Potential Problem)
 REVIEWED A COPY OF A 337 THAT WAS EXECUTED BY UABR273K IN SUPPORT OF A NVIS INSTALLATION. THE 337 REFERENCED AN INCORRECT APPROVAL DATE FOR THE ACCOMPANYING FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT. THE AIRCRAFT OPERATOR (HDNA) REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A CORRECTED COPY FROM THE REPAIR STATION.

66.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	09/30/2009	NN202C	NV75
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200903163
 E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)
 INSPECTED AN ALTERATION PERFORMED BY THE REPAIR STATION ON 1-22-07. IT WAS RE-CONFORMED AS PART OF ORDER 8900.51 ON 02-11-09. THE ONLY PHOTO EVIDENCE USED FOR THE CONFORMITY WAS OBTAINED ON 05-14-08. ||
 ||
 AN ECO WAS LATER GENERATED TO INSTALL A FILTER ON THE CLOCK. THIS HAD NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED DURING THE MDL ADDITION OF THIS S/N ON 07-18-08.||
 ||
 A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE OPERATOR BY ASU ASKING THAT THE REVISED DRAWINGS ADDING THE NEW FILTER BE INSTALL IN THE AIRCRAFT DOCUMENTATION. THE ECO WAS DATED 01-13-09. THE LETTER WAS DATED 04-22-09. THE LETTER MADE NO MENTION OF THE NEED TO INSTALL A NEW FILTER. ||
 ||
 ON 09-16-09 DURING MY SURVEILLANCE I DISCOVERED THIS FACT AND VERIFIED THAT A FILTER HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED. THE OPERATOR DECLINED HAVING ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEED FOR A FILTER AND HAD NOT RECEIVED ONE FROM ASU. ASU WAS CONTACTED, A FILTER WAS RECEIVED AND INSTALLED BY THE OPERATOR. LATER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT A FILTER WAS SHIPPED BY ASU TO A LOCATION OTHER THAN WERE THE DOM'S FACILITY IS LOCATED. THE DATE OF THAT SHIPMENT WAS 07-27-09.||
 ||
 WHILE REVIEWING THE APPROVED DATA USED DURING THE CONFORMITY, PERFORMED 02-11-09, I DISCOVERED THE TDFM RADIOS DEPICTED ON THE APPROVED INSTALLATION DATA AND ICA WERE NOT THE ONES INSTALLED IN THE AIRCRAFT. TDFM-618'S WERE SHOWN AND TDFM 500'S WERE INSTALLED. THE TDFM 500'S WERE INSTALLED BY THE OPERATOR ON 9-11-08. A 337 WAS COMPLETED BY THE OPERATOR AT THIS TIME.||
 ||
 ||
 ||

67.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	F	C	5608	145	09/30/2009	N202CF	NV75
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200903165
 E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
 INSPECTED AN ALTERATION PERFORMED BY THE REPAIR STATION ON 1-22-07. IT WAS RE-CONFORMED AS PART OF ORDER 8900.51 ON 02-11-09. THE ONLY PHOTO EVIDENCE USED FOR THE CONFORMITY WAS OBTAINED ON 05-14-08. ||
 ||
 AN ECO WAS LATER GENERATED TO INSTALL A FILTER ON THE CLOCK. THIS HAD NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED DURING THE MDL ADDITION OF THIS S/N ON 07-18-08.||
 ||
 A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE OPERATOR BY ASU ASKING THAT THE REVISED DRAWINGS ADDING THE NEW FILTER BE INSTALL IN THE AIRCRAFT DOCUMENTATION. THE ECO WAS DATED 01-13-09. THE LETTER WAS DATED 04-22-09. THE LETTER MADE NO MENTION OF THE NEED TO INSTALL A NEW FILTER. ||
 ||
 ON 09-16-09 DURING MY SURVEILLANCE I DISCOVERED THIS FACT AND VERIFIED THAT A FILTER HAD NOT BEEN INSTALLED. THE OPERATOR DECLINED HAVING ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NEED FOR A FILTER AND HAD NOT RECEIVED ONE FROM ASU. ASU WAS CONTACTED, A FILTER WAS RECEIVED AND INSTALLED BY THE OPERATOR. LATER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT A FILTER WAS SHIPPED BY ASU TO A LOCATION OTHER THAN WERE THE DOM'S FACILITY IS LOCATED. THE DATE OF THAT SHIPMENT WAS 07-27-09.||
 ||
 WHILE REVIEWING THE APPROVED DATA USED DURING THE CONFORMITY, PERFORMED 02-11-09, I DISCOVERED THE TDFM RADIOS DEPICTED ON THE APPROVED

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR Status	Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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INSTALLATION DATA AND ICA WERE NOT THE ONES INSTALLED IN THE AIRCRAFT. TDFM-618'S WERE SHOWN AND TDFM 500'S WERE INSTALLED. THE TDFM 500'S WERE INSTALLED BY THE OPERATOR ON 9-11-08. A 337 WAS COMPLETED BY THE OPERATOR AT THIS TIME.||

||
WHILE REVIEWING THE WORK ORDER FOR THIS ALTERATION (# 31649) THE FOLLOWING WAS NOTED.||

||
THE CONFORMITY PERFORMED IAW 8900.51 WAS COMPLETED ON THE WORK ORDER FORM ON 11-12-08 HOWEVER, THE 337 CONFORMITY WAS NOT COMPLETED UNTIL 02-12-09. ||

||
WHILE REVIEWING THE WORK ORDER PACKAGE SEVERAL ERRORS WERE DISCOVERED. DOCUMENTS WITH THIS WORK ORDER NUMBER, REGISTRATION AND SERIAL NUMBER WERE IN THE WORK ORDER BUT THE DATA PERTAINED TO ANOTHER OPERATOR AND DIFFERANT AIRCRAFT E.G. AGUSTA 119 AND BHT 222. ||

||
A COPY OF THE STC CERTIFICATE WAS NOT ON FILE AS PART OF THE AIRCRAFT PERMANENT RECORD AS REQUIRED BY THE LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS OF THE STC #SR01476SE.||

||
A 337 FOR ANOTHER AIRCRAFT WAS DISCOVERED IN THE WORK ORDER FILE. THIS 337 WAS ALSO PART OF THE OPERATORS RECORDS. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO BOTH THEIR ATTENTION FOR PROPER ACTION. ||

68.	NM11	UABR ECD-EC135-T2+	NM11MKB	C	C	5732	145	09/28/2009	N235U	WS27
		200903080							W	

E617P (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance P-Potential Problem)
SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSPECT AN ALTERATION PERFORMED BY ASU TO INSTALL STC # SR01207SE ON N.235UW, S/N 0548, AN EC 135 T2+. THIS ALTERATION WAS STARTED ON 05-14-09 AND WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 05-22-09. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEILLANCE IS DETAILED BELOW.||

||
1) THE POTENTIOMETERS (3) USED TO CONTROL THE SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM WERE NOT PLACARDED OR INSTALLED IAW THE APPROVED DRAWINGS E.G. 135-0548-012, 135-0548-013 AND 135-0548-014.||

||
2) THE POTENTIOMETERS (3) WERE NOT INSTALLED OR PLACARDED IAW CHAPTER 4 FIGURE 4-1 OF THE ICA #135004-4 REV A 12/27/07.||

||
3) THE ICA APPENDICES OF ICA #135004-4 REV A 12/27/07 DID NOT DEPICT THE PLACARDING OR INSTALLATION OF THE POTENTIOMETERS.||

||
A LETTER OF INVESTIGATION WAS SENT OUT IN THIS MATTER.||

||
AFTER RECEIVING A RESPONSE BACK FROM THE REPAIR STATION AN EDT WAS PERFORMED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A LETTER OF CORRECTION WAS APPROPRIATE AND ISSUED IN THIS MATTER.

69.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	I	C	5661	145	08/19/2009	BOI	
		200901227								

E402I (E-Air Agencies 402-Training I-Information)
A REVIEW OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM IDENTIFIED AREAS THAT COULD USE IMPROVEMENT. A REVISION TO THE APPROVED PROGRAM HAS BEEN SUBMITTED.

70.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	I	C	3650	145	08/10/2009	BOI	
		200901196								

E801P (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
THIS REPAIR STATION HAS HAD SEVERAL ENFORCEMENT AGAINST IT THIS YEAR AND NEED MORE SURVEILLANCE IN FUTURE.||

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	SEE ADDITIONAL PTRS ON THIS CRS AND ENFORCEMENTS.										
	THIS OFFICE IS DOING ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE THIS FISCAL YEAR AND BEYOND.										

71.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5650	145	08/05/2009		BOI
	200901219										
	E617I (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance I-Information)										
	ALL THE REQUIRED AREAS HAVE BEEN INSPECTED.MANY AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED DURING OTHER SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS IN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.										
	SOME IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BUT OVER ALL THE QUALITY PROCESSES MUST BE OVERHAULED.										
	PRICIPLE INSPECTORS WILL CONTINUE WORKING WITH MANAGEMENT TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE QUALITY PROCESSES AS WELL AS REPAIR STATION MANUALS.										

72.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	S	C	5654	145	08/05/2009		BOI
	200901220										

73.	NM11	UABR	ECD-EC135-T2+	NM11MKB	E	C	5606	145	07/30/2009	N235U	WS27
	200901213										
	E610I (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance I-Information)										
	SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSPECT AN ALTERATION PERFORMED BY ASU TO INSTALL STC # SR01207SE ON N295UW, S/N 0548, AN EC 135 T2+. THIS ALTERATION WAS STARTED ON 05-14-09 AND WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 05-22-09. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEILLANCE IS DETAILED BELOW.										
	1) THE OPERATOR DID NOT HAVE A COPY OF THE STC CERTIFICATE MAINTAINED AS PART OF THE PERMANENT RECORDS OF THE MODIFIED AIRCRAFT AS REQUIRED BY THE LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS SECTION OF THE STC.										
	NOTE: THIS WAS VERIFIED BY THE AIR METHODS LEAD MECHANIC ON SIGHT USING THE LOCAL RECORDS AS WELL AS THE RECORDS MAINTAINED ON THE INTRANET BY THE PART 135 OPERATOR.										
	2) THE POTENTIOMETERS (3) USED TO CONTROL THE SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM WERE NOT PLACARDED OR INSTALLED IAW THE APPROVED DRAWINGS E.G. 135-0548-012,135-0548-013 AND 135-0548-014.										
	3) THE POTENTIOMETERS (3) WERE NOT INSTALLED OR PLACARDED IAW CHAPTER 4 FIGURE 4-1 OF THE ICA #135004-4 REV A 12/27/07.										
	4) THE ICA APPENDICES OF ICA #135004-4 REV A 12/27/07 DID NOT DEPICT THE PLACARDING OR INSTALLATION OF THE POTENTIOMETERS.										
	FOLLOW UP OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE OPERATOR AS WELL AS THE REPAIR STATION WILL BE CONDUCTED.										

74.	NM11	UABR	ECD-EC135-T2+	NM11MKB	F	C	5608	145	07/30/2009	N235U	WS27
	200901215										
	E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information)										
	SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED TO INSPECT AN ALTERATION PERFORMED BY ASU TO INSTALL STC # SR01207SE ON N295UW, S/N 0548, AN EC 135 T2+. THIS ALTERATION WAS STARTED ON 05-14-09 AND WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE ON 05-22-09. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEILLANCE IS DETAILED BELOW.										
	1) THE OPERATOR DID NOT HAVE A COPY OF THE STC CERTIFICATE MAINTAINED AS PART OF THE PERMANENT RECORDS OF THE MODIFIED AIRCRAFT AS REQUIRED BY THE LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS SECTION OF THE STC.										
	NOTE: THIS WAS VERIFIED BY THE AIR METHODS LEAD MECHANIC ON SIGHT USING THE LOCAL RECORDS AS WELL AS THE RECORDS MAINTAINED ON THE INTRANET BY THE PART 135 OPERATOR.										

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Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	<p>2) THE POTENTIOMETERS (3) USED TO CONTROL THE SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM WERE NOT PLACARDED OR INSTALLED IAW THE APPROVED DRAWINGS E.G. 135-0548-012,135-0548-013 AND 135-0548-014. </p> <p>3) THE POTENTIOMETERS (3) WERE NOT INSTALLED OR PLACARDED IAW CHAPTER 4 FIGURE 4-1 OF THE ICA #135004-4 REV A 12/27/07. </p> <p>4) THE ICA APPENDICES OF ICA #135004-4 REV A 12/27/07 DID NOT DEPICT THE PLACARDING OR INSTALLATION OF THE POTENTIOMETERS. </p> <p>FOLLOW UP OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY THE OPERATOR AS WELL AS THE REPAIR STATION WILL BE CONDUCTED. </p> <p>IMPROVEMENTS IN THE QUALITY SYSTEM WOULD HAVE PRETENDED THESE ERRORS. </p> <p>THE PRINCIPLE INSPECTOR WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS IN THIS AREA.</p>										

75.	NM11	UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3657	145	07/14/2009		BOI
	<p>200901032</p> <p>E533I (E-Air Agencies 533-Facilities/Equipment/Surface I-Information)</p> <p>INSPECTION OF SHOP AND FACILITY WITH PAI ON THIS DATE FOUND SHOP AND OFFICE IN GOOD ORDER THIS DATE.</p>										

76.	NM11	UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3601	145	07/14/2009		BOI
	<p>200901115</p> <p>E841I (E-Air Agencies 841-Maintenance I-Information)</p> <p>INSPECTION OF PART ROOM FOR SHELF LIFE ITEMS SHOWED NO OVERDUE DATES AT THIS TIME. </p> <p>INSPECTION OF FIELD KITS FOUND LOTS OF WORK ORDERS BUT NO KITS BUILT UP. PART ROOM CLERK STATED THEY DIDN'T HAVE PARTS TO COMPLETE WORK ORDER AT THIS TIME. </p> <p>INVENTORY SEEMED LOWER THAN AT ANY TIME IN PAST SURVEILLANCE. </p> <p>THEY HAD NO GLASS OR LAMPS IN STOCK OR WIRE CUT FOR PROJECTS OUT GOING NEXT WEEK. </p> <p>NOTE: THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN PAST YEAR AND HALF I'VE SEEN THERE PARTS ROOM LOW.</p>										

77.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	S	C	5656	145	07/14/2009		BOI
	<p>200901222</p>										

78.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	S	C	5657	145	07/14/2009		BOI
	<p>200901223</p>										

79.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5731	145	07/09/2009		
	<p>200902522</p> <p>E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)</p> <p>AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON N311AE AFTER AN ALTERATION WAS PERFORMED TO INSTALL AN NVG COMPATIBLE SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM. THIS AIRCRAFT IS OPERATED BY AIR EVAC A HEMS OPERATOR. DURING THIS INSPECTION THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE FOUND: </p> <p>1) THE ALTERED WARNING/CAUTION PANEL DID NOT MATCH THE APPROVED DATA OR THE FLIGHT MANUAL. THE BAGGAGE DOOR AND GEN FAIL LIGHTS WERE INCORRECT. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OPERATOR, THEIR PMI, ACO AND MANAGEMENT. </p>										

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
81.	EA23 200902355	UABR		EA23RES	I	C	3671	65	05/20/2009		BUF
<p>E801I (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information) PERFORMED SURVEILLANCE ON THIS MECHANIC WHILE WORKING AWAY FROM HOME FOR THIS REPAIR STATION, UABR, INSTALLING A NIGHT VISION GOGGLE STC. ALL PAPERWORK WAS IN ORDER AND THIS MECHANIC HAD HIS CERTIFICATE WITH HIM. THIS ITEM IS CLOSED.</p>											
82.	EA23 200902365	UABR		EA23RES	I	C	3671	65	05/20/2009		BUF
<p>E801I (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information) PERFORMED SURVEILLANCE ON THIS MECHANIC WHILE WORKING AWAY FROM HOME FOR THIS REPAIR STATION, UABR, INSTALLING A NIGHT VISION GOGGLE STC. ALL PAPERWORK WAS IN ORDER AND THIS MECHANIC HAD HIS CERTIFICATE WITH HIM. THIS ITEM IS CLOSED.</p>											
83.	WP13 200904702	UABR	MD-500-N	WP13HLR	C	C	3454	43	05/20/2009	N501HP	HNL
<p>E317I (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports I-Information) AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, INC. WAS HIRED TO INSTALL PER STC # SP01635SE A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM THAT IS MANUFACTURED AND INSTALLED IAW MASTER DRAWING LIST MDL-500004-3, REV. IR, DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 2005 AND MAINTAINED IAW THE ICA -500004-3, REVISION 3 IR DATED OCTOBER 3, 2005. AN FAA FORM WAS COMPLETED 01-30-2006 BY REPAIR STATION #UABR272K AND APPROVED RETURN TO SERVICE BY IA 2764671 ON 01/30/2006. A FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT WAS APPROVED BY MANAGER, SEATTLE ACO DATED OF APPROVAL: 01/17/2006. 05/18/2009 UPDATED COMPLETED FAA FORM 337. WILL BE CONTACTING MR. JAMES L. BLAKE, TECH SUPPORT AT 425 227-1710 TO DISCUSS FURTHER ACTION. PTRS CLOSED </p>											
84.	NM11 200901186	UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3604	145	05/06/2009		BOI
<p>E901I (E-Air Agencies 901-Management I-Information) REVIEW OF RSM/QSM AND MANAGEMENT CHARTS AND RETURN TO SERVICE AUTHORITY. FOUND TO BE CURRENT ON THIS DATE.</p>											
85.	NM11 200901193	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11DCD	I	C	3606	145	05/06/2009	N229AE	BOI
<p>E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information) INSPECTION OF WORK AWAY AND WORK ORDERS FOR ASU. INSPECTED LOG BOOK ENTRY ACFT TT 27785.7 REF W/O 35896 337 DATED 04/17/2009 REF STC: SR01383SE ACO CONCURRENCE 04/10/2009. ADDED TO MDL 04/10/09 ICA-206004-4 REV A DATED 01/07/08 INSPECTED OUT OF SERVICE LOG ENTRY DATED 04/09/09 AND RETURN TO SERVICE DATED 04/17/09 ALL ENTRY'S WERE FOUND TO BE I/A/W RES/QSM ON THIS DATE.</p>											

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Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
86.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	05/06/2009	N311AE	BOI
<p>200901211 E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED ON WORK AWAY MAINTENANCE, AN ALTERATION WAS PERFORMED ON THIS AIRCRAFT TO INSTALL A SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM UNDER STC SR01383SE. IT APPEARS THAT THE ALTERATION MAY NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED IAW THE LIMITATION AND CONDITIONS OF THE STC. THE PAI FOR AIR EVAC, THE PART 135 CERTIFICATE HOLDER CALLED ME ON 3/19/09 TO INFORM ME THAT HE HAD PERFORMED SURVEILLANCE ON THIS AIRCRAFT AND THE SKYTRAC SYSTEM WAS NOT FILTERED. THIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FILTERING ON AN IDENTICAL SYSTEM ON N19AE SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR. AN INVESTIGATION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE IF THIS ALTERATION WAS PERFORMED OUTSIDE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LIMITATION AND CONDITIONS OF THE STC. </p>											
87.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11MKB	I	C	5606	145	05/06/2009	N229AE	BOI
<p>200901212 E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information) WORK AWAY SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED FOR THE ALTERATION OF THE AIRCRAFT LIGHTING SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM WAS PERFORMED FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION AND MAINTENANCE PERFORMED WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE CRS MANUALS. THE FOLLOWING WERE AREAS THAT REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1) THE TECHNICIAN/INSPECTOR INSTALLED BLUE RING TERMINALS FOR THE SYSTEM CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCH. THE WIRING USED WAS 20 AWG THEREFORE, A RED RING TERMINAL WAS REQUIRED. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE TECHNICIANS ATTENTION TO PREVENT UNDUE DELAY WITH THE ALTERATION. THE TECHNICIAN/INSPECTOR RE-TERMINATED THE WIRING WITH THE CORRECT TERMINALS. 2) DURING THE ALTERATION THE ACK ELT REMOTE SWITCH WAS FILTERED. THE TECHNICIAN/INSPECTOR FAILED TO COMPLETELY FILTER THE LED E.G. THE HEAT SHRINKABLE TUBING WAS NOT INSTALLED AND SEALANT WAS NOT APPLIED. DURING THE LIGHT LEAKAGE TESTING THIS SYSTEM WAS NOT INSPECTED. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TECHNICIAN/INSPECTOR SO IT COULD BE CORRECTED WITHOUT DELAYING THE ALTERATION. THE COMPLETED WORK ORDER WAS REVIEWED ON 05/05/09. NO OTHER DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED. A LETTER WITH THE DEFICIENCIES FOUND WILL BE SENT TO THE ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER.</p>											
88.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5732	145	04/14/2009		
<p>200901971 E617U (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance U-Unacceptable) WHILE PERFORMING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A REPAIR STATION TECHNICIAN RETURNED AN AIRCRAFT TO SERVICE WHEN THAT TECHNICIAN WAS NOT CERTIFICATED UNDER 14 CFR PART 65. A LETTER OF INVESTIGATION WAS SENT TO THE REPAIR STATION ON 02/24/09. A RESPONSE TO THE LOI WAS RECEIVED ON 03-04-09. ASU WILL IMPLEMENT A DOCUMENTED INTERNAL PROCEDURE DIRECTED BY THE QUALITY MANAGER. ALSO THE AIRCRAFT EFFECTED WILL BE RE-INSPECTED AND THE THE AIRCRAFT RECORD DOCUMENTED. A SNAAP LOC WILL BE SENT TO THE REPAIR STATION. A FOLLOW UP TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED.</p>											
89.	NM11	UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3656	145	04/13/2009		AL53

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
200901200	E647I (E-Air Agencies 647-Conformance I-Information)									
	INSPECTION OF ALTERATION OF BHT-206-L1 AT MUSCLE SHAOLS AL FOUND THAT THE MECHANIC HAD 145 MANUALS ON COMPUTER AT TIME OF INSPECTION. MECHANIC HAD BHT MANUALS ON COMPUTER AT AIR EVAC OFFICE AT THIS BASE. MECHANIC DIDN'T CHECK TO SEE IF STC WERE AND ICA WERE PRESENT AT TIME OF ALTERATION. THIS WAS COVERED DURING OUT BRIEFING WITH MECHANIC AND HE STATED HE WOULD ADJUST THE NEXT TIME HE ALTERED AN ACFT.									
90.	NM11 UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11DCD	I	C	3658	145	04/13/2009	N229AE	AL53
	200901201	E644I (E-Air Agencies 644-Conformance I-Information)								
	INSPECTED CAL TOOLS AND HAND TOOLS FOUND TO BE WITHIN CALIBRATION ON THIS INSPECTION.									
91.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3654	145	04/13/2009		AL53
	200901206	E801I (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information)								
	IN PROGRESS INSPECTION ON W/O35896 IN AL53 AB. N229AE BHT 206-L1. ONE ITEM NOTED WAS MECHANIC DIDN'T HAVE ALL STC REVIEWED AT TIME OF INSTALLATION AND THIS BECAME A MINOR FACTOR. ALSO HE TRIED TO INSTALL THE WRONG SIZE WIRE TERMINAL BUT WAS CORRECTED BY PAI AT THAT TIME.									
92.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5601	145	04/13/2009		BOI
	200901208	E843I (E-Air Agencies 843-Maintenance I-Information)								
	WORK AWAY SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED FOR THE ALTERATION OF THE AIRCRAFT LIGHTING SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM WAS PERFORMED FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION AND MAINTENANCE PERFORMED WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE CRS MANUALS AND PROCEDURES FOR PARTS AND MATERIALS.									
93.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3775		04/13/2009		BOI
	200901463	E599I (E-Air Agencies 599-Facilities/Equipment/Surface I-Information)								
	I AM FORWARDING THIS SUP CASE TO THE BOI FSDO FOR INVESTIGATION. IT PERTAINS TO ASU INVENTORIES ON FILTER ASSEMBLIES. PLEASE COORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES WITH ANM-240.									
	CLOSED NO ACTION ASU CERTIFICATE REVOKED ON 04/08.									
94.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5658	145	04/10/2009		BOI
	200901224	E817I (E-Air Agencies 817-Maintenance I-Information)								
	WORK AWAY SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED FOR THE ALTERATION OF THE AIRCRAFT LIGHTING SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM WAS PERFORMED FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION AND MAINTENANCE PERFORMED WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE CRS MANUALS.									
	THE TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT USED DURING THIS ALTERATION WERE SERVICIABLE AND CALIBRATED IAW CRS MANUAL PROCEEDURES AND PART 145 REQUIREMENTS.									
95.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5660	145	04/10/2009		BOI
	200901226	E209I (E-Air Agencies 209-Manuals I-Information)								
	WORK AWAY SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED FOR THE ALTERATION OF THE AIRCRAFT LIGHTING SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM WAS PERFORMED FOR NVIS COMPATIBILITY. THE ALTERATION AND MAINTENANCE PERFORMED WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE CRS MANUALS.									

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THE MANUAL SYSTEM WAS AVAILABLE ELECTRONICLY BY THE TECHNICIAN/INSPECTOR. ||

E205I (E-Air Agencies 205-Manuals I-Information)
THE MANUALS WERE CURRENT.

E207I (E-Air Agencies 207-Manuals I-Information)
THE MANUALS WERE DISTRIBUTED VIA THE COMPANY COMPUTER SYSTEM THAT CAN BE REMOTELY ACCESSED.

96.	NM11	UABR BHT-206-L1	NM11MKB	F	C	5618	145	03/31/2009	N311AE	BOI
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200901218
E801P (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON N311AE AFTER AN ALTERATION WAS PERFORMED TO INSTALL AN NVG COMPATIBLE SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM. THIS AIRCRAFT IS OPERATED BY AIR EVAC A HEMS OPERATOR. DURING THIS INSPECTION THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE FOUND: ||

1) THE ALTERED WARNING/CAUTION PANEL DID NOT MATCH THE APPROVED DATA OR THE FLIGHT MANUAL. THE BAGGAGE DOOR AND GEN FAIL LIGHTS WERE INCORRECT. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OPERATOR, THEIR PMI, ACO AND MANAGEMENT. ||

2) A SKYTRAC SYSTEM WAS INSTALLED IN THE COCKPIT. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE 5 LEDS ON THIS SYSTEM HAD NOT BEEN FILTERED. THIS WAS IDENTIFIED AS A POTENTIAL PROBLEM BY ASU'S INSTALLATION TECHNICIANS DURING THE ALTERATION OF N19AE. N19AE HAD THESE LED'S FILTERED AFTER THIS PROBLEM WAS IDENTIFIED. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AND THE ACO. THIS SYSTEM WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE DRAWING PACKAGE SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY THE ACO. ||

3) A BECKER TRANSPONDER CONTROL HEAD WAS INSTALLED IN THE INSTRUMENT PANEL. THIS SYSTEM DID NOT HAVE AN NVG POST LIGHT ASSOCIATED WITH IT. THIS CONTROL HEAD HAS SEVERAL SWITCHES AND KNOBS NEEDED FOR OPERATION. THIS MAY BE AN ISSUE DURING NVG OPERATIONS. ALSO THE CONTROL HEAD HAS WHITE PANEL LIGHTING THAT IS STILL ILLUMINATED DURING NVG OPERATIONS. ALL OF THESE ISSUES WERE ALSO BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AND THE ACO. ||

4) A DIAMOND TOT GAUGE WAS FILTERED IN THE INSTRUMENT PANEL. THE APPROVED DATA REQUIRED THE PLACEMENT OF RED INSTRUMENT MARKING TAPE (LINES) ON THE EXTERIOR OF THE GLASS DUE TO VISIBILITY ISSUES. THIS REQUIREMENT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN INITIALLY REQUIRED ON A DIFFERENT TYPE TOT GAUGE THAT HAD RED LINES MARKING THE TEMPERATURE LIMITS. THE TOT GAUGE INSTALLED IN THIS AIRCRAFT USES GEOMETRIC SYMBOLS RATHER THAN LINES. THESE GEOMETRIC SYMBOLS ARE ALSO CALLED OUT IN THE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT FOR THIS TOT GAUGE. BECAUSE OF THE WAY THE LINES WERE USED ON THIS GAUGE RATHER THAT THE GEOMETRIC SYMBOLS THIS ALTERATION APPEARS TO HAVE CREATED AN ERROR IN THE FLIGHT MANUAL. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AND THE ACO. ||

THE AIR CARRIER PI'S HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON THESE FINDINGS. I WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THEM AS THIS SITUATION CONTINUES. ||

A FOLLOW UP WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH THE ACO AS WELL AS THE PI'S FOR THE AIR EVAC CERTIFICATE ONCE THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED. ||

ON 2-23-09 AN E-MAIL WAS RECEIVED FROM ASU MANAGEMENT MAKING AN ACCUSATION THAT I MADE A COMMENT THAT I WOULD NOT OPERATE THE AIRCRAFT IF I WERE THEM AND ANOTHER THAT I WAS REQUESTED TO PUT THAT IN WRITING BUT DIDN'T. INSPECTOR KAREL, THE BASE MECHANIC JOHNNY REYES AND THE MARTIN BASE PILOT SUPERVISOR WERE ALL PRESENT DURING THIS SURVEILLANCE. I'M UNSURE WHY THESE FALSE ACCUSATIONS WERE MADE BY ASU MANAGEMENT BUT TO INSURE THAT THERE WASN'T A MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE OPERATOR I PLACE A CALL TO MR. REYES. I ASKED ABOUT THESE ACCUSATION. HE CONFIRMED NO SICH COMMENTS WERE MADE. IN FACT HE SAID THEY HAVE BEEN OPERATING NVG FOR SOME TIME. ||

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ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WAY N311AE AND N19AE WERE MODIFIED COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED. THE SKYTRAC SYSTEM WAS FILTERED ON N19AE BECAUSE OF INTERFERENCE WITH NVG OPERATIONS. SINCE N311AE WAS NOT FILTERED THIS INFORMATION WAS SHARED WITH THE OPERATOR IN CASE OF A POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL CONFLICT. SINCE THESE TYPES OF NVG EVALUATION MUST BE PERFORMED BY AN AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY I HAD NOT WAY TO CONFIRM THIS FOR SURE. I THOUGHT IT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY TO ENSURE THAT THE OPERATOR WAS AWARE THAT THIS SYSTEM HAD CAUSED A PROBLEM WITH ANOTHER IDENTICALLY CONFIGURED AIRCRAFT.||

03/18/09 IT APPEARS AT THIS TIME THAT A POSSIBLE VIOLATION HAS OCCURRED. SEVERAL MEETING HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BETWEEN THE REGION, ACO,MIDO AND THE FSDO TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUES SURROUNDING THIS ALTERATION. AN LOI WILL BE SENT OUT AND AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED.||

AFTER EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION BY THE ACO IS WAS DETERMINED THAT CERTIFICATION ISSUES MAY HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED HOWEVER A REPAIR STATION VIOLATION WAS NOT IDENTIFIED. USING THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE ACO THIS ENFORCEMENT WAS CLOSED WITH NO ACTION.

97.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	I	C	3659	145	03/24/2009		BOI
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200901194

E1051 (E-Air Agencies 105-Personnel I-Information)

ON 03/20/2009 REEXAMINATION TEST (44709) COMPLETED ON CHRISTOPHER M. REBER A&P 3064194 AT BOISE FSDO.||

TEST WAS COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR DOUGLAS C. DYMOCK AND DAN FRANDSON. THIS TEST WAS PROVIDED BY AIRMAN TESTING STANDARDS BRANCH AFS630. TEST WAS 70 QUESTION AND REQUIRED A SCORE OF 70% OR BETTER TO PASS.||

MR REBER SCORED 74.83% IN HIS ALLOTTED TIME FOR THE TEST.||

AFTER TEST WAS COMPLETED MR. REBER STATED TO BOTH INSPECTORS HE HAD FELT THE TEST WAS FAIR AND WE WERE FAIR TO HIM DURING THIS TEST.||

AS A FOOT NOTE HE ALSO STATED THE SURVEILLANCE ON THE REPAIR STATION HE WORK FOR AND WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THIS 44709 HAD BEEN FAIR AND THAT ASU MANAGEMENT HAD CAUSED SOME UNTRUE FACTS TO BE REPORTED ABOUT THE SURVEILLANCE. THIS WAS TOLD TO BOTH INSPECTORS AND THIS IS MY STATEMENT TO THIS FACT.

98.	NM11	UABR	NM11DLF	A	C	3532	65	03/24/2009		
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200902323

J1011 (J-Crewmembers/Other Personnel 101-Personnel I-Information)

ON 03-20-2009 A RE EXAMINATION (44709) WAS ADMINISTERED TO MR. CHRISTOPHER REBER, CERTIFICATE # 3064194, BY INSPECTOR DAN FRANDSON. INSPECTOR DOUGLAS DYMOCK ASSISTED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE RE EXAM. THE RE EXAM WAS ADMINISTERED AT THE BOISE FSDO. THIS TEST WAS MANDATED AS A RESULT OF SURVEILLANCE ON AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED (ASU) WORK AWAY PROCEDURES. SEE PTRS NUMBERS NM11200803401 AND NM11200902098.||

THE TEST WAS PROVIDED BY AIRMAN TESTING STANDARD BRANCH AFS630. THE TEST WAS A 70 QUESTION TEST AND REQUIRED A PASSING SCORE OF 70% OR BETTER. MR. REBER SCORED 74.83% IN THE ALLOTTED TIME FOR THE TEST.||

A LETTER WAS SENT TO MR. REBER INFORMING HIM OF THE SATISFACTORY RESULTS OF THE RE EXAMINATION.||

AFTER THE TEST WAS COMPLETED, MR. REBER STATED TO BOTH INSPECTORS THAT HE FELT THE REASON FOR THE TEST WAS JUSTIFIED AND THAT HE HAD BEEN TREATED FAIRLY DURING THE TEST.||

MR. REBER ALSO STATED THAT IN HIS OPINION ASU OFTEN AGGRAVATES THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ITSELF AND THE FAA. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WAS TREATED FAIRLY BY INSPECTOR MIKE BAIRD DURING THE SURVEILLANCE THAT LED TO THE RE EXAM. THESE STATEMENT WERE GIVEN FREELY AND UNSOLICITED. ||

THE ABOVE STATEMENTS WERE GIVEN IN FRONT OF BOTH INSPECTORS FRANDSON AND

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99.	CE03 UABR		CE03GFG	C	C	3746	145	03/20/2009		
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200906384
 E307I (E-Air Agencies 307-Records/Reports I-Information)
 ON MARCH 19, 2009, MYSELF AND INSPECTOR STEVEN LONG FROM THE ST. LOUIS FLIGHT STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE WERE CONTACTED BY OFFICE MANAGEMENT TO OBTAIN COPIES OF THE AIRCRAFT RECORDS FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE NIGHT VISION GOGGLE MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED BY AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, FAA REPAIR STATION CERTIFICATE # UABR273K, ON THE FOLLOWING AIR EVAC EMS, INC AIRCRAFT: ||

||
 N249AE, S/N 45459 ||
 N311AE, S/N 45572 ||
 N19AE, S/N 45691 ||
 N267AE, S/N 45582 ||
 ||

THE REQUEST FOR THE ABOVE AIRCRAFT RECORDS WAS SENT VIA E-MAIL DATED 03/18/2009 BY INSPECTOR MR. MIKE BAIRD FROM THE BOISE FLIGHT STANDARDS DISTRICT OFFICE. THIS REQUEST WAS TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING RECORDS: ||

- ||
 1. FAA FORM 337 ||
 2. AIRCRAFT LOG BOOK ENTRY ||
 3. FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT ||
 4. ICA ||
 5. STC MASTER DRAWING LIST ||
 6. STC DRAWING PACKAGE ||
 7. REPAIR STATION FORMS SIGNED BY AIR EVAC REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING COCKPIT CONFORMITY AND PROPER OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT AFTER THE ALTERATION. ||

||
 THE REQUESTED INFORMATION ON THE ABOVE AIRCRAFT WAS SUPPLIED AND COPIED EXCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ||

- N249AE, ITEM # 4, 6 AND 7. (HAS NOT BEEN SUPPLIED BY ASU AT THIS TIME) ITEM 4, AIR EVAC HAS THE ICA, THE COVER PAGE DOESN'T HAVE THE SERIAL NUMBER LISTED. ||
 N267AE, ITEM # 6 AND 7. (HAS NOT BEEN SUPPLIED BY ASU AT THIS TIME) ||

||
 THE FOLLOWING SUPPLIED RECORDS WERE OBTAINED ON MARCH 19, 2009, FROM THE AIR EVAC'S RECORDS DEPARTMENT LOCATED IN WEST PLAINS, MISSOURI. THESE RECORDS HAVE ALL BEEN STAMPED "I CERTIFY THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL" SIGNED AND DATED 03/19/09 BY MYSELF. THIS STAMP INDICATES THAT THESE RECORDS WERE REQUESTED, COPIED AND SUPPLIED BY MR. MARION DEJONG, QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER FOR AIR EVAC EMS, INC., AND SUPPLIED TO MYSELF AND MR. STEVEN LONG. UNLESS FURTHER REQUESTED, NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE WILL BE DONE.
 ||

100.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3731	21	03/02/2009		
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200901910
 E617U (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance U-Unacceptable)
 DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OF AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, INC. ON JANUARY 26, 2009 THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE DISCOVERED. ||

1) THIS REPAIR STATION WAS NOT FOLLOWING THERE APPROVED TRAINING MANUAL. NONE OF THE EMPLOYEES RECORDS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 1, AND SECTION 3 OF THERE MANUAL WERE COMPLETED. TRAINING RECORDS WERE MISSING DATES, SIGNATURES AND HOW ,WHERE AND WHEN THEY TRAINED. ||
 (SEE PTRS NM11200901207) ||

||
 2) THIS REPAIR STATION HAD TWO MECHANICS WORKING AWAY I/A/W OPES SPECS D-100 WITH TOOLS OUT OF CALIBRATION. ||

||
 3) THIS REPAIR STATION RETURN TO SERVICE AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS NOT ON ITS CAPABILITIES LIST. IT ALSO FAILED TO COMPLETE ITS REQUIRED SELF EVALUATION AS REQUIRED BY BOTH ITS MANUAL AND CFR'S. ||
 ||

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<p>4) AFTER THIS WAS DISCOVERED BY FOUR FAA INSPECTORS THIS REPAIR STATION E-MAIL UPDATED SELF EVALUATION LIST AND TRAINING RECORDS TO THIS OFFICE. ADDITIONAL THEY ADDED THE S-76 AIRCRAFT TO THERE CAPABILITIES LIST AND FORWARDED THAT LIST TO THIS OFFICE. AT NO TIME WERE THEY ABLE TO PRODUCE ANY CAPABILITIES LIST DURING THIS INSPECTION TO ANY OF THE FOUR INSPECTORS PRESENT THAT DAY. </p> <p> </p> <p>A LOI HAS BEEN SENT FROM THIS OFFICE DATED 02/09/2009 AFTER A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ITS OFFICE FILES TO SEE IF SOMEHOW THEIR BEEN AN OVERSIGHT. REVIEW WITH ACTING MANAGER PRIOR TO LOI GOING OUT. </p> <p> </p> <p>REVIEW OF TRAINING PROGRAM FOUND THAT ASU DIDN'T MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN THERE APPROVED TRAINING MANUAL. </p> <p>THIS SHORT COMING IS BEING ADDED TO ONE LARGER ENFORCEMENT AS THIS APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY WITH CFR PART 145.163(B)(C). </p> <p> </p> <p>AS A FOLLOW-UP THIS OFFICE DID REVIEW ASU RECORDS ON 02/05/2009 AND FOUND THEY HAD BEEN CORRECTED ONLY AFTER THEY WERE INFORMED THAT LOI HAD BEEN SENT BY THIS OFFICE WITH SEVERAL OTHER ITEMS FOUND ON THIS SURVEILLANCE. </p> <p> </p> <p>PER REGIONAL INSTRUCTION THESE CASE HAVE BEEN BROKEN-UP INTO THREE CASES. </p> <p>THE TRAINING AND CALIBRATION CASES HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO SNAPP'S AND THE CAPABILITIES LIST IS GOING FWD AS AN COMPLETE ENFORCEMENT. </p> <p>ALSO THIS OFFICE FOUND THAT THE DOM HAD COMPLETED A 337 FORM USING HIS OWN A&P-IA AND THIS WAS ALSO CARRIED FWD INTO AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION COMPLETED BY PMI. </p> <p> </p> <p>THE FINAL ENFORCEMENT HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO PAI FOR COMPLETION ON CAPABILITY LIST. THIS WAS FWD TO MANAGEMENT ON 03/02/2009.</p>							

101.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	C	C	3390	145	03/02/2009
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200902013

E903I (E-Air Agencies 903-Management I-Information)

TELECON WITH REGIONAL INSPECTORS ON DATA WHICH WAS DISCOVER DURING INSPECTION OF ASU AT TENNESSEE. ||

PRESENT IN THIS MEETING WERE MIDO INSPECTORS, REGIONAL INSPECTORS, RICK DOMINGO, JODY RADCLIFFE, JIM BLAKE, RICK MCCAULEY, AND SOME OTHER ACO PERSONAL||

FROM BOISE MIKE BAIRD AND MYSELF.||

||

THIS OFFICE IS STILL TRYING TO OBTAIN GUIDANCE FROM ACO (SACO) ON DIFFERENCES FOUND FROM DRAWING AND WHAT THE ACO HAS APPROVED. ASU SEEMS TO BE HIP SHOOTING PROJECT AS THEY HAVE DONE IN THE PAST WORKING PROJECTS THROUGH THE ACO IN BIG PACKAGES AND DRAWING WHICH AT BEST ARE MISLEADING.||

ACO HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS LACK OF EQUIPMENT LIST AND GAUGES NOT INCLUDED IN DRAWING PACKAGES. FLIGHT MANUALS NOT CURRENT AND LIGHTS NOT FILTERED.||

||

AT PRESENT THIS OFFICE HAS NOT RECIVED DIRECTION FROM AFS-240/260/MIDO OR ACO AS TO HOW TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM.||

102.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	C	C	5399	145	02/27/2009
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200902017

E603I (E-Air Agencies 603-Conformance I-Information)

A TELECON WAS HELD BETWEEN BOI-FSDO, SACO, SMIDO, NM REGION. THIS MEETING WAS HELD TO DISCUSS ISSUES DISCOVERED DURING MY LAST SURVEILLANCE IN TENNESSEE. THIS SURVEILLANCE INVOLVED TWO AIRCRAFT OPERATED BY AIR EVAC, A HEMS OPERATOR. ||

||

DURING THE MEETING LONG DISCUSSIONS REGARDING ASU STC PROCEDURES WERE CONDUCTED. ONE KEY POINT WAS BROUGHT UP BY THE SACO. OF THE APPROXIMATELY 350 AIRCRAFT ALTERED BY ASU FOR THE INSTALLATION OF AN NVG SUPPLEMENTAL LIGHTING SYSTEM, ONLY ABOUT 50 HAVE BEEN INSPECTED FOR COMPLIANCE. ALSO THE SACO DOES NOT CURRENTLY KNOW WHAT SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR NVG

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COCKPIT COMPATIBILITY. THIS LEAD TO CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE POTENTIAL ISSUES THAT WERE DISCOVERED IN TENNESSEE. SUCH AS THE TOT GAUGE MARKINGS, BECKER TRANSPONDER WHITE PANEL LIGHTING AND THE INSTALLATION OF THE SKYTRAC SYSTEM WITH OUT ANY FILTERS.||

||
TOWARDS THE END OF THE TELECON I ASKED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SACO AND SMIDO TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ISSUES I HAD FOUND ON N19AE AND N311AE. A PARTIAL ANSWER WAS GIVEN IN THAT THE SKYTRAC AND TOT ISSUES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED FOR SURE. THIS INFORMATION WAS PASSED ON TO THE PAI FOR AIR EVAC. HE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH HIS REGION AND THE OPERATOR ON THE CORRECT WAY TO ADDRESS THIS. IT WAS STILL UNCLER IF THE ACO WOULD REQUIRE THE CORRECTION OF THE PREVIOUSLY APPROVED DATA FOR N19AE AND N311AE. THE LIGHTING ON THE BECKER TRANSPONDER REMAINS IN QUESTION. I FORWARDED AN E-MAIL TO NM REGION ON 03/02/09 REQUESTING WRITTEN GUIDANCE IN THIS AREA.

103.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	E	C	5660	145	02/26/2009		BOI
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200901225
E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
REVIEWED REPAIR STATION DOCUMENTS FOR INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND QUALITY PROCESSES. WHILE REVIEWING RECENT CHANGES TO THE ROSTER IT WAS NOTICED THAT AN INSPECTOR WAS REMOVED. IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THIS INSPECTOR HAD ISSUES WITH HER REPAIRMAN CERTIFICATE. A QUICK REVIEW OF ALTERATIONS RECENTLY PERFORMED BY THE REPAIR STATION UNCOVERED AN ALTERATION PERFORMED AND THE RETURN TO SERVICE BY THIS INDIVIDUAL WHEN SHE WAS NOT CURRENTLY CERTIFICATED UNDER PART 65. THIS COULD BE CONTRARY TO PART 145.157.||

||
A LETTER OF INVESTIGATION WILL TO SENT TO THE REPAIR STATION.

104.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11MKB	F	C	5618	145	02/25/2009	N19AE	BOI
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200901217
E801P (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED AT THE AIR EVAC FACILITY IN DYERSBURG TN. ||

||
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WE NOTED WITH THE ALTERATION:||

||
1) THE DRAWING PACKAGE USED BY THE ASU TECHNICIANS DID NOT MATCH THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION IN REGARDS TO THE SKYTRAC AND THE BECKER TRANSPONDER. ALSO THE MAGNETIC COMPASS HAD AN INTERNAL RED LENS WHICH HAD TO BE REMOVED FOR NVG COMPATIBILITY.||

||
2) THE TECHNICIAN AGAIN DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED FILTERS AND SUPPLIES. THEY NEEDED FILTERS FOR THE SKYTRAC AND TFM-500. THE ALSO DIDN'T HAVE THE CORRECT BUS WIRE OR ALUMINUM PREP AND ALIDYNE FOR THE POST LIGHT INSTALLATIONS. ||

||
3) THE TECHNICIAN INSTALLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCH PLACARDS BACKWARD BUT LATER DISCOVERED THE ERROR AND CORRECTED IT.||

||
4) AFTER THE MODIFICATION THE TECHNICIANS DID NOT VERIFY THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WITH THE FLIGHT MANUAL AS REQUIRED BY THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS/DRAWING NOTES.||

||
5) INSPECTOR KAREL, THE AIR EVAC BASE MECHANIC AND MYSELF DID VERIFY AFTER THE ALTERATION WAS COMPLETE THAT NO AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES EXISTED WITH THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL.||

||
6) AS THE TECHNICIAN'S WERE ASSEMBLING THE BACK OF THE INSTRUMENT PANEL I STOP THE OPERATION BECAUSE I NOTICED THAT THE WIRING THE TECHNICIAN INSTALLED FOR THE NVG POTENTIOMETER WAS ALLOWED TO REST ON TOP OF THE VOLTAGE DROPPING RESISTOR. SINCE THE RESISTOR DOES PRODUCE HEAT DURING OPERATION I HAD THIS CORRECTED TO PREVENT ANY AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES. ||

||
7) DURING THE INSTALLATION THE SKYTRAC SYSTEM WAS FILTERED AND HAD FILTERS REMOVED THREE TIMES. THE TECHNICIANS SEEMED UNSURE WHERE TO FILTER THE

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Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Code	Result	Status	No. FAR	Status Date	Reg#	Depart
105.	NM11 UABR BHT-206-L1	NM11MKB	F	C	5654	145	02/24/2009	N19AE	BOI
<p>200901221 E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem) SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED AT THE AIR EVAC FACILITY IN DYERSBURG TN. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WE NOTED WITH THE ALTERATION: 1) THE DRAWING PACKAGE USED BY THE ASU TECHNICIANS DID NOT MATCH THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION IN REGARDS TO THE SKYTRAC AND THE BECKER TRANSPONDER. ALSO THE MAGNETIC COMPASS HAD AN INTERNAL RED LENS WHICH HAD TO BE REMOVED FOR NVG COMPATIBILITY. 2) THE TECHNICIAN AGAIN DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED FILTERS AND SUPPLIES. THEY NEEDED FILTERS FOR THE SKYTRAC AND TFM-500. THE ALSO DIDN'T HAVE THE CORRECT BUS WIRE OR ALUMINUM PREP AND ALIDYNE FOR THE POST LIGHT INSTALLATIONS. 3) THE TECHNICIAN INSTALLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCH PLACARDS BACKWARD BUT LATER DISCOVERED THE ERROR AND CORRECTED IT. 4) AFTER THE MODIFICATION THE TECHNICIANS DID NOT VERIFY THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WITH THE FLIGHT MANUAL AS REQUIRED BY THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS/DRAWING NOTES. 5) INSPECTOR KAREL, THE AIR EVAC BASE MECHANIC AND MYSELF DID VERIFY AFTER THE ALTERATION WAS COMPLETE THAT NO AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES EXISTED WITH THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL. 6) AS THE TECHNICIAN'S WERE ASSEMBLING THE BACK OF THE INSTRUMENT PANEL I STOP THE OPERATION BECAUSE I NOTICED THAT THE WIRING THE TECHNICIAN INSTALLED FOR THE NVG POTENTIOMETER WAS ALLOWED TO REST ON TOP OF THE VOLTAGE DROPPING RESISTOR. SINCE THE RESISTOR DOES PRODUCE HEAT DURING OPERATION I HAD THIS CORRECTED TO PREVENT ANY AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES. 7) DURING THE INSTALLATION THE SKYTRAC SYSTEM WAS FILTERED AND HAD FILTERS REMOVED THREE TIMES. THE TECHNICIANS SEEMED UNSURE WHERE TO FILTER THE SYSTEM OR NOT. DURING THE LIGHT LEAKAGE TEST THE SKYTRAC WAS DETERMINED BY THE TECHNICIANS TO BE CAUSING INTERFERENCE WITH THE VIEW OUT THE RIGHT WIND SCREEN. THEY THEN INSTALLED THE FILTERS AGAIN. ON OTHER NOTE WORTHY ITEM IS THAT AFTER THE FILTERS WERE INSTALLED THE FELL OFF TWICE AND HAD TO BE RE-INSTALLED. THE CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF THIS FILTER SYSTEM MAY BE IN QUESTION. THE FACT THAT THE REPAIR STATION QUALITY SYSTEM DID NOT PREVENT THE DEFICIENCY WITH THE WIRING CONTACTING THE VOLTAGE DROPPING RESISTOR IS OF CONCERN. MOST OF THE WORK PERFORMED BY THIS CERTIFICATE HOLDER IS AWAY FROM THE REPAIR STATION WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE COMPLETE REPAIR STATION STAFF EXTRA EMPHASIS MUST BE APPLIED TO ALL QUALITY SYSTEMS. AN IMPROVEMENT TO</p>									

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart	
	THE REPAIR STATION QUALITY SYSTEM MAY BE NEEDED. FOLLOW UP INSPECTIONS WILL BE PERFORMED.										

106.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11DCD	F	C	3606	145	02/19/2009	N19AE	BOI
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200901190

E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)

ON 02-08-2009, MR. MICHAEL BAIRD (AWI) AND CRAIG KAREL (AWI) TRAVELED TO DYERSBERG, TENNESSEE TO OBSERVED ASU TECHNICIANS MODIFY AN BELL 206 L1 MEDICAL HELICOPTER TO NIGHT VISION CONFIGURATION. THIS AIRCRAFT, N19AE, S/N 45691 IS OPERATED BY AIR EVAC EMS INC.||

||
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF CONCERN WERE NOTED REGARDING THE ALTERATION TO THIS AIRCRAFT:||

||
1. THE DRAWINGS USED BY ASU TECHNICIANS DID NOT REPRESENT THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION.||

A. SKY TRACK SYSTEM||

B. BECKER TRANSPONDER||

C. THE MAGNETIC COMPASS LIGHT HAD A RED LENS AS PART OF THE LIGHT ASSEMBLY||

2. THE TECHNICIANS DID NOT HAVE ALL THE NECESSARY FILTERS AND SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR THE ALTERATION.||

A. NVG FILTER FOR THE TFM-500||

B. MAIN ELECTRICAL WIRE FROM THE ELECTRICAL BUSS TO THE NVG SWITCH.||

C. ALUMINUM PREP AND ALIDINE||

3. THE NVG SWITCH WAS PLACARDED BACKWARDS.||

4. AN EVALUATION OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL USING THE FLIGHT MANUAL AS REFERENCE WAS NOT PERFORMED AFTER THE ALTERATION.||

||

||
THE FOLLOWING WAS NOTED TO CORRECT THE ITEMS AS STATED ABOVE.||

||

THE TECHNICIANS MADE NOTED CORRECTIONS TO THE DRAWINGS.||

THE SKY TRACK SYSTEM HAS FIVE LIGHTS. THE TECHNICIANS ADDED FILTERS TO THEM.||

THE BECKER TRANSPONDER OEM LIGHTING WAS NOT ADDRESSED.||

THE MAGNETIC COMPASS RED LENS WAS REMOVED AND A FILTERED BULB INSTALLED.||

THE TECHNICIANS HAD SUPPLIES AND FILTERS SHIPPED IN.||

THE TECHNICIANS CORRECTED THE NVG SWITCH PLACARDING.||

AN EVALUATION OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WAS NOT ADDRESSED.

107.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11DCD	F	C	3606	145	02/19/2009	N311AE	DYR
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200901192

E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

ON 02-13-2009, MR. MICHAEL BAIRD (AWI) AND CRAIG KAREL (AWI) INSPECTED AN BELL 206 L1, N311AE, S/N 45572 OPERATED BY AIR EVAC INC. WHICH WAS ALTERED ON 02-04-2009 TO NIGHT VISION CONFIGURATION. ||

||
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF CONCERN WERE NOTED REGARDING THE ALTERATION TO THIS AIRCRAFT:||

||

1. THE BECKER TRANSPONDER OEM LIGHTING WAS NOT CORRECTED.||

2. THE SKY TRACK SYSTEM LIGHTS WERE NOT FILTERED.||

3. TWO OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL LIGHTS WERE POSITIONED CONTRARY TO THE FLIGHT MANUAL.||

4. THE TOT GAUGE MARKINGS THAT WERE ADDED TO THE FILTERED GLASS DID NOT MATCH THE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT FOR THIS INSTRUMENT.

108.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11DCD	I	C	3654	145	02/19/2009	N19AE	BOI
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200901197

E816P (E-Air Agencies 816-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

ON 02-08-2009, MR. MICHAEL BAIRD (AWI) AND CRAIG KAREL (AWI) TRAVELED TO DYERSBERG, TENNESSEE TO OBSERVED ASU TECHNICIANS MODIFY AN BELL 206 L1

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn	Inspector	Act	A/C	Loc.
Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Code	Result	Status
No.	FAR	Status	Date	Reg#	Depart

MEDICAL HELICOPTER TO NIGHT VISION CONFIGURATION. THIS AIRCRAFT, N19AE, S/N 45691 IS OPERATED BY AIR EVAC EMS INC.||

||
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF CONCERN WERE NOTED REGARDING THE ALTERATION TO THIS AIRCRAFT:||

- ||
1. THE DRAWINGS USED BY ASU TECHNICIANS DID NOT REPRESENT THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION.||
 - A. SKY TRACK SYSTEM||
 - B. BECKER TRANSPONDER||
 - C. THE MAGNETIC COMPASS LIGHT HAD A RED LENS AS PART OF THE LIGHT ASSEMBLY||
 2. THE TECHNICIANS DID NOT HAVE ALL THE NECESSARY FILTERS AND SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR THE ALTERATION.||
 - A. NVG FILTER FOR THE TFM-500||
 - B. MAIN ELECTRICAL WIRE FROM THE ELECTRICAL BUSS TO THE NVG SWITCH.||
 - C. ALUMINUM PREP AND ALIDINE||
 3. THE NVG SWITCH WAS PLACARDED BACKWARDS.||
 4. AN EVALUATION OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL USING THE FLIGHT MANUAL AS REFERENCE WAS NOT PERFORMED AFTER THE ALTERATION.||

||
THE FOLLOWING WAS NOTED TO CORRECT THE ITEMS AS STATED ABOVE.||

||
THE TECHNICIANS MADE NOTED CORRECTIONS TO THE DRAWINGS.||
THE SKY TRACK SYSTEM HAS FIVE LIGHTS. THE TECHNICIANS ADDED FILTERS TO THEM.||
THE BECKER TRANSPONDER OEM LIGHTING WAS NOT ADDRESSED.||
THE MAGNETIC COMPASS RED LENS WAS REMOVED AND A FILTERED BULB INSTALLED.||
THE TECHNICIANS HAD SUPPLIES AND FILTERS SHIPPED IN.||
THE TECHNICIANS CORRECTED THE NVG SWITCH PLACARDING.||
AN EVALUATION OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WAS NOT ADDRESSED.

109. NM11 UABR NM11DCD C C 3734 145 02/19/2009
200901940

E817U (E-Air Agencies 817-Maintenance U-Unacceptable)
DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OF AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED ON JANUARY 27, 2009 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC HAD TWO MECHANICS IN THE FIELD WORKING WITH TOOLS OUT OF CALIBRATION IN THERE TOOL BOX'S THIS OPERATOR DIDN'T KNOW OF THIS FACT TILL THIS INSPECTOR REVIEWED THERE CALIBRATION LIST AND THIS OVERSIGHT ON THE DATE OF THIS INSPECTION. THEY CALLED THE TWO MECHANICS AND TOLD THEM TO STOP USE OF THE TOOLS AND STATED THEY HAD USED THEM AT THAT DATE. THE ABOVE TOOLS HAD BEEN OUT OF CALIBRATION FOR THREE DAY AND THIS REPAIR STATION FAILED TO NOTE THERE CALIBRATION LIST. ||

||
MECAHICS WORKING WITH TOOLS OUT OF CALIBRATION IS CONTRARY TO 14 CFR PART 145.109(A)(B) 145.211(B)(C) AND (VIII).||

||
ALSO NOTED DURING THIS INSPECTION WAS THAT THEY ALSO HAD TOOLS OUT OF CALIBRATION IN THERE PARTS MANUFACTURING SHOP. THIS OFFICE NOTIFIED MIDO OF THIS PROBLEM AND THEY ARE DOING ANOTHER ENFORCEMENT ON THIS MATTER.||

||
(NOTE) THIS WAS PART OF EIR 2009NM110021 BUT REGIONAL COUNSEL ADVISED THIS SHOULD BE A SNNAP AND LETTER OF CORRECTION ON 02/18/2009. PRESENT AT THIS TELICON WAS ROB MARTIN, DAVE CAWTHRA, MIKE BAIRD MYSELF AND FORM REGION DAVID SHAYNE (LEGAL) AND JODY RADCLIFFE.

110. NM11 UABR NM11DCD C C 3460 145 02/19/2009
200901944

E903I (E-Air Agencies 903-Management I-Information)
ON 02/19/2009 THIS OFFICE RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM PETROLEUM HELICOPTERS INC. (PHI) QUALITY ASSURANCE DIRECTOR QUESTIONING WHY THIS OFFICE HAD REQUESTED LOG BOOK RECORDS AND 337,ICA'S AND FMS RECORDS FOR AN S-76

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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HELICOPTER (N753P) ALTERED BY ASU REPAIR STATION.||
 THIS INSPECTOR HAD PLACED CALLS TO MARK HAGER, (CHIEF INSPECTOR PHI)
 REQUESTING THIS INFORMATION ON 02/18/2009 BUILDING AN ENFORCEMENT CASE
 AGAINST ASU FOR ALTERING AIRCRAFT NOT LISTED ON THERE CAPABILITY LIST.||

||
 THIS OFFICE DIDN'T DISCUSSES THIS MATTER WITH ANY PHI PERSONNEL OR ANSWER ANY
 QUESTIONS ON EITHER PHONE CALLS.||

||
 THE QUALITY DIRECTOR/DER ASKED IF THIS OFFICE WAS DOING ANOTHER
 INVESTIGATION OF ASU. HE WAS TOLD I CAN'T ANSWER THAT QUESTION.||
 HE THAN STATED YOU JUST DID, AND THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

111.	NM11	UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3734	145	02/19/2009		
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200901945
 E401U (E-Air Agencies 401-Training U-Unacceptable)
 DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OF AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC.(ASU) ON
 01/28/2009 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THEY WERE NOT FOLLOWING THERE APPROVED
 GUIDANCE IN THERE TRAINING PROGRAM AND ACCEPTED GUIDANCE WITHIN THERE
 RSM/QSM. ||

||
 NONE OF THERE EMPLOYEES WERE MEETING THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT IDENTIFIED IN
 SECTION 1, SECTION 3, AND SECTION 6 OF THERE TRAINING MANUAL. THIS IS
 CONTRARY WITH 14 CFR PART 145.163 (B)(C).||

||
 ASU TRAINING RECORDS WERE MISSING SIGNATURES FROM TRAINER, MISSING DATES,
 DIDN'T LIST THE TYPE OF TRAINING AND SOME EMPLOYEE WERE JUST DOING THERE
 OWN TRAINING AND SIGNING OFF IT HAD BEEN COMPLETED. ||
 THEY DIDN'T HAVE ANY LESSON PLANS OR FOLLOW UP ON REMEDIAL TRAINING WHICH
 HAD TAKEN PLAGE WITH ONE EMPLOYEE.||

||
 THIS MATTER HAD ALSO BEEN ADDRESS IN LETTER DATED ON 09/29/2008 AND ADDRESS
 BOTH TO THE ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER AND THE REPAIR STATION MANAGER.||

||
 ASU WAS AWARE THEY WERE NOT KEEPING COMPLETE TRAINING RECORDS BUT STATED
 THEY WERE TO OVERLOADED WITH WORK TO COMPLETE ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINE
 IN THERE MANUALS.||

||
 THIS MATTER WAS ATTACHED TO ANOTHER ENFORCEMENT BUT ON ADVICE FROM REGIONAL
 LEGAL WE MOVED IT TO ANOTHER EIR NUMBER FROM 2009NM110021.||

||
 PERSON PRESENT DURING THIS MEETING WERE BOISE ACTING MANAGER DAVE CAWTHRA,
 ROB MARTINEZ MIKE BAIRD, MYSELF AND FROM REGION DAVID SHAYNE (LEGAL) AND
 JODY RADCLIFFE.||

||
 AFTER REVIEW IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS BE CHANGED TO A SNNAP.

112.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	02/17/2009	N19AE	BOI
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200901214
 E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)
 SURVEILLANCE WAS PERFORMED AT THE AIR EVAC FACILITY IN DYERSBURG TN. ||

||
 THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WE NOTED WITH THE ALTERATION:||

||
 1) THE DRAWING PACKAGE USED BY THE ASU TECHNICIANS DID NOT MATCH THE
 AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION IN REGARDS TO THE SKYTRAC AND THE BECKER
 TRANSPONDER. ALSO THE MAGNETIC COMPASS HAD AN INTERNAL RED LENS WHICH HAD
 TO BE REMOVED FOR NVG COMPATIBILITY.||

||
 2) THE TECHNICIAN AGAIN DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED FILTERS AND SUPPLIES. THEY
 NEEDED FILTERS FOR THE SKYTRAC AND TFM-500. THE ALSO DIDN'T HAVE THE
 CORRECT BUS WIRE OR ALUMINUM PREP AND ALIDYNE FOR THE POST LIGHT
 INSTALLATIONS. ||

||
 3) THE TECHNICIAN INSTALLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER SWITCH PLACARDS BACKWARD BUT

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	LATER DISCOVERED THE ERROR AND CORRECTED IT.										
	4) AFTER THE MODIFICATION THE TECHNICIANS DID NOT VERIFY THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WITH THE FLIGHT MANUAL AS REQUIRED BY THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS/DRAWING NOTES.										
	5) INSPECTOR KAREL, THE AIR EVAC BASE MECHANIC AND MYSELF DID VERIFY AFTER THE ALTERATION WAS COMPLETE THAT NO AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES EXISTED WITH THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL.										
	6) AS THE TECHNICIAN'S WERE ASSEMBLING THE BACK OF THE INSTRUMENT PANEL I STOP THE OPERATION BECAUSE I NOTICED THAT THE WIRING THE TECHNICIAN INSTALLED FOR THE NVG POTENTIOMETER WAS ALLOWED TO REST ON TOP OF THE VOLTAGE DROPPING RESISTOR. SINCE THE RESISTOR DOES PRODUCE HEAT DURING OPERATION I HAD THIS CORRECTED TO PREVENT ANY AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES.										
	7) DURING THE INSTALLATION THE SKYTRAC SYSTEM WAS FILTERED AND HAD FILTERS REMOVED THREE TIMES. THE TECHNICIANS SEEMED UNSURE WHERE TO FILTER THE SYSTEM OR NOT. DURING THE LIGHT LEAKAGE TEST THE SKYTRAC WAS DETERMINED BY THE TECHNICIANS TO BE CAUSING INTERFERENCE WITH THE VIEW OUT THE RIGHT WIND SCREEN.										
	THEY THEN INSTALLED THE FILTERS AGAIN. ON OTHER NOTE WORTHY ITEM IS THAT AFTER THE FILTERS WERE INSTALLED THE FELL OFF TWICE AND HAD TO BE RE-INSTALLED. THE CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS OF THIS FILTER SYSTEM MAY BE IN QUESTION.										
	8) IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE BECKER TRANSPONDER MOUNTED IN THE INSTRUMENT PANEL HAD IT'S WHITE PANEL LIGHTING ILLUMINATED DURING NVG OPERATION. ALSO THERE IS NO NVG POST LIGHT ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRANSPONDER. THIS SYSTEM HAS SEVERAL SWITCHES AND KNOBS THAT ARE DIFFICULT TO SEE IN NVG CONDITIONS. THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AND THE ACO.										

113.	NM11	UABR	BHT-206-L1	NM11CFK	F	C	3606	145	02/13/2009	N19AE	BOI
	200901975										
	E621U (E-Air Agencies 621-Conformance U-Unacceptable)										
	THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF CONCERN WERE NOTED REGARDING THE ALTERATION TO THIS AIRCRAFT. THIS SURVELLANCE WAS PERFORMED AT THE AIR EVAC FACILITY IN DYERSBURG TN.										
	1. THE DRAWINGS USED BY ASU TECHNICIANS DID NOT REPRESENT THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION.										
	A. SKY TRACK SYSTEM										
	B. BECKER TRANSPONDER										
	C. THE MAGNETIC COMPASS LIGHT HAD A RED LENS AS PART OF THE LIGHT ASSEMBLY										
	2. THE TECHNICIANS DID NOT HAVE ALL THE NECESSARY FILTERS AND SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR THE ALTERATION.										
	A. NVG FILTER FOR THE TFM-500										
	B. MAIN ELECTRICAL WIRE FROM THE ELECTRICAL BUSS TO THE NVG SWITCH.										
	C. ALUMINUM PREP AND ALIDINE										
	3. THE NVG SWITCH WAS PLACKARDED BACKWARDS.										
	4. AN EVALATION OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL USING THE FLIGHT MANUAL AS REFERANCE WAS NOT PERFORMED AFTER THE ALTERATION.										
	THE FOLLOWING WAS NOTED TO CORRECT THE ITEMS AS STATED ABOVE.										
	THE TECHNICIANS MADE NOTED CORRECTIONS TO THE DRAWINGS.										
	THE SKY TRACK SYSTEM HAS FIVE LIGHTS. THE TECHNICIANS ADDED FILTERS TO THEM.										
	THE BECKER TRANSPONDER OEM LIGHTING WAS NOT ADDRESSED.										
	THE MAGNETIC COMPASS RED LENSE WAS REMOVED AND A FILTERED BULB INSTALLED.										
	THE TECHNICIANS HAD SUPPLIES AND FILTERS SHIPPED IN.										
	THE TECHNICIANS CORRECTED THE NVG SWITCH PLACARDING.										
	AN EVALATION OF THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WAS NOT ADDRESSED.										

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
114.	NM11 200901918	UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3390	145	02/12/2009		
<p>E903I (E-Air Agencies 903-Management I-Information) RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM CHRIS ATWOOD ON 02/12/2009 REGARDING CAPABILITIES LIST FOR ASU REPAIR STATION. MRS ATWOOD STATED SHE HAS AND HAS ALWAYS HAD A CAPABILITIES LIST SINCE CERTIFICATION AND THAT I PERSONAL WAS AWARE OF THIS PER HER PHONE CALL TODAY. SHE ALSO WANTED IT UPDATED TO REFLEX THE AIRCRAFT ADDED ON 01/27/09 AND LATER. I TOLD HER THIS MUST BE REVIEW WITH REGION AS I HAVE AN ENFORCEMENT ONGOING AND I WOULD ADVISE OFFICE MANAGER. I INFORMED HER I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS LIST AND I'M SURE THAT THE S-76 HELICOPTER WAS NEVER ADDED TO THIS LIST. I ALSO INFORMED HER THAT SHE AND HER HUSBAND COULD NOT PRODUCE ANY SUCH LIST DURING OUR VISIT AT THE REPAIR STATION ON 01/27/2009 WITH FOUR INSPECTOR PRESENT. IT WAS AFTER OUR RETURN TO THE OFFICE THAT THEY E-MAIL A NEW (SO STATED BY HER) LIST TO OUR OFFICE FOR REVIEW. AT NO TIME DID THEY DO A SELF EVALUATION AS REQUIRED BY BOTH THERE MANUAL AND THE CFR NOR COULD THEY PRODUCE ONE DURING OUR VISIT ON THE 01/27/09. MRS. ATWOOD AGAIN INFORMED ME I HAD THIS SELF EVALUATION LIST ALREADY AND THEY E-MAIL IT ON 01/27/09. MRS. ATWOOD WAS VERY UPSET AND HARD TO DEAL WITH ON THIS PHONE CALL AND STATE SHE WILL TAKE THE MATTER UP TO REGION.</p>											
115.	NM11 200901916	UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3390	145	02/11/2009		
<p>E903I (E-Air Agencies 903-Management I-Information) COMPLETED TELICON DEBRIEF WITH REGION ABOUT EIR # 2009NM110021. PRESENT FOR THIS MEETING WERE ROB MARTINEZ, DAVE CAWTHRA AND MYSELF. ON THE PHONE WERE JODY RADCLIFFE, JAMES BLAKE (BOTH IN SEATTLE) MIKE BAIRD AND CRAIG KAREL (BOTH IN TN DOING SURVEILLANCE OUT IN THE FIELD) AT ISSUE WERE THE E-MAILS SENT BY ASU STATING THEY ALREADY HAD PRIOR CAPABILITIES LIST AND AMENDMENTS TO THAT LIST. I'VE HAVE SENT COPIES OF THE CHECK LIST USED BY CERTIFICATION TEAM LEADER SHOWING AT THE TIME OF THERE CERTIFICATION THEY DIDN'T HAVE CAPABILITIES LIST NOR HAD THEY EVER HAD ONE ISSUED BY THIS OFFICE. FURTHER MORE THEY HAVE NEVER REQUESTED TO AMEND A CAPABILITIES LIST IN THE PAST. ASU SENT E-MAIL ON 01/27/2009 STATING THEY WERE ADDING TO THIS LIST WHICH THEY NEVER HAD ISSUED. ALSO ADDRESS IN THIS PHONE CALL WERE THE CALIBRATION LIST AND THE USE OF UNCALIBRATED TOOLS FOUND ON SURVEILLANCE ON 01/27/2009.</p>											
116.	NM11 200901202	UABR		NM11DCD	E	C	3658	145	02/09/2009		BOI
<p>E817U (E-Air Agencies 817-Maintenance U-Unacceptable) DURING ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE OF AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, INC. ON JANUARY 26, 2009 THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE DISCOVERED. 1) THIS REPAIR STATION WAS NOT FOLLOWING THERE APPROVED TRAINING MANUAL. NONE OF THE EMPLOYEES RECORDS AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 1, AND SECTION 3 OF THERE MANUAL WERE COMPLETED. TRAINING RECORDS WERE MISSING DATES, SIGNATURES AND HOW ,WHERE AND WHEN THEY TRAINED. (SEE PTRS NM11200901207) 2) THIS REPAIR STATION HAD TWO MECHANICS WORKING AWAY I/A/W OPES SPECS D-100 WITH TOOLS OUT OF CALIBRATION. 3) THIS REPAIR STATION RETURN TO SERVICE AN AIRCRAFT THAT WAS NOT ON ITS CAPABILITIES LIST. IT ALSO FAILED TO COMPLETE ITS REQUIRED SELF EVALUATION AS REQUIRED BY BOTH ITS MANUAL AND CFR'S. 4) AFTER THIS WAS DISCOVERED BY FOUR FAA INSPECTORS THIS REPAIR STATION E-MAIL UPDATED SELF EVALUATION LIST AND TRAINING RECORDS TO THIS OFFICE. ADDITIONAL THEY ADDED THE S-76 AIRCRAFT TO THERE CAPABILITIES LIST AND FORWARDED THAT LIST TO THIS OFFICE. AT NO TIME WERE THEY ABLE TO PRODUCE ANY CAPABILITIES LIST DURING THIS INSPECTION TO ANY OF THE FOUR INSPECTORS</p>											

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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PRESENT THAT DAY.||

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A LOI HAS BEEN SENT FROM THIS OFFICE DATED 02/09/2009 AFTER A COMPLETE REVIEW OF ITS OFFICE FILES TO SEE IF SOMEHOW THEIR BEEN AN OVERSIGHT. REVIEW WITH ACTING MANAGER PRIOR TO LOI GOING OUT.

117.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3659	145	02/09/2009		BOI
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200901203

E1131 (E-Air Agencies 113-Personnel I-Information)

REVIEW OF PERSONNEL RECORDS ASU FOUND EITHER I HAD JUST GOT THERE RIGHT AFTER THEY HAD LET GO OF AN EMPLOYEE OR THEY WERE LATE IN NOTIFYING OUR OFFICE BUT THEY DID STATE THAT ONE OF THERE REPAIRMAN HAD BEEN LET GO WHEN I REQUESTED THEM.||

THEY FAX A CURRENT COPY TO OUR OFFICE THAT AFTERNOON AND IT WAS POSTED IN THERE REPAIR STATION FILE ON 01/27/2009.||

AS TO THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE EMPLOYEE WAS LET GO I HAVE THREE DIFFERENT TIMES BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH A DATE.

118.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	F	C	3661	145	02/05/2009		BOI
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200901207

E402P (E-Air Agencies 402-Training P-Potential Problem)

REVIEW OF TRAINING PROGRAM FOUND THAT ASU DIDN'T MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN THERE APPROVED TRAINING MANUAL.||

THIS SHORT COMING IS BEING ADDED TO ONE LARGER ENFORCEMENT AS THIS APPEARS TO BE CONTRARY WITH CFR PART 145.163(B)(C).||

||

AS A FOLLOW-UP THIS OFFICE DID REVIEW ASU RECORDS ON 02/05/2009 AND FOUND THEY HAD BEEN CORRECTED ONLY AFTER THEY WERE INFORMED THAT LOI HAD BEEN SENT BY THIS OFFICE WITH SEVERAL OTHER ITEMS FOUND ON THIS SURVEILLANCE.

119.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5661	145	02/05/2009		BOI
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200901228

E402I (E-Air Agencies 402-Training I-Information)

REVIEWED PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE REPAIR STATION TRAINING PROGRAM. FOUND DEFICIENCIES WITH FORMS DOCUMENTATION AND RECOMMENDED A CHANGE IN THE TRACKING OR REMEDIAL TRAINING. A REVISED PROGRAM WILL BE SUBMITTED AFTER CORRECTIONS ARE MADE.

120.	NM11 UABR		NM11DLF	A	C	3608	145	01/30/2009		BOI
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200901793

E802U (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance U-Unacceptable)

PERFORMED SURVEILLANCE OF AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED REPAIR STATION AS PART OF A TEAM INCLUDING DOUG DYMCK, CRAIG KAREL AND MIKE BAIRD. FOUND THE TRAINING RECORDS WERE NOT UP TO DATE AND THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE NOT LISTED AS QUALIFIED AS TRAINERS YET WERE SIGNING OFF TRAINING FOR OTHER PERSONNEL. THE CALIBRATED TOOLS WERE NOT CURRENT AND 2 MECHANICS HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO THE FIELD WITH TOOLS THAT WERE OUT OF CALIBRATION. || FOLLOWING IS AN ROC OF THIS VISIT.||

||

ON JANUARY 27, 2009, I ASSISTED DOUGLAS DYMCK WITH AN INSPECTION AT AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED (ASU). DURING THE INSPECTION OF THE CERTIFICATED REPAIR STATION, DOUG DYMCK AND I WENT TO THE PARTS ROOM TO INSPECT THE STC INSTALLATION KITS, CALIBRATED TOOLS AND TRAINING RECORDS.|| DOUG ASKED FOR A COUPLE OF STC INSTALLATION KITS FROM DAVE, THE PARTS MANAGER. DAVE PULLED TWO KITS FROM THE STORAGE CABINET AND GAVE ONE TO ME FOR INSPECTION AND ANOTHER TO DOUG. DURING THE INSPECTION OF THOSE KITS DOUG AND I ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONTENTS. WHEN WE WERE THROUGH WITH THAT PART OF THE INSPECTION WHILE WE WERE PUTTING THE ITEMS THAT WE REMOVED BACK INTO THE KITS DAVE INFORMED US NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT AND HE WOULD PUT THE STUFF BACK IN. HE PACKED UP THE KITS AND PUT THEM BACK IN THE STORAGE CABINET.|| WE THEN ASKED TO SEE THE CALIBRATED TOOLS LIST. THAT WAS BROUGHT TO US BY

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn	Inspector	Act	A/C	Loc.				
Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Code	Result	Status	No. FAR	Status Date	Reg#	Depart
<p>DAVE, UPON FIRST GLANCE WE NOTED THAT MANY OF THE TOOLS APPEARED TO BE OUT OF CALIBRATION. DAVE CONSULTED WITH THE PERSON THAT WAS RESPONSIBLE TO KEEP THE LIST UP TO DATE. HE FOUND THAT MANY OF THE TOOLS THAT APPEARED OUT OF CALIBRATION HAD BEEN CALIBRATED, ASU HAD CALIBRATION CERTIFICATES ON HAND BUT THE LIST HAD NOT BEEN UPDATED. SEVERAL OF THE TOOLS HAD NOT BEEN CALIBRATED AND WERE BEING USED IN THE REPAIR STATION AND THE MANUFACTURE OF FILTERS FOR THE PMA. DAVE AND LANE BOTH CONFIRMED THAT TWO ELECTRICAL CRIMPERS WERE IN THE FIELD WITH MECHANICS THAT HAD BEEN SENT ON AN INSTALL. THEY BOTH CALLED THE MECHANICS AND TOLD THEM NOT TO USE THEM. THE OTHER TOOLS IN QUESTION WERE DIGITAL CALIPERS. ONE CALIPER WAS KEPT IN THE PARTS ROOM. DAVE PROVIDED THAT CALIPER FOR OUR INSPECTION, THERE WAS A DATE DISCREPANCY ON THE CALIBRATION LIST AND THIS CALIPER WAS STILL IN CALIBRATION. THE OTHER CALIPER WAS BEING USED IN MANUFACTURE OF THE PMA'ED NVIS FILTERS AND WAS BEING KEPT IN "THE GLASS CUTTING SHED". WE ASKED DAVE IF WE COULD SEE IT, DAVE ASKED LANE TO GO TO THE GLASS CUTTING SHED AND BRING THE CALIPERS INTO THE PARTS ROOM. LANE HANDED THE CALIPERS TO ME AND I HANDED THEM TO DOUG. UPON FURTHER INSPECTION IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT THIS CALIPER WAS OUT OF CALIBRATION. I MADE A PHOTOCOPY OF THE BACK OF THE CALIPER TO DOCUMENT THE CALIBRATION STICKER AND SERIAL NUMBER. WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A COPY OF THE CALIBRATION LIST. THE CALIBRATION LIST CONFIRMED BY SERIAL NUMBER THAT THE CALIPER THAT WAS OUT OF CALIBRATION WAS BEING USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF PMA'ED NVIS FILTERS. AS DOUG WAS TALKING TO DAVE ABOUT THE CALIBRATED TOOLS I WALKED INTO THE SMALL CONSUMABLES AREA IN THE PARTS ROOM AND CHECKED FOR EXPIRATION DATES AND NVIS WIRE MARKINGS. I DID NOTE ONE TUBE OF SEALANT THAT HAD EXPIRED A DAY OR TWO BEFORE, I HANDED THAT TUBE OF SEALANT TO DAVE AND TOLD HIM IT HAD EXPIRED. </p> <p>DOUG AND I THEN MOVED ON TO THE TRAINING RECORDS. UPON REVIEWING THE TRAINING RECORDS OF CARL CEDARQUIST & LANE CHRISTENSEN, SEVERAL DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND. THE DISCREPANCIES INCLUDED UNDOCUMENTED INSPECTION AND RETURN TO SERVICE APPROVALS, INACCURATE AND UNSIGNED TRAINING RECORDS AND TRAINING RECORDS THAT WERE SIGNED BY PERSONNEL THAT ARE NOT LISTED IN THE RSM AS TRAINERS. A DEBRIEF MEETING WAS HELD WITH SHAWN, THE DOM AND MIKE AND CHRIS ATWOOD, THE OWNERS OF ASU ABOUT THE FINDINGS OF THE INSPECTION. </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>DAN L FRANDSON </p> <p>AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR </p>									

121.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	F	C	5604	145	01/29/2009	BOI
	200901209								

E622U (E-Air Agencies 622-Conformance U-Unacceptable)
 AN INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED TO VERIFY THE REPAIR STATION CAPABILITIES LIST AUTHORIZATIONS AND THE WORK BEING PERFORMED. IT WAS IDENTIFIED THAT AN ALTERATION WAS PERFORMED ON A S76C HELICOPTER WITHOUT A SELF EVALUATION AND WITHOUT REVISING THE CAPABILITIES LIST. ||

||

AFTER THE DEFICIENCY WAS IDENTIFIED AND BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE REPAIR STATION MANAGEMENT A SELF EVALUATION AND REVISION TO THE CAPABILITIES LIST WAS COMPLETED. THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE CHDO WERE BACK DATED PRIOR TO THE RETURN TO SERVICE OF THE S76C IN QUESTION. INSPECTOR DYMOCK WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THIS DEFICIENCY AND PROCEED WITH ENFORCEMENT ACTION IF WARRANTED.

122.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	F	C	5605	145	01/29/2009	BOI
	200901210								

E840P (E-Air Agencies 840-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
 AN INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED ON WORK ORDER #30976A. IT WAS IDENTIFIED THAT THE 337 THAT WAS COMPLETED AS PART OF THIS WORK ORDER HAD ERRORS IN BLOCK 8. THE ICA AND FMS DOCUMENT DATES DID NOT MATCH THE ACTUAL DOCUMENTS. ALSO SEE RELATED PTRS #NM1120091216. A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO SEE IF THIS IS A SYSTEMIC ERROR.

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
123.	NM11 200901216	UABR	BHT-206-L3	NM11MKB	F	C	5608	145	01/29/2009	N560P	EKO

E802U (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance U-Unacceptable)

AN INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED ON A MODIFICATION OF A BELL 206 L3 OPERATED BY JEFLYN DBA ACCESS AIR. THE INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF ORDER 8900.51 AND TO VERIFY THE REPAIR STATION QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM AS PERTAINS TO THE CORRECTION ACTION PLAN FOR PREVIOUSLY ALTERED AIRCRAFT. ||

||
THE REPAIR STATION PERFORMED A CONFORMITY INSPECTION AS IDENTIFIED IN BLOCK 6 OF THE FAA FORM 337 DATED 11/10/08. THE CONFORMITY WAS PERFORMED BY CHRISTOPHER REBER, AN AUTHORIZED INSPECTOR FOR THE REPAIR STATION. THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED: ||

||
1) THE DATES FOR THE ICA AND FMS IN BLOCK 8 OF THE 337 DID NOT MATCH THE ACTUAL DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR. ||

||
2) THE DRAWINGS PROVIDED TO THE OPERATOR DO NOT MATCH THE AIRCRAFT, E.G. THE APPENDIX C DRAWING IS FOR ANOTHER S/N (45280) NOT 51013. ALSO THE WRONG AUDIO PANEL IS DEPICTED ON THE DRAWING. THE DRAWING SHOWS A ACS 300A, AN ACS 775SL IS INSTALLED. ||

||
3) THE STC DRAWINGS SHOW A REFERENCE MARK ON THE NVG POTENTIOMETERS. NONE WERE INSTALLED. ||

||
4) THE STC DRAWINGS REQUIRE AN EXTERNAL RED LINE TO BE INSTALLED ON THE TOT GAUGE. THIS HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. ||

||
5) THE CABIN EMS SHORE POWER ANNUNCIATOR REQUIRES A FILTER IAW THE STC. THE ANNUNCIATOR WAS NOT FILTERED. IN ADDITION THE FILTER CALLED OUT IN THE STC COULD NOT BE INSTALLED ON THE EXITING ANNUNCIATOR DUE TO ITS SIZE AND SHAPE. ||

||
6) THE CABIN AUDIO PANEL INSTALLED DID NOT MATCH THE DRAWING USED FOR CONFORMITY. ||

||
7) THE #1 COMM RADIO DID NOT HAVE A FILTER INSTALLED IAW THE STC. ||

||
8) THE MAGNETIC COMPASS DID NOT HAVE A NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHT BULB INSTALLED IAW THE STC. ||

||
9) THE HIGH PRESSURE O2 INDICATOR IN THE CABIN WAS NOT FILTERED IAW THE STC. ||

||
10) THE LOW ROTOR RPM INDICATOR ON THE WARNING/CAUTION PANEL WAS THE WRONG COLOR. THE ONE INSTALLED WAS RED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AMBER IAW THE RFM. ||

||
11) THE STC DRAWINGS DEPICT PROVISIONS FOR CHIN BUBBLE CARPETS. THESE PROVISIONS WERE NOT INSTALLED AND THE OPERATOR DID NOT HAVE THE CHIN BUBBLE CARPETS. ||

||
12) THE CABIN FLOOD LIGHT SWITCHES WERE ILLUMINATED WITH WHITE LIGHT. THE STC DATA DOESN'T ADDRESS THIS FOR THIS MAKE/MODEL HOWEVER, IT DOES ON THE 407 STC WHICH IS CONFIGURED WITH THE SAME EQUIPMENT. A FOLLOW UP WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH THE ACO TO DETERMINE IF THIS WAS AN OVERSIGHT IN THE APPROVED DATA. ||

||
A FOLLOW UP WAS CONDUCTED WITH THE QUALITY MANAGER AT ASU TO REVIEW THE DATA USED FOR THE CONFORMITY OF THIS A/C. THE PICTURES USED FOR THIS CONFORMITY SHOWED SOME OF THE DEFICIENCIES FOUND DURING THE INSPECTION SUCH AS THE WRONG LOW ROTOR RPM, COMM #1 FILTER MISSING AND NO EXTERIOR RED LINE ON THE TOT. NO PICTURES WERE AVAILABLE OF THE CABIN CONFIGURATION SO IT'S UNCLEAR HOW A CONFORMITY BY MR. REBER COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS AREA. ||

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
124.	NM11 200802468	UABR		NM11DLF	A	C	3230	145	01/16/2009		
<p>E2111 (E-Air Agencies 211-Manuals I-Information) PARTICIPATED ON CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT TEAM FOR AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED. ATTENDED INITIAL MEETING FOR RSM/QCM REVIEW DURING THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS. THE MANUALS WERE REVIEWED USING A PROJECTOR IN THE ROOM WITH MIKE & CHRIS ATWOOD, SHAWN WOODWORTH AND KIP MCDERMOTT. MY PARTICIPATION IN THE CERTIFICATION WAS LIMITED BY MY LIMITED EXPERIENCE AND TIME IN THE FAA. THE CPM, ASSIGNED BY REGION, WAS THE DRIVING FORCE IN THE CERTIFICATION. ALTHOUGH, EVEN WITH MY LIMITED EXPERIENCE I NOTICED THAT THE 8900.1 GUIDANCE FOR CERTIFICATION OF A 145 REPAIR STATION WAS NOT BEING FOLLOWED BY THE CPM AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CERTIFICATION TEAM WERE NOT ALLOWED INPUT.</p>											
125.	NM11 200901671	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5399	145	12/23/2008		
<p>E6171 (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance I-Information) A MEETING WAS CONDUCTED TO ASSIST ASU MANAGEMENT WITH PROCESSES TO IMPROVE IN-PROCESS AND FINAL INSPECTIONS. IMPROVEMENTS WE ALSO DISCUSSED TO MAKE AN RSM/QCM REVISION. THIS REVISION SHOULD CORRECT MANY INACCURACY'S IN THE MANUALS AS WELL AS TO ADDRESS BETTER WORK AWAY PROCEDURES. ASU MANAGEMENT AGREED TO HAVE THIS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE END OF JANUARY. THE PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCE CONDUCTED ON N302LE WAS DISCUSSED. SOME OF THE RESPONSES FROM THE ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER WERE COVERED. THIS MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT A LATER DATE.</p>											
126.	NM11 200901675	UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3390	145	12/23/2008		
<p>E9031 (E-Air Agencies 903-Management I-Information) NOTES FROM MEETING WITH ASU AND BOISE FSDO PRESENT FROM ASU: MIKE AND CHRIS ATWOOD, SHAWN WOODWORTH, AND KIP MCDERMOTT. PRESENT BOISE FSDO: MIKE BAIRD DAVE CAWTHRA, ROB MARTINEZ AND DOUG DYMOCK. DAVE CAWTHRA OPEN MEETING WITH SUGGESTIONS ABOUT SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (SMS) AND HOW IT COULD BE BENEFIT TO ASU UNDER THERE CURRENT PROBLEMS. NEXT ITEM COVERED WAS THE RESPONSE TO A LETTER SENT TO ASU ON 11/25/08. THIS LETTER WAS BY MIKE BAIRD ON THE INSTALLATION OF A ASU STC COMPLETED IN SEPT OF 2008 WITH SEVERAL CORRECTION NOTED DURING THIS OVERSIGHT. ALSO COVERED WAS THE STATUS OF OPEN AND CLOSED ENFORCEMENTS MIKE HAS ONE OPEN AND DOUG HAS TWO CLOSED THIS FISCAL YEAR. ASU STATED THEY HAD NOT RECEIVED LETTER OF CORRECTION FROM OKC. (AFTER LOOKING INTO THIS MATTER THEY HAD RECEIVED ONE AND THE OTHER SHOULD BE THEIR ANY DAY AS IT WAS SENT BY OKC ON 12/12/08) COVERED WAS THE SHOT COMING OF RSM/QSM AND THE NEED TO CORRECT ITEMS WHICH DIDN'T MEET MINIMUMS REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED IN FAA ORDER 8900.1 THE ISSUE OF ASU TRAINING MANUAL WAS BROUGHT UP AGAIN AS LETTERS OF DIFFERENCES WERE SENT ON 09/29/2008. THE TRAINING PROGRAM DIDN'T MEET MINIMUMS OUTLINED IN FAA ORDER 8900.1. ASU STATED THEY ARE WORKING ON THIS AND SHOULD HAVE A REVISED MANUAL IN PLACE FOR OUR REVIEW NO LATER THAN 01/31/2009. ASU ALSO STATE THEY WANTED BRIEFING AFTER SURVEILLANCE IS COMPLETED ON THERE MECHANICS. I REMINDED THEM THIS WAS COMPLIED WITH IN ANCHORAGE WITH BOTH MECHANICS AND AT THAT TIME SHAWN WOODWORTH DID REMEMBER THIS TOO. </p>											

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
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||
 ROB MARTINEZ RECOMMENDED ASU DO A SELF EVALUATION OF ALL AIRCRAFT ASU HAS ALTERED SINCE NEW CERTIFICATION. ASU (CHIRS ATWOOD) SEEM VERY UPSET ABOUT THIS RECOMMENDATION AND THIS DIDN'T GO MUCH FURTHER AT THAT TIME.||

||
 IN CLOSING ASU KNOWS ITS HAS PROBLEMS WITH ITS TRAINING PROGRAM AND ITS RSM/QSM AND WELL CONTINUE TO WORK ON THESE PROBLEMS. THEY STATED THEY ARE DOING MORE TRAINING WITH TECHS AND USING MORE CHECK LIST. NONE OF WHICH HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THERE RSM/QSM AT THIS TIME.||

||
 ANOTHER MEETING IS SCHEDULE FOR 02/2009||

127.	NM11	UABR	NM11RDM	C	C	3390	145	12/22/2008
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200901674

E8011 (E-Air Agencies 801-Maintenance I-Information)
 12/22/2008 MTG WITH OPERATOR TO EMPHASIZE SMS/SYSTEM SAFETY CONCEPTS BE DEVELOPE INTO THERE RSM/QM.||

||
 AND DISCUSS THE RESPONSE TO LETTER SENT BY PAI 12/11/2008||

||
 OPERATOR TO SUBMITT DRAFT COPY BY END OF JAN/2009

128.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	C	C	3732	21	12/11/2008
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200901535

E317U (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports U-Unacceptable)
 AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC. WAS DIRECTED UNDER FAA NOTICE 8900.51 TO PROVIDED SUPPORTING DATA TO INSTALL NVIS COMPATIBLE LIGHTING SYSTEM DOCUMENT ION IN 337 FORMAT. ||

THEY HAVE SINCE SENT OUT 10 PACKAGES TO OPERATORS STATING THEY MUST COMPLETE BLOCK SEVEN OF THIS 337 FORM AND SEND IT INTO AIRCRAFT RECORDS.||

THIS IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER NOTICE 8900.51 THAT THE OPERATOR SIGN BLOCK SEVEN , (BUT SOMEONE MUST) (SEVERAL OPERATORS HAVE STATED THEY WANT ASU TO SIGN BLOCK SEVEN)THE AIRCRAFT MUST MEET ITS ALTERED STATE AND SIGN BY ONE PERSON MEETING FAR PART 43.||

IDAHO HELICOPTERS RECEIVED ONE OF THE PACKAGES FOR N431SL S/N 31913 WITH BLOCK SIX SIGNED AND INSTRUCTIONS TO SIGN BLOCK SEVEN BY ASU. THEY HAVE SINCE CALL THIS OFFICE ASKING US TO INSPECT THIS 337 ON NOV 24, 2008.||

I INSPECTED THIS 337 FORM DATED 11/14/2008 AND FOUND THE FOLLOWING ERRORS.||

- 1) ICA REV DATED WRONG ||
- 2) WRONG REV LEVEL ICA'S.||
- 3) WRONG FMS DATE.||

||
 THIS 337 FORM WAS SIGNED BY ASU IN BLOCK 6 OF THE CONFORMITY STATEMENT AND DATED.||

||
 THIS IS CONTRARY TO CFR PART 43.13 (A)||

||
 SNAPP FWD 12/11/2008 TO OKC||

129.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	C	C	3399	145	12/03/2008
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200901556

E811P (E-Air Agencies 811-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
 AFTER FINDING ERRORS WITH 337 SIGNED AND SENT TO 135 OPERATORS BY AVIATION SPECIAL UNLIMITED INC (ASU) ON 11/24/2008 A CALL WAS PLACED TO ASU ASKING FOR EXPLANATION AS TO HOW THIS COULD HAVE HAPPEN. (AT THE TIME OF THIS CALL ASU DIDN'T KNOW THE FAA WAS AWARE OF THE ERRORS AND WAS PRESENT DURING A PHONE CALL BETWEEN A OPERATOR AND THEM. ASU ASKED THE OPERATOR NOT TO TELL THE FAA OF THIS PROBLEM AT THAT TIME TOO.)||

ASU (CHIRS ATWOOD) STATED THEY HAD ONLY ONE 337 OUT AND THE PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY ONE EMPLOYEE. THEY ALSO STATED THEY DIDN'T THINK THE FAA WAS INTERESTED IN THAT KIND OF OVERSIGHT.||

THE 337 IN QUESTION WAS C/W FAA NOTICE 8900.51 AND THIS OPERATOR HAD SENT SEVERAL OUT BUT WAS NOT FORTH RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THIS CALL. ||

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart	
	THIS INSPECTOR RECEIVED A E-MAIL ON 12/1/2008 STATING THE HAD RECOVER ALL BUT THREE OF THESE 337 WHICH THEY SAID THEY HAD NOT SENT ON OUR PHONE CALL ON 11/25//2008. PRESENT DURING THIS PHONE CALL WAS MIKE BAIRD (PAI) ROB MARTINEZ (ASI BOISE OFFICE) AND MYSELF (PMI)										
130.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5372	145	12/01/2008			
	200901542 E211I (E-Air Agencies 211-Manuals I-Information) REVIEWED THE SECOND SUBMISSION FOR REVISION A TO THE RSM/QCM. THE SECOND ATTEMPT WAS DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THE REVISION A DATED 11/01/08 WAS ACCEPTED ON THIS DATE. AN ACCEPTANCE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO THE ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER FOR THE REPAIR STATION.										
131.	NM11 UABR	BHT-407	NM11MKB	C	C	5732	145	11/24/2008	N301LE		
	200900600 E617U (E-Air Agencies 617-Conformance U-Unacceptable) A POST MAJOR ALTERATION/STC INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED OF WORK AWAY PROCEDURES. DURING THE INSPECTION SEVERAL AREAS WERE FOUND TO BE DEFICIENT. 1) THE TSO'D STANDBY ADI WAS ALTERED TO INSTALL AN NVG COMPATIBLE FILTER. IAW STC SR01383SE THE INSTRUMENT SHOULD HAVE HAD A PLACARD INSTALLED TO IDENTIFY THIS ALTERATION TO THE TSO'D INSTRUMENT. NO SUCH PLACARD WAS INSTALLED. 2) THE RFMS SUPPLEMENT REQUIRED BY STC SR01383SE WAS INSTALLED IN THE FLIGHT MANUAL HOWEVER DUE TO THE CONFIGURATION OF THIS AIRCRAFT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVISION B. REVISION A WAS INSTALLED IN THE FLIGHT MANUAL. 3) STC SR01383SE, DRAWING 407-53568-013 REVISION A, NOTE 24 REQUIRES THAT NVG POST LIGHTS BE INSTALLED AS DEPICTED ON THE DRAWING. TWO OF THE POST LIGHTS INSTALLED ON THE PEDESTAL PANEL DID NOT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. (ANOTHER REVISION TO THE DRAWING HAS BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE STC HOLDER TO THE ACO FOR APPROVAL) 4) THE FUNCTION TESTING REQUIRED BY THE PART 135 OPERATORS GMM AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE COULD NOT BE VERIFIED BY THE AIRCRAFT RECORDS OR THE CLOSED REPAIR STATION WORK ORDER. AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH THE REPAIR STATION MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AND TECHNICIANS IT WAS VERIFIED THAT THE FUNCTION TESTING WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH. IN MEETINGS WITH KEY REPAIR STATION PERSONNEL ON OCTOBER 1ST AND 3RD THE REPAIR STATION THUS FAR HAS FAILED TO DISPLAY A COOPERATIVE OR COMPLIANT ATTITUDE. THEY FEEL THAT DIRECT SURVEILLANCE OF THEIR TECHNICIANS AND INSPECTIONS OF MAINTENANCE PERFORMED THAT IS NOT PRE-COORDINATED WITH THE REPAIR STATION IS INAPPROPRIATE. THIS MATTER WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE WITH THE SURVEILLANCE AS PLANNED AND WITHOUT CHANGE. LOI WAS SENT ON 10/06/08 AND RECEIVED ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. THIS ENFORCEMENT ACTION RESULTED IN A LETTER OF CORRECTION DATED 11/24/08										
132.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3240	145	11/19/2008			
	200901497 E105P (E-Air Agencies 105-Personnel P-Potential Problem) I WAS PART OF A CERTIFICATION SUPPORT TEAM TO ISSUE A NEW 145 CERTIFICATE TO AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC. I WAS ORDERED TO BE PART OF THIS TEAM										

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Dsgn Record ID	Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
	BY BOISE OFFICE MANAGER. PROJECT MANAGER OR CPM RAN THIS CERTIFICATION AND DIDN'T ALLOW ANY MEMBERS INPUT. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO OFFICE MANAGER ATTENTION AND I REQUEST TO STOP CERTIFICATION BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TOO. IN SHORT THE CPM RAN THE SHOW CALLED THE SHOT AND TOOK ALL AUTHORITY AWAY FROM CERTIFICATION MEMBERS. CERTIFICATION WAS NOT DONE I/AW FAA ORDERS (8900.1)AND THIS WAS FORWARDED TO REGION PERSONNEL SEVERAL TIMES. ALL THREE MEMBER FROM THE BOISE OFFICE WHO WERE ORDER TO WORK WITH CPM HAVE STATED THIS TO REGIONAL PERSONAL AND STATED ORDER WERE NOT FOLLOWED. THIS PTRS WAS MADE TO CLOSE OUT A LOGBOOK ENTRY ONLY.										

133.	NM11	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5240	145	11/19/2008		
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200901749

E105P (E-Air Agencies 105-Personnel P-Potential Problem)

I PARTICIPATED IN THE RE-CERTIFICATION OF AVIATION SPECIALITIES UNLIMITED INC. AFTER THEIR PART 145 CERTIFICATE WAS REVOKED. I WAS ORDERED TO BE PART OF THE RECERTIFICATION TEAM BY BOI FSDO MANAGEMENT. DURING THE CERTIFICATION THE CPM REMOVED ANY AUTHORITY FOR ME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CERTIFICATION. WHEN I MADE RECOMMENDATIONS TO FOLLOW OUR CERTIFICATION GUIDANCE I WAS ASKED BY THE CPM HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE AGENCY? WHEN I TRIED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER AND USE OUR GUIDANCE I WAS TOLD BY THE CPM I WAS EMBARRASSING THE AGENCY. DUE TO THIS AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES I DON'T FEEL THAT I ACCOMPLISHED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS TASK AND THEREFORE DID NOT COMPLETE THIS PTRS AT FIRST. I AM MAKING THIS ENTRY TO DOCUMENT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CERTIFICATION AND NOT STATING THAT THE CERTIFICATION WAS COMPLETED IAW OUR GUIDANCE. THIS FACT HAS BEEN UPCHANNELED THROUGH OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND REGION.

134.	NM11	UABR	BHT-407	NM11MKB	E	C	5606	145	11/13/2008	N301LE	TRX
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200803398

E610U (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance U-Unacceptable)

A POST MAJOR ALTERATION/ STC INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED OF WORK AWAY PROCEDURES. DURING THE INSPECTION SEVERAL AREAS WERE FOUND TO BE DEFICIENT.||

||

1) THE TSO'D STANDBY ADI WAS ALTERED TO INSTALL AN NVG COMPATIBLE FILTER. IAW STC SR01383SE THE INSTRUMENT SHOULD HAVE HAD A PLACARD INSTALLED TO IDENTIFY THIS ALTERATION TO THE TSO'D INSTRUMENT. NO SUCH PLACARD WAS INSTALLED.||

||

2) THE RFMS SUPPLEMENT REQUIRED BY STC SR01383SE WAS INSTALLED IN THE FLIGHT MANUAL HOWEVER DUE TO THE CONFIGURATION OF THIS AIRCRAFT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVISION B. REVISION A WAS INSTALLED IN THE FLIGHT MANUAL.||

||

3) STC SR01383SE, DRAWING 407-53568-013 REVISION A, NOTE 24 REQUIRES THAT NVG POST LIGHTS BE INSTALLED AS DEPICTED ON THE DRAWING. TWO OF THE POST LIGHTS INSTALLED ON THE PEDESTAL PANEL DID NOT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. (ANOTHER REVISION TO THE DRAWING HAS BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE STC HOLDER TO THE ACO FOR APPROVAL)||

||

4) THE FUNCTION TESTING REQUIRED BY THE PART 135 OPERATORS GMM AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURE COULD NOT BE VERIFIED BY THE AIRCRAFT RECORDS OR THE CLOSED REPAIR STATION WORK ORDER.||

||

5) STC SR01383SE, DRAWING 407-53568-012 REVISION A NOTE 19 REQUIRES THE INSTALLER TO PERFORM AN EVALUATION OF THE AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FOR ADEQUATE POWER DISTRIBUTION AND ADDITIONAL LOADS CAPABILITY DURING ALL OPERATIONS PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH THE ALTERATION. NEITHER THE PERMINANT AIRCRAFT RECORDS OR THE WORK ORDER FILE SHOW EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED. AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION IT WAS DETERMINED THIS REQUIREMENT WAS COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE ALTERATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IN THE FUTURE THIS WILL BE DOCUMENTED AS PART OF THE WORK ORDER.||

||

THIS SURVEILLANCE RESULTED IN AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION.

SPAS NPTRS Record List for ASU

Rec. No	Record ID	Dsgn Code	Make/Model Series	Inspector Code	Result	Status	Act No.	FAR	Status Date	A/C Reg#	Loc. Depart
135.	NM11 200901447	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5372	145	11/05/2008		
<p>E205U (E-Air Agencies 205-Manuals U-Unacceptable) THE RSM/QCM REVISION DATED 10-01-08 WAS REVIEWED AND REJECTED. THE REVISION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 8900.1 VOL 2 CHAP 11 SEC 4 PARA 2-1296 AS WELL AS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR REVISION IDENTIFIED IN THEIR CURRENT ACCEPTED RSM/QCM. A LETTER WAS SENT TO THE ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER IDENTIFYING THE UNACCEPTABLE AREAS.</p>											
136.	NM11 200901444	UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3399	145	11/04/2008		
<p>E299I (E-Air Agencies 299-Manuals I-Information) RECEIVED CALL FROM RICHARD A. JOHNSON ATTORNEY AT LAW ABOUT GETTING HELP WITH CHANGES IN ASU TRAINING PROGRAM. HE REQUESTED WE HAVE A MEETING OVER PROPOSED CHANGES HE IS WRITING TO ASU TRAINING PROGRAM. HE WANTED TO GET TOGETHER ON 11/4/2008 IN THE AFTERNOON BUT I WAS UNABLE TO MAKE THIS APPOINTMENT DUE TO WORK TILL 11/17/2008. I REFERRED MR. KOHNSON TO FAA ORDER 8900.1 VOL 3, CHAPTER 55 SECTION 1 AND VOLUME 6 CHAPTER 9 SECTION 11 FOR GUIDANCE PLUS AC 145-10 TOO.</p>											
137.	NM11 200803401	UABR	BHT-407	NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	10/27/2008	N302LE	MKC
<p>E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem) AN INSPECTION WAS CONDUCTED TO EVALUATE WORK AWAY PROCEDURES. THE INSPECTION INVOLVED THE MAJOR ALTERATION/STC ON N302LE. THIS STC WAS INSTALLED FOR NVG COCKPIT COMPATIBILITY. THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES WERE NOTED. 1) STC SR01383SE REQUIRES THAT THE INSTALLER PERFORM AN EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FOR ADEQUATE POWER DISTRIBUTION AND ADDITIONAL LOADS CAPABILITY DURING ALL OPERATIONS PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH THE INSTALLATION. THIS EVALUATION WAS NOT PERFORMED AT THE JOB SITE. A REVIEW OF THE WORK ORDER WILL BE CONDUCTED UPON COMPLETION TO VERIFY IF THIS EVALUATION WAS CONDUCTED AT SOME OTHER TIME. IT WAS LATER VERIFIED THAT THIS REQUIREMENT WAS ADDRESSED BUT NOT DOCUMENTED. THE QUALITY MANAGER AGREED TO INCLUDE THIS INFORMATION IN THE WORK ORDER PACKAGE. 2) WIRE # NVG-15A20N WAS CONNECTED TO AN EXISTING SCREW THAT WAS PART OF THE CENTER PEDESTAL. THIS SCREW IS USED TO SUPPORT THE STRUCTURE IN THE PEDESTAL. WIRE NVG-15A20N PROVIDES ELECTRICAL RETURN TO ENERGIZE THE NEWLY INSTALLED RELAY FOR NVG SWITCHING. THE INSTALLATION OF THIS RING TERMINAL WAS NOT INSTALLED IAW WITH ACCEPTABLE PRACTICES (PAINT WAS NOT REMOVED TO PROVIDE PROPER BONDING). PRIOR TO RE-ASSEMBLY OF THE PEDESTAL PANEL THIS DEFICIENCY WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LEAD TECHNICIAN TO AVOID UNDUE DELAY IN THE WORK BEING PERFORMED. 3) SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS AND AVIONICS SYSTEMS WERE REMOVED, MODIFIED AND RE-INSTALLED WITHOUT ANY TYPE OF FUNCTION TEST AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PART 135 OPERATORS GMM OR THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURES RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS DEFICIENCY WAS PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED WITH THE DOM AND ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER. THIS CAN BE REFERENCED IN PTRS NM11200802791 AND NM1120083398. A MEETING WAS HELD WITH ASU MANAGEMENT AND THE BOI FSDO PI'S AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT. ASU'S ATTITUDE AT THE MEETING REGARDING THIS DEFICIENCY WAS ARGUMENTATIVE AND RELUCTANT TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 14 CFR PART 43. AFTER THE MEETING ASU MANAGEMENT CONTACTED NORTHWEST MOUNTAIN REGION SPECIALISTS AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER OPERATORS TO SOME HOW GAIN RELIEF FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF PART 43. ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THIS AREA TO CONFIRM COMPLIANCE. 4) THE NEWLY INSTALLED NVG C/B SWITCH WAS NOT PLACARDED IAW STC DRAWINGS. THIS DEFICIENCY WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LEAD TECHNICIAN AT THE COMPLETION OF THE ALTERATION. THIS WAS DONE TO PRECLUDE ANY UNDUE DELAY. IT WAS CORRECTED ON THE SPOT BY THE TECHNICIAN. </p>											

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5) ORIGINAL INSTALLATION OF NVG POST LIGHTS OVER THE STBY ADI INTERFERED WITH THE REINSTALLATION OF THE MED BED. ADDITIONAL HOLES WERE DRILLED TO RELOCATE THE POST LIGHTS. THIS RELOCATION RESULTED IN A PLACARD BEING OBSCURED ABOVE THE STBY ADI. INSPECTOR/LEAD TECHNICIAN DID NOT CORRECT THE PROBLEM. THE MIS-DRILLED HOLE WERE LEFT OPEN.||

6) FILTER ASU-B0105MM-1 WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE JOB SITE. A FILTER WAS MANUFACTURED ON SITE. THE FILTER THAT WAS MANUFACTURED DIDN'T SEEM TO RESEMBLE THE MANUFACTURING DRAWING. WHEN THE FILTER WAS INSTALLED IT WAS NOT EDGE SEALED IAW THE -014 DRAWING. ||

7) WHILE OBSERVING THE LEAD TECHNICIAN TERMINATING THE WIRES TO THE NVG SWITCHING RELAY IT WAS NOTED THAT THE TECHNICIAN WAS OVER CRIMPING THE WIRES. THE CRIMP TOOL WAS SET FOR TERMINATING 18 AWG WIRES WHEN THE WIRES BEING TERMINATED WERE 14 AWG. THIS WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TECHNICIAN. HE RESPONDED " HE WAS NOT SURE HOW TO SET THE CRIMP TOOL". THE WIRES WERE INSTALLED WITHOUT BEING RE-TERMINATED.||

8) RELAY MOUNTING BRACKET P/N ASU-SDIM-3 WAS NOT MANUFACTURED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD ALLOW IT TO BE INSTALLED AS SHOWN ON DRAWING 407-53572-013. THIS WAS A KNOWN PROBLEM TO THE TECHNICIAN CRIS REBER. ADDITION HOLE HAD TO BE DRILLED TO USE THE PROVIDED BRACKET.||

9) WHEN THE ASU INSPECTOR/TECHNICIAN PERFORMED THE LIGHT LEAKAGE TEST PROCEDURES AS OUTLINED IN ASU FORM ASU-NVT-002 "ASU/NVG EVALUATION" HE FAILED TO CHECK BOTH NAT AUDIO PANELS, CABIN OXYGEN METER AND INDICATOR LIGHT. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE TECHNICIAN WAS UNABLE TO OPERATE THE AUDIO PANELS OR THE C CABIN EQUIPMENT. HE EVEN MENTIONED WHEN ASKED BY THE JUNIOR TECHNICIAN ABOUT CHECKING THE CABIN EQUIPMENT "I'VE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO TURN ON THE OXYGEN METER OR INDICATOR LIGHT". ||

A LESS THAN COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE AND SOMETIMES HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT WAS EXPERIENCED THROUGHOUT THE INSPECTION, ESPECIALLY FROM ASU MANAGEMENT. ALTHOUGH EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE BY THE INSPECTOR TO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ALTERATION BY THE REPAIR STATION IT SEEMED THAT HAVING AN INSPECTOR IN THE HANGER WAS THE REAL PROBLEM. ||

NUMEROUS ACCUSATIONS WERE MADE BY THE INSTALLER AND ASU MANAGEMENT IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT THE SURVEILLANCE FROM TAKING PLACE. A REQUEST WAS MADE TO THE OFFICE MANAGER TO IMMEDIATELY TERMINATE THE SURVEILLANCE. THE REQUEST WAS NOT HONORED.||

IMMEDIATELY AFTER REALIZING THAT SURVEILLANCE WAS GOING TO BE PERFORMED ON THIS ALTERATION THE LEAD TECHNICIAN CONTACTED ASU MANAGEMENT TO HAVE WIRING THAT WAS STAMPED IAW THE STC SHIPPED NEXT DAY AIR. THE TECHNICIANS ON SITE HAD UNMARKED WIRE THAT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN USED PRIOR TO KNOWING AN FAA INSPECTOR WOULD BE CONDUCTION SURVEILLANCE. THE TECHNICIAN MADE A COMMENT THAT HE WANTED ASU TO START PROVIDING THE MARKED WIRE FOR ALL ALTERATIONS. UNMARKED WIRING HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AS A PROBLEM AREA WITH ASU ALTERATIONS. SEE PTRS NM11200802791.||

138.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	F	C	3606	145	10/23/2008	BOI
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200901204

E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)

INSPECTION OF ASU WORK AWAY AT EVERGREEN HELICOPTERS ANCHORAGE BASE. ASU DIDN'T HAVE TO INSTALL OR REMOVE ANY EQUIPMENT OR WORK WITH THE WIRING ON THIS SHIP. EVERGREEN C/W THIS UNDER WORK ORDER 6401. ALL OPERATIONAL TEST WERE TO BE C/W UNDER THIS SAME WORK ORDER. ||

ASU DIDN'T FOLLOW THERE MANUAL IN SO FAR AS TO CHECK TO SEE HOW OR WHAT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM THE HELICOPTER WAS BEING MAINTAINED UNDER. (IN THIS CASE IT WAS A CAMP MANUAL)||

ADVISED ASU DOM OF THIS MATTER AND SHOWED THEM EVERGREEN CAMP AND ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THIS CAMP. ASU STATED THEY WOULD ADD THIS TO THERE TRAINING PROGRAM AND ALERT OTHER TECH WITHIN COMPANY SO THIS MATTER WONT

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ARISE AGAIN.||
ON 10/23/2008 TALKED TO DOM ABOUT ADVISING TECH OF MAINTENANCE PROGRAM OF SHIP BEING ALTER. HE STATED THIS HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO ALL ATTENTION, WITHIN COMPANY.

139.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3732	21	10/23/2008		
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200901318
E201U (E-Air Agencies 201-Manuals U-Unacceptable)
DURING SURVEILLANCE OF REPAIR STATION RECORDS AND REVIEW OF WORK ORDER LOG IT WAS NOTED THAT AVIATION SPECIALTIES DIDN'T C/W FAR 145.207 (A) FOLLOWING GUIDANCE OUTLINED IN THERE RSM/QSM. PART IDENTIFIED WAS SECTION 5 QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM PAGE 5.3. AND SECTION 6 FORMS, PAGE 6.1||
LOI SENT FROM THIS OFFICE ON 10/07/2008.||
RICHARD A. JOHNSON ATTORNEY AT LAW RESPONDED TO LOI WITH LETTER ATTACHED TO LETTER OF CORRECTION. IN SHORT HIS LETTER STATED PART OF THERE MANUAL AND DIDN'T FOLLOW INSTRUCTION ON FORM OR MANUAL. SNAPP FWD TO OKC ON 10/24/2008 AFTER OFFICE REVIEW WITH BOTH MANAGER AND ASSISTANT MANAGER CONCURRENCE.||

140.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	E	C	3608	145	10/07/2008		BOI
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200901195
E802U (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance U-Unacceptable)
DURING SURVEILLANCE OF REPAIR STATION WORK ORDER LOG IT WAS NOTED THEY WERE NOT FOLLOWING QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM OUTLINED IN THERE MANUAL SECTION 5 PAGE 5.3 AND INSTRUCTION FOR COMPLETION OF FORMS OUTLINED IN SECTION 6 PAGE 6.1 WORK ORDER LOG SHEET.||
SEE: PTRS NM11200901318||
LOI SENT TO THIS OPERATOR ENFORCEMENT # 2009NM110003.

141.	NM11 UABR		NM11DLF	A	C	3608	145	10/03/2008		BOI
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200901257
E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)
SAT IN ON A MEETING WITH MIKE BAIRD OF THE FAA, CHRIS ATWOOD AND SHAWN THE DOM OF ASU. DISCUSSED WERE ELECTRICAL LOAD ANALYSIS OF THE INSTALLED LIGHTING PACKAGE AND THE FUNCTION TESTS NEEDED FOR EQUIPMENT THAT HAS BEEN REMOVED AND REINSTALLED. CHRIS REBURG HAS BEEN DISPATCHED FROM ASU TO DO THE FUNCTIONAL CHECKS ON N302LE WHICH HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED TO SERVICE AT THIS TIME BUT HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING THE FUNCTIONAL CHECKS THAT NEEDED TO BE DONE ON N301LE, WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN RETURNED TO SERVICE. UNTIL WE GOT TO ASU'S OFFICE AND ADVISED THEM THAT IT NEEDED TO BE DONE. ||
WE WERE AGAIN ASKED TO LET THEM KNOW WHEN WE INTENDED TO GO TO AN INSTALL AND AGAIN THEY WERE ADVISED THAT WE WILL TRY MOST OF THE TIME BUT SOMETIMES WE WILL JUST SHOW UP, JUST LIKE AT ANY OTHER REPAIR STATION.

142.	NM11 UABR		NM11DCD	F	C	3661	145	09/29/2008		
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200800917
E802I (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance I-Information)
INSPECT QC/RSM MANUAL AND CONFORMANCE PER MANUAL.

E403P (E-Air Agencies 403-Training P-Potential Problem)
ON SEPT 23, 2008 OUR OFFICE RECEIVED A FAXED REVISION TO AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC. (ASU) PERSONNEL ROSTER, ADDING CARL CEDERQUIST AND JENNIFER DENIELS TO AUTHORIZE FOR RETURN TO SERVICE AUTHORITY. BOTH OF THESE EMPLOYEE'S WERE ADDED TO YOUR REPAIR STATION IN THE PAST YEAR AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING TRAINING RECORDS.||
BOISE FSDO DID AN REVIEW OF BOTH EMPLOYEE'S TRAINING RECORDS AND FOUND THAT ASU HAS SEVERAL ISSUES THAT WILL REQUIRE PROMPT ACTION. ||
BOTH EMPLOYEE'S DIDN'T HAVE INITIAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT WHICH THEY STATED THEY WOULD COMPLETE IN THERE TRAINING MANUAL DATED 04/30/08. (SECTION 3 PART 1 PAR (D)) THEY HAD A COMPLETE OMISSION OF SECTION 4 COURSE DEFINITION WHICH STATED THE REPAIR STATION WOULD DEVELOP FOR ARES OF STUDY TO IDENTIFY THE ENTIRE SCOPE OF TRAINING. ALSO THEY DIDN'T HAVE EFFECTIVENESS

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MEASUREMENT IN PLACE AS OUTLINED IN SECTION 7 OF THERE APPROVED TRAINING MANUAL.||
 LETTER SENT TO REPAIR STATING MANAGER (SHAWN WOODWORTH) OUTLINING ASU SHORTCOMING DATED 09/29/2008 HAND DI LIVERED THIS DATE BY DOUGLAS DYMOCK.||
 THIS INSPECTOR FINDS NO DOCUMENTATION SHOWING EITHER EMPLOYEE BEING ADDED TO RETURN TO SERVICE LIST HAD ANY TRAINING OUTLINED IN ASU APPROVED TRAINING MANUAL.

143.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	X	C	5606	145	09/29/2008		
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200802790
 E621I (E-Air Agencies 621-Conformance I-Information)
 WORK AWAY SURVEILLANCE WILL BE CONDUCTED AS SOON AS IT CAN BE SCHEDULED WITH THE OPERATOR.||
 ||
 DUPLICATE PTRS ENTRY. INSPECTION CONDUCTED UNDER ANOTHER PTRS NUMBER.

144.	NM11 UABR		NM11DLF	A	C	3659	141	09/24/2008		BOI
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200803408
 E409P (E-Air Agencies 409-Training P-Potential Problem)
 ASSISTED INSPECTOR DOUG DYMOCK WITH AN INSPECTION OF THE TRAINING RECORDS AND PERSONELL FILES OF AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED. UPON INSPECTING THE TRAINING RECORDS IT WAS FOUND THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS LAID OUT IN THE RSM/QSM WERE NOT BEING FOLLOWED. THE OPERATOR WAS MADE AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND A FOLLOW UP VISIT WILL BE MADE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE INITIAL TRAINING AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR NEW HIRES HAS BEEN GIVEN. THE RSM/QSM ALSO NEEDS TO BE UPDATED AND REQUIRE PROCEDURES AND QUALIFICATIONS BEFORE GIVING EMPLOYEES MORE RESONSIBILITY. SPENT 2 HOUR TALKING WITH THE OPERATOR ABOUT THE LACK OF TRAINING FOR THE EMPLOYEES UPGRADED TO INSPECTOR OR WITH RETURN TO SERVICE AUTHORITY. ALSO, GAVE INSTRUCTION TO THE ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER AND CHRIS ATWOOD ABOUT THE FAA AUTHORITY AND DUTIES WHEN PERFORMING A SPOT INSPECTION. THEY CLAIMED THAT WE WERE MAKING THE MECHANICS NERVOUS WHILE DOING A SPOT INSPECTION AND THAT THE FAA NEEDED TO WAIT UNTIL ALL THE WORK WAS COMPLETED THEN DO THE SPOT INSPECTION. THEY WERE INFORMED THAT A SPOT INSPECTION IS MAINTENANCE IN PROCESS AND COULD NOT WAIT UNTIL THE MAINTENANCE WAS DONE. THEY ALSO INFORMED US THAT BECAUSE OF THE ADDED SURVEILLANCE AND THE UPDATING OF THE TRAINING PROGRAM AND EMPLOYEE RECORDS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE THE OCT 31, 2008 DEADLINE FOR THE SUSPECT AIRCRAFT.

145.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	09/06/2008		BOI
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200800916
 E816I (E-Air Agencies 816-Maintenance I-Information)
 WILL INSPECT WORK AWAY REPAIRMAN IN FILED AS OVER 95% OF WORK IS COMPLETED AWAY.||
 ||
 PERFORMED WORK AWAY INSPECTION OF THE ALTERATION OF AN EC-135 N911TS FOR THE INSTALLATION OF NVG LIGHTING. INSPECTED ALL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT USED FOR THE ALTERATION. ONE PAIR OF CRIMPERS USED FOR RING TERMINALS WAS NOT IN CALIBRATION. THESE CRIMPERS WERE NOT USED IN THE ACTURAL INSTALLATION OF THE NVG LIGHTING SYSTEM. DOM WAS NOTIFIED AND APPROPRIATE ACTIONS IAW THE RSM WILL BE TAKEN.||
 ||
 A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED.

146.	NM11 UABR		NM11MKB	F	C	5606	145	09/05/2008		GRB
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200802791
 E610P (E-Air Agencies 610-Conformance P-Potential Problem)
 WORK AWAY SURVEILLANCE WAS CONDUCTED AT NEENAH WI. ON N911TS. THIS IS A HELICOPTER MANAGED BY PHI. THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES WERE NOTED.||
 ||
 1) WIRING INSTALLED WAS NOT MARKED IAW THE STC.||
 ||

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2) POTENTIOMETERS WERE NOT INSTALLED IAW STC DRAWINGS.||

||

3) GLARE SHIELD ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT WAS NOT INSTALLED IN THE LOCATION DESIGNATED ON THE STC DRAWING. IT WAS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY .25" FROM THE GI-106 NAVIGATION INDICATOR. NO EMI TESTING WAS ACCOMPLISHED FOR THIS MODIFICATION.||

||

4) STC MDL WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE WORK SITE SO VERIFICATION OF ALL REQUIRED DRAWINGS AND DOCUMENTS IAW THE STC WAS NOT POSSIBLE.||

||

6) NO POST INSTALLATION FUNCTIONAL CHECKS WERE PERFORMED OTHER THAN A CHECK FOR LIGHT BLEED THROUGH E.G. AIR CARRIER GMM REQUIREMENTS OR HELICOPTER MANUFACTURES MAINTENANCE MANUAL FUNCTIONAL CHECK.||

||

7) NEWLY INSTALLED NVIS LED LIGHTS ON THE GLARE SHIELD OBSCURED THE VIEW OF THE WARNING CAUTION PANEL TO INCLUDE THE ROTOR RPM WARNING.

147.	NM11	UABR	NM11DLF	F	C	3608	145	09/05/2008	BOI
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200803316

E802P (E-Air Agencies 802-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

INSPECTED THE PARTS ROOM AND FACILITIES AT ASU FOR CONFORMANCE WITH THE RSM/QSM. INSPECTED WIRING FOR LABELS AND FLY AWAY KITS AND DRAWINGS FOR NVG INSTALLATIONS. NOTED THAT THE PART NUMBERS ON THE DRAWINGS AND INVOICES SOMETIMES DID NOT MATCH THE PART NUMBERS ON THE PART. I DISCUSSED THAT WITH THE PARTS MANAGER AND HE SAID THAT IS A PARTS TRACKING PROGRAM GLITCH THAT HE IS WORKING ON. IT IS A LOW INCIDENCE PROBLEM AND IS BEING ADDRESSED BY THE COMPANY.

148.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	F	C	3605	145	08/21/2008	BOI
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200800915

E409I (E-Air Agencies 409-Training I-Information)

FOLLOW-UP ON PTRS NM11200800914. THIS OPERATOR HAS NOW COMPLETED NEEDS ASSESSMENTS FOR CURRENT AND NEW EMPLOYEE.||
OPERATOR STATED THEY WILL REVISE AS NEED IN NEAR FUTURE.

E840P (E-Air Agencies 840-Maintenance P-Potential Problem)

A REVIEW OF W/O 34858 FOUND THAT A COPY OF THE LOG BOOK RETURN TO SERVICE DIDN'T HAVE A DATE IN ITS CLOSING STATEMENT.||
THIS OPERATOR CALL AIRCRAFT OWNER TO CONFIRM LOGBOOK HAD A DATE IN ITS BODY.||
MECHANIC WILL CORRECT W/O THIS AFTERNOON.

149.	NM11	UABR	NM11DCD	F	C	3605	145	08/19/2008	BOI
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200800914

E317I (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports I-Information)

THIS REPAIR STATION HAS HAD MULTIPLE RECORDS PROBLEM IN PAST , THIS IS A NEW CERTIFICATION AND THIS OFFICE WILL INSPECT WORK ORDER PACKAGES FROM FIELD REPAIRMAN

E409P (E-Air Agencies 409-Training P-Potential Problem)

THIS WAS A FOLLOW-UP ON PTRS NM112008913 AND TRAINING RECORDS.||
AT THIS TIME THEY HAVE NOT DO NOT MEET ALL ITEMS OUT LINED IN TRAINING MANUAL. OPERATORS STATED THEY WILL CORRECT NEED REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW EMPLOYEES AND HAVE IT IN PLACE AS THEY ARE NOT C/W THERE MANUAL.
OPERATOR (CRIS AND MIKE ATWOOD) STATED THIS WOULD BE FIX ON 08/20/2008.

150.	NM11	UABR	NM11MKB	I	C	5650	145	08/15/2008	BOI
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200800931

E501I (E-Air Agencies 501-Facilities/Equipment/Surface I-Information)

ALL APPLICABLE AREAS OF 8900.1 WERE INSPECTED. MINOR AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT WERE IDENTIFIED AND IMPLEMENTED.

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151.	NM11 200800913	UABR		NM11DCD	I	C	3605	145	08/12/2008		BOI
<p>E317I (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports I-Information) THIS REPAIR STATION HAS HAD MULTIPLE RECORDS PROBLEM IN PAST. THIS IS A NEW CERTIFICATION AND THIS OFFICE WILL INSPECTED CLOSED WORK ORDER PACKAGES FROM FIELD REPAIRMAN.</p> <p>E409P (E-Air Agencies 409-Training P-Potential Problem) WHILE REVIEWING W/O # 34881 IT WAS NOTED THAT A NEW EMPLOYEE HAD COMPLETED BLOCK 6 AND 7 OF THIS 337 FORM. THIS EMPLOYEE DIDN'T HAVE TRAINING SHOWING HE HAD ANY EC-135-P2+ AIRFRAME BACKGROUND. WHEN QUESTIONING DOM HE STATED KIN MCDURMOT THEIR TRAINING PERSON HAD GONE OUT ON THIS INSTALL. MR. MCDURMOT CURRENTLY DOESN'T HAVE A AIRMAN CERTIFICATE. THE A&P DID HAVE A BACKGROUND IN OTHER MODELS AND WILL UPDATE HIS TRAINING RECORDS.</p>											
152.	NM11 200802988	UABR		NM11DCD	C	C	3775		08/07/2008		
<p>E961I (E-Air Agencies 961-Management I-Information) THE PTRS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REVOCATION CASE AGAINST AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, INC IS NM11200702963. THE CASE WAS CLOSED IN OUR OFFICE ON 10/22/2007 AND FORWARDED TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE FOR REVIEW. THE EIR CASE IS 2007NM110061. THE DATE OF THE CERTIFICATE REVOCATION WAS 4/29/2008. AFTER THE REPAIR STATION WAS REVOKED, A TEAM ASSIGNED BY ANM-230 PUT TOGETHER A CERTIFICATION TEAM TO RE CERTIFICATION THE SAME REPAIR STATION. THE TEAM LEADER WAS JARVIS L. CORCHRAM FROM THE PORTLAND OR FSDO. THE NEW CERTIFICATE WAS ISSUED ON MAY 29, 2008 AND AUTHORIZED THEM TO OPERATE AN APPROVED REPAIR STATION WITH LIMITED AIRFRAME AND LIMITED INSTRUMENT RATINGS. THE CERTIFICATION FOR NIGHT VISION GOGGLES WAS NOT REISSUED AS IT WAS ISSUED IN ERROR ON THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATION. ALL CERTIFICATES OF THE AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED, INC. CHIEF INSPECTOR WERE REVOKED AND REMAIN REVOKED TO THIS DATE. </p> <p> NOTE: THIS PTRS WAS DUE TO SUSPECTED UNAPPROVED PART-S20080424003 - AVIATION SPECIALTIES UNLIMITED INC.</p>											
153.	NM11 200800932	UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5654	145	07/25/2008		BOI
<p>E317I (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports I-Information) REVIEW OF A MAJOR ALTERATION FOUND THAT MANAGEMENT AS WELL AS EMPLOYEES DOWN TO THE TECHNICIAN LEVEL WERE UNCLEAR ABOUT THE REQUIREMENTS OF 14 CRF 145.205 AS WELL AS THE SAME REQUIREMENT IN THE REPAIR STATION MANUAL. </p> <p> A FOLLOW UP INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO VERIFY THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PUT INTO PLACE.</p>											
154.	NM11 200802792	UABR		NM11MKB	I	C	5605	145	07/17/2008		BOI
<p>E317I (E-Air Agencies 317-Records/Reports I-Information) SEVERAL AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED WERE IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE MADE. MANAGEMENT WAS RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEAS AND WILL PRESENT POSSIBLE OPTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.</p>											
155.	NM11 200802768	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5387	145	07/15/2008		
156.	NM11 200802770	UABR		NM11MKB	C	C	5375	145	07/15/2008		